

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

The Official Journal of the American Sociological Society

VOLUME 15

AUGUST, 1950

NUMBER 4

Editor

MAURICE R. DAVIE

Assistant Editors

GORDON W. BLACKWELL

PAUL H. LANDIS

HARRY ALPERT

WILLIAM H. SEWELL

CLARENCE GLICK

CLIFFORD KIRKPATRICK

Book Review Editor

STEPHEN W. REED

Editorial Staff

JOHN S. ELLSWORTHE, JR.

A. B. HOLLINGSHEAD

L. W. SIMMONS

JOHN SIRJAMAKI

Executive Officer

MATILDA WHITE RILEY

THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW is published at 450 Almai Street, Menasha, Wisconsin, bi-monthly in February, April, June, August, October and December. Copyright 1950 by the American Sociological Society.

★ Membership dues of the Society, including subscription, are \$8.00 per year. Subscription rate, \$5.00. Single issues, \$1.00. Postage is paid by the publishers in the United States and Canada; other countries, \$1.00 per year.

Contents

Social Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union: 1940-1950	ALEX INKELES	465
Polarities and the Impairment of Science	CLAUDE C. BOWMAN	480
International Cultural Relations	BYRON L. FOX	489
Shared Values in Complex Societies	DAVID F. ABERLE	495
The Neighborhood, Urban Ecology, and City Planners	RICHARD DEWEY	502
Functional Analysis of Sex Roles	MIRRA KOMAROVSKY	508
Age as a Factor in Marriage	PAUL C. GLICK AND EMANUEL LANDAU	517
The Rank Order of Sensitivity to Discriminations of Negroes in Columbus, Ohio	W. S. M. BANKS, II	529
Wartime Manpower Controls in Japan	EDGAR C. MC VOY	534

NOTES ON RESEARCH AND TEACHING

Some Methodological Problems in Social Work Research	ERNEST GREENWOOD AND FRED MASSARIK	546
Predicting Outcome of Adult Probationers in Wisconsin	J. L. GILLIN	550
Who Teaches Social Psychology?	WILLIAM BRUCE CAMERON, PHILIP LASLEY AND RICHARD DEWEY	553

COMMUNICATIONS AND OPINION

Comment on "Some Social Consequences of Atomic Power"	VINCENT H. WHITNEY	556
Max Weber versus Oliver C. Cox	HANS GERTH	557
In Defense of the <i>Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences</i>	ROBERT C. SORENSEN	558
A Correction		558

OFFICIAL REPORTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Report of the Committee on Nominations	559
Report of the Reorganization Committee	560

Editorial Offices
133 Hall of Graduate Studies
Yale University
New Haven, Conn.

Executive Office
Columbia University
427 West 117th Street
New York 27, N.Y.

Entered as second-class matter at the post office at Menasha, Wisconsin, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in the Act of February 23, 1925, embodied in paragraph 4, section 538, P.L. and R., authorized June 4, 1936.

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

OFFICERS FOR THE YEAR 1950

President, LEONARD S. COTTRELL, JR., Cornell University

First Vice-President, ROBERT K. MERTON, Columbia University

Second Vice-President, MARGARET JARMAN HAGOOD, Division of Farm Population and Rural Life

Secretary, JOHN W. RILEY, JR., Rutgers University

COMMITTEES

EXECUTIVE

LEONARD S. COTTRELL, JR.

ROBERT K. MERTON

MARGARET JARMAN HAGOOD

Former Presidents

KIMBALL YOUNG

CARL C. TAYLOR

LOUIS WIRTH

E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER

TALCOTT PARSONS

Elected at Large

MARGARET JARMAN HAGOOD

DONALD R. YOUNG

IRA DE A. REID

CONRAD TAEUBER

GORDON W. BLACKWELL

KINGSLEY DAVIS

Elected from Affiliated Societies

EDMUND DE S. BRUNNER

HARRINGTON C. BREARLEY

ALVIN GOOD

NORMAN HAYNER

JAMES M. REINHARDT

CECIL C. NORTH

PETER LEJINS

NATHAN L. WHETTEN

ADMINISTRATION

LEONARD S. COTTRELL, JR.

JOHN W. RILEY, JR.

MAURICE R. DAVIE

Elected by the Executive Committee

LOUIS WIRTH

CARL C. TAYLOR

NATHAN L. WHETTEN

NEWS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS

BOOK REVIEWS

Kuczynski: <i>Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire: Volumes I and II</i> . Irene B. Taeuber	569
Adorno, et al.: <i>The Authoritarian Personality</i> . Joseph H. Bunzel	571
Bettelheim and Janowitz: <i>Dynamics of Prejudice</i> . Joseph H. Bunzel	571
Ackerman and Jahoda: <i>Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder</i> . Joseph H. Bunzel	571
Inkeles: <i>Public Opinion in Soviet Russia</i> . N. S. Timasheff	573
Sansom: <i>The Western World and Japan</i> . John F. Embree	575
Lewis and Maude: <i>The English Middle Classes</i> . Jay Rumney	576

BOOK NOTES

United Nations: <i>Statistical Yearbook: 1948</i> . Harry R. Rudin	577
United Nations: <i>International Advisory Social Welfare Services</i> . Charles G. Chakerian	577
Klapper: <i>The Effects of Mass Media</i> . E. H. Volkart	577
Meriam, et al.: <i>The Cost and Financing of Social Security</i> . Charles G. Chakerian	578
Fink: <i>The Field of Social Work</i> (Revised edition). Charles G. Chakerian	578
Zahl: <i>Blindness</i> . Harry Best	578
Hiscock: <i>Community Health Organization</i> (Revised edition). Charles G. Chakerian	579
Fogarty: <i>Town and Country Planning</i> . John Sirjamaki	579
Davis: <i>Character Assassination</i> . E. H. Volkart	579
Ulrich, et al.: <i>Management Behavior and Foreman Attitude</i> . Raye Hudson	579
Goetz and Morley: <i>Popol Vuh</i> . John Biesanz	580
Bestor: <i>Backwoods Utopias</i> . John Sirjamaki	580

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

American SOCIOLOGICAL Review

August
1950

Volume 15
Number 4

The Official Journal of the American Sociological Society



SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND MOBILITY IN THE SOVIET UNION: 1940-1950*

ALEX INKELES†

Harvard University

IN INTRODUCING the new Soviet Constitution in 1936 Stalin stated that the Soviet population was divided into two major classes, the working class and the peasantry, and a third group, the intelligentsia, which as a genuflection in the direction of Marxian orthodoxy he called a *stratum*. The members of all three groups were defined as being "equal in rights" within Soviet society, and Stalin further asserted that under Soviet conditions the amount of social distance and the political and economic contradictions between the groups was diminishing and indeed was being obliterated.¹ Even as he made these declarations, however, the actual relations between and within the major social groups were moving in a very different direction under the impact of social forces which Stalin had himself largely set in motion in 1931.

For in that year, faced by severe problems in relation to the productivity of labor and an extraordinarily high rate of labor turn-

over under the First Five Year Plan,² Stalin launched an attack against "equality-mongering" and wage equalization and began a movement for personal incentive based on differential rewards. No working class in history had managed without its own intelligentsia, he asserted, and there were "no grounds for believing that the working class of the U.S.S.R. can manage without its own industrial and technical intelligentsia." There were in every shop and factory, furthermore, certain "leading groups" of skilled workers who are "the chief link in production." In consideration of these facts he called for an end to the "baiting of specialists" and its replacement by a new policy "of showing them greater attention and solicitude, displaying more boldness in enlisting their cooperation . . . (and) creating suitable conditions for them to work in, without stinting money for this purpose." In regard to the skilled workers, he ordered that they be treated to promotion to higher positions and to payment of higher levels of

* Expanded version of paper read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society held in New York, December 28-30, 1949.

† The author is indebted to the Russian Research Center of Harvard University, of which he is a Research Associate, for making available research assistance in the persons of Arnold Horelick and Hans Rogger.

¹ Joseph V. Stalin, *Voprosy Leninizma*, 11th ed., Moscow: Ogiz, 1940, pp. 510-512, 516.

² In 1930, for example the average number of workers engaged was 174 per cent and the average number who left jobs was 152 per cent of the total average in employment during the year. See Alexander Baykov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic System*, New York: Macmillan Company, 1947, p. 215. Also see Maurice Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development Since 1917*, New York: International Publishers, 1948, pp. 239-243.

wages, to "a system of payment which gives each worker his due according to his qualifications." The unskilled workers were to be given a similar "stimulus and the prospect of advancement" by this pattern of wage payments. And, Stalin affirmed, "the more boldly we do this the better."³

Rapidly implemented in the succeeding years, Stalin's campaign produced a series of new institutions for differential economic reward and strengthened those which existed only in rudimentary form: on the collective farms, the labor-day and the piecework system of payment; in industry, more precise gradings between the various skill categories, increasingly great spreads between the wages of the least skilled and the most skilled workers, and the extreme extension of the progressive piece-rate system; and in the case of managers and technicians, pay scales separate and distinct from those for workers, special "personal salaries," and bonuses taken out of the enterprises' profits.

As a result of these and related economic and political measures the Soviet Union possessed by 1940 an elaborately and precisely stratified status system within which at least ten major social-class groups could be distinguished for purposes of sociological analysis. Unfortunately, limits of space permit neither full description of each of the groups nor a detailed statement of the method by which they were delineated, and we must restrict ourselves here merely to enumerating them.⁴

³ See his speeches of February 4 and June 23, 1931 addressed to Soviet economic managers in J. Stalin, *Selected Writings*, New York: International Publishers, 1942, pp. 194-202 and 203-221.

⁴ The class structure of the Soviet Union has not yet been given adequate extended treatment in the sociological literature. Some brief general treatments of varying quality are available. See David Dallin, *The Real Soviet Russia*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947, pp. 108-226; Rudolph Schlesinger, *The Spirit of Post-War Russia*, London: Dennis Dobson, Ltd., 1947, pp. 21-47; Nicholas S. Timasheff, *The Great Retreat*, New York: E. P. Dutton, 1946, pp. 293-331; Julian Towster, *Political Power in the U.S.S.R., 1917-1947*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1948, pp. 313-343; A. Yugow, *Russia's Economic Front for War and Peace*, New York: Harper Brothers, 1942, pp. 220-245, 256-259.

The intelligentsia was actually divided into at least four sub-units:

1. The ruling élite, a small group consisting of high Party, government, economic, and military officials, prominent scientists, and selected artists and writers.

2. The superior intelligentsia, composed of the intermediary ranks of the categories mentioned above, plus certain important technical specialists.

3. The general intelligentsia, incorporating most of the professional groups, the middle ranks of the bureaucracy, managers of small enterprises, junior military officers, technicians, etc.

4. The white collar group, largely synonymous with the Soviet term for employees, which ranges from petty-bureaucrats through accountants and bookkeepers down to the level of ordinary clerks and office workers.

The working class was also markedly differentiated, incorporating:

1. The working class "aristocracy," that is, the most highly skilled and productive workers, in particular large numbers of the so-called Stakhanovites.

2. The rank and file workers, those in one of the lesser skill grades earning slightly above or below the average wage for all workers.

3. The disadvantaged workers, estimated to include as many as one-fourth of the labor force, whose low level of skill and lack of productivity or initiative kept them close to the minimum wage level.

The peasantry, although relatively homogeneous, also was divided into distinguishable sub-groups:

1. The well-to-do peasants, consisting of those particularly advantaged by virtue of the location, fertility, or crop raised by their collective farms—i.e., those living on the so-called "millionaire" farms—and those whose trade, skill, or productivity pushes them into the higher income brackets even on the less prosperous farms.

2. The average peasant, shading off into the least productive or poor peasant groups.

There was, in addition, a residual group of those in forced labor camps who are really outside the formal class structure, although

available reports indicate that these camps have an internal class structure of their own which derives its main lines from the class structure of the society as a whole.

The sequence in which the subgroups are listed above may be taken as reflecting their rank order within each of the three major categories, but this does not apply to the list as a whole. The rank order within the structure as a whole appears to be as follows: ruling élite (1); superior intelligentsia (2); general intelligentsia (3); working class aristocracy (4); white collar (5.5); well-to-do peasants (5.5); average workers (7); average peasants (8.5); disadvantaged workers (8.5); forced labor (10). It must be recognized, however, that the complexity of the structure and the degree of variation within each of the subgroups was such as to make any such rank ordering a very rough approximation. In addition, this type of rank ordering does not reflect the actual degree of social distance between strata.

Membership in any one of these major social-class groups⁵ was predominantly determined on the basis of a complex of conditions, of which occupation, income, and the possession of power and authority were the main elements. Thus, the system was essentially based on differences in the functions performed by individuals in the productive process, the administrative apparatus, and the power structure rather than on either hereditary and semi-hereditary factors, which were primary in defining social position in Tsarist Russia, or on ideological considerations, which predominantly determined the stratification patterns during the earlier years of the Soviet regime.

Yet while these divisions were essentially economic and functional, the evaluation of the different occupations was markedly affected by cultural factors, such as the tradi-

tional tendency to rate brain work above physical labor. The strength of such tendencies, inadvertently strengthened by the regime itself,⁶ is strikingly reflected in the following criticism directed at Soviet parents:

Many of us are to blame for spoiling our children, asking them when they are still in rompers, "What do you want to be when you grow up?" and falling into raptures at their answers—an academician, a ballerina, or something else of that sort. And now these same children are called upon to be steel smelters, rolling mill operators, forge hands—dirty, hot, and hard jobs.⁷

Furthermore, despite the fact that the range of income and special privilege available to each of the major groups was fairly distinct, there was a significant degree of overlapping. Thus, an appreciable number of workers and peasants had incomes on the average higher than those of large segments of the white collar group and in some cases equaling the incomes of many individuals in the general and even in the superior intelligentsia.⁸ Highly skilled workers, particularly

* Both because of its desire to capitalize on the promise of social mobility for all strata of the population, and because of the extreme need for technically competent personnel created by the expansion of the economy, Soviet propaganda in the 'thirties glorified the status of the professionally trained. The consequences of such emphasis were apparently far from fully foreseen by the leaders. Note the comment of the late President Kalinin: "Formerly we educated people to become intellectuals and not persons doing physical labor. I personally consider this incorrect, since in our state the majority of the population is, after all, occupied in physical labor." Quoted in *Oktjabr*, No. 10, 1944, p. 119.

⁷ A. Loginov, "Young Complements of the Working Class," *Oktjabr*, No. 10, 1944, pp. 120-121, quoted in Philip R. Lever, the "State Labor Reserves System of the Soviet Union," unpublished M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1948.

⁸ See Abram Bergson, *The Structure of Soviet Wages*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946, *passim*, and William Schumer, "Incomes of Selected Professions in the U.S.S.R." unpublished M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1948. Unfortunately, both of these works deal only with the period up to the mid-thirties, after which the dispersion of incomes within and between particular occupations generally increased. For comments on later developments see: Gregory Bienstock, S. M. Schwarz, and A. Yugow, *Management in Russian Industry and Agriculture*,

⁵ The term "social-class group" as used here represents a composite, based on the criteria used by Max Weber to distinguish "economic class" and "social status group." See *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, 1946, pp. 180-195; *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, 1947, pp. 424-429.

the Stakhanovites, were also granted greater privileges in the access to scarce goods and services—especially under rationing—and were awarded more formal prestige and status by the regime than most ordinary employees. Finally, the major groupings based on income and power had begun to develop fairly definitive styles of life, to elaborate differential patterns of association, and to manifest varying degrees of group-consciousness.

As a result of these conditions the component social-class groups were enmeshed in a complicated system of inter-relationships producing a pattern of social stratification which was certainly not as simple as Stalin's description of it. Neither did it conform to some of the descriptions of it in Western literature on the U.S.S.R. in which the error was frequently made of placing all Party members—regardless of income, power, or prestige—at the head of the social hierarchy, or of assuming that the divisions between the *occupational* groups were so sharp and distinct that all employees ranked above all workers, and all workers above all peasants.

Although a relatively precise system of social stratification had been elaborated by 1940, this system was the product of a recent and enormous shifting of population into the newly developed positions opened up as a result of the expansion of the national economy under the industrialization and collectivization programs from 1928 on. It is to be noted that while the total number of workers and employees more than doubled in roughly the first decade of the Plans,⁹ the size of the intelligentsia increased at the striking rate of 3.8 times between 1926 and 1937. In the same period the number of responsible managers of large and small scale enterprises increased by 4.6 times, and other categories showed even more marked expansion—the number of engineers and architects being 7.9

Oxford University Press, 1944, pp. 91-95, 163-169; Baykov, *op. cit.*, pp. 339-350; Dobb, *op. cit.*, pp. 424-429; Naum Jasny, *The Socialized Agriculture of the U.S.S.R.*, Stanford University Press, 1949, pp. 688-705.

⁹ *Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitel'stvo Soyusa SSR, 1933-1938*, Moscow: Gosplanizdat, 1939, p. 20.

times, and the number of scientific workers (including professors) being 5.9 times greater in 1937 than in 1926. In the case of agriculture alone some 580,000 positions, almost all newly created, were filled by collective farm chairmen and their deputies.¹⁰

Comparable opportunities for advancement became available at other levels as the changes in the socio-economic and political structure created a demand for enormous numbers of lower managerial personnel, semi-professionals, and skilled workers. During 1938, for example, the program for giving initial and refresher training for those in industry and allied fields encompassed 6,580,500 people outside of the universities and secondary schools. The great bulk (5,418,000) were enrolled in "courses" designed to impart rudimentary industrial skills, but almost 300,000 were training to be foremen and Stakhanovites. Similarly in the field of agriculture, 1,211,387 persons completed brief training courses during 1937 and 1938 to qualify for positions as combine operators, mechanics, veterinary assistants, field brigade leaders, etc.¹¹

A description of mobility in this period must, finally, give attention to the marked changes in the position of women in the Soviet Union. The proportion which women constituted of the total labor force increased from 28 per cent in 1928 to 38 per cent in 1938,¹² which meant that the absolute number of women workers and employees was more than doubled. Throughout this period women comprised a large part, in some cases over half, of the students at industrial training schools,¹³ and as a result they came to

¹⁰ K. Seleznev, "On the New Soviet Intelligentsia," *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, No. 13, 1939, p. 40. *XVIII S'ezd Vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii*, Stenographic Report, Moscow: Ogiz, 1939, pp. 309-310.

¹¹ *Kul'turnoe Stroitel'stvo SSSR*, Moscow: Gosplanizdat, 1940, pp. 136, 138.

¹² *Planovoe Khozyaistvo*, No. 10, 1939, p. 114. This increase was not bought cheaply. Women worked very largely because of the need to supplement family income. Despite considerable strides in the provision of creches, kindergartens, and communal services, the available resources were far from enabling women to work without extreme hardships arising from their continuing responsibilities as wives and mothers.

represent a significant proportion of the skilled workers in Soviet industry.¹³ Their advance in fields requiring higher training was even more impressive. Between 1928 and 1938 the proportion of women in the universities increased from 28 per cent to 43 per cent, and from 37 per cent to 51 per cent in the specialized secondary schools.¹⁴ The effect of this upward movement was reflected in the fact that they constituted about 40 per cent of all specialists in the Soviet Union before the war.¹⁵ The shifts in the rural regions were no less striking, as large numbers of women assumed positions of responsibility and skill on the collective farms.¹⁶

Thus it may be said that on the eve of the war decade the Soviet Union possessed virtually a completely open class system, characterized by a high degree of mobility. This mobility was created predominantly by the tremendous expansion of the national economy, but was given additional impetus by the high rate of natural attrition accompanying the revolutionary process, by the de-classing—and in part physical elimination—of major portions of the former upper and middle classes, and by a political system

which periodically removed large numbers of people from responsible positions by means of the *chistka* or purge.

* * *

The war decade must be recognized as having provided an extreme test of the stability and solidity of the system of stratification existing in 1940. For on the two former occasions when the Soviet Union had experienced extensive social upheaval and strain there had been a marked tendency for the society to move away from stratification towards social equalization and the elimination of economic class differences.¹⁷ This tendency was most evident in the period of War Communism from 1918 to 1921, and was perhaps best reflected in the fact that in the latter year the wages of the most skilled workers were only 102 per cent of those of the least skilled workers, that is, they were in effect equal.¹⁸ A similar tendency, although less marked, was manifested during the early turbulent years of the First Plan. In industry this took most concrete form in the tendencies towards wage equalization which Stalin later fought. And in agriculture it was apparent in the tremendous levelling effect of the forced collectivization, which swept away the entire stratum of rich peasants or *kulaks* along with many of the middle peasants, and reduced the remainder to the common, and initially relatively impoverished, status of collective farm members.

In sharp contrast, during the war years the system of stratification was in no major respect subjected by the Communist leaders to measures designed to press equalization

¹³ In 1941, for example, women constituted 32 per cent of the electricians in electrical sub-stations, 29 per cent of the machine molders, and 27 per cent of the compressor operators. It is important to note that they were represented as well in occupations most unsuited for women, being 17 per cent of the stevedores and 6 per cent of the steamboiler stokers. N. Voznesensky, *The Economy of the U.S.S.R. During World War II*, Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1948, p. 66.

¹⁴ *Kul'turnoe Stroitel'stvo*, p. 113.

¹⁵ By 1949 women constituted 44 per cent of all specialists in the Soviet Union. The pre-war percentage was, of course, somewhat lower. *Izvestiya*, March 8, 1949.

¹⁶ In addition to providing concrete opportunities for training and advancement, the collective farm introduced a more general and far-reaching change in the position of women. For under the labor-day system of payment each woman is paid directly for her work, rather than having the rewards for her labor go into the general family funds through the person of her husband or father. Sir John Maynard regarded this change as having produced one of the fundamental social sources of support for the regime, by putting the village women "on the side of the Soviets." *Russia in Flux*, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948, pp. 399-400.

¹⁷ This applied, of course, only in regard to those segments of the population considered eligible for membership in the new society, especially workers and poor peasants. The policy in regard to the former so-called "possessing classes" was not merely to equalize but to eliminate them. The old technical and administrative intelligentsia were associated with the possessing classes in this respect; but since they could not be destroyed without irreparable loss to the society, the initial goal in their case was the more limited one of declassing them and bringing them to the same or even a lower status level than workers or peasants.

¹⁸ Baykov, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

and to erase the lines of stratification. On the contrary, almost all of the war-time measures respected the major pre-war lines of demarcation. This applied in the realm of monetary rewards; in the structure and operation of the rationing system, particularly through the use of "closed stores" open only to specified segments of the population; in the application of differential patterns for evacuating populations from threatened areas, and so on.

Not only did the system of stratification demonstrate its durability during the war years, but there was an intensification of the process of lending greater precision to the lines of division and of more fully formalizing and institutionalizing the differences between the major social-class groups. This was most strikingly indicated, indeed it was symbolized, by the regulations established to govern the award of the most important military decorations created during the war. For the first time in Soviet history it was provided by law that certain awards such as the Order of Victory, formally defined as the highest Soviet military decoration, was to be granted only to commanding personnel of highest rank, and so on through the hierarchy of military command down to such medals as the Orders of Glory, which were awarded only to junior officers and enlisted personnel.¹⁹ This was in marked contrast to the conditions for granting the military awards in existence before the war, such as the Order of the Red Banner, granted without distinction to the rank and file, officers, and high commanding personnel alike.²⁰

Thus, the Soviet regime has adopted the principle that recognition and reward are to be determined not only by the *extent* of a man's contribution beyond the call of duty, but also by the *status* he held when he made this contribution. A comparable development occurred with the creation in 1939 of special

¹⁹ For a description of the major decorations created during the war (up to 1944) and the conditions for their award, see *Sbornik Zakonov SSSR: Uzakaz Presidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR 1938-1944*, Moscow: 1945, pp. 260-286.

²⁰ *Malaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya*, Moscow: Ogiz, 1938, Vol. 7, p. 767.

"Stalin Prizes" for outstanding contributions in the arts, sciences, and industry. The prizes are awarded annually to as many as a thousand persons, and range from 50,000 to 300,000 rubles in cash.²¹ Ordinary citizens, of course, have very slight chances of qualifying for awards in the arts and sciences, but even in the case of prizes granted for inventions and fundamental improvements in production methods there is almost no representation of the rank and file worker or even of the lower ranks of industrial management such as foremen.²²

Perhaps even more striking has been the recent practice of providing large cash grants and substantial annuities for the widows and heirs of prominent Soviet officials, scientists, and artists. To choose some examples more or less at random: the wife of Peoples' Artist of the U.S.S.R., A. V. Aleksandrov, was given 50,000 rubles and a personal pension of 750 rubles per month, and his son Yuri a pension of 750 rubles per month until completion of his higher education; the widow of Lt. General of Engineering Troops D. M. Karbyshev was granted a pension of 1,000 rubles a month, and his daughter and son each 700 rubles per month until the completion of their education.²³ No instances are known to this writer of comparable grants made to persons of lesser social rank who made outstanding contributions at the level of *their* occupational skill.

A second major development which tended further to formalize the distinctions between the major social groupings was the adoption of a series of laws which placed several millions of Soviet citizens in civilian uniforms. At the present time all officials and responsi-

²¹ For the decree which initially established the Prizes, then limited to 100,000 rubles, see *Pravda*, December 21, 1939.

²² Of 121 awards made in 1948 for inventions and fundamental improvements in production methods, only 4 went to persons with the rank of foreman and below—to a shepherd, a chief drill master, two foremen, and in one case "the workers of the plant." In each instance, the prize was given *jointly* to these persons and to a man of higher rank—engineer, director of the plant, senior scientist, etc. Based on the notice of awards published in *Pravda*, July 3, 1948.

²³ *Pravda*, August 17, 1948.

ble personnel, and in some cases rank and file employees and workers, in the railway and river transport systems, in the coal and iron ore industries, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Procuracy, as well as students in State Labor Reserves Schools, must wear either uniforms—which vary in quality, color, and style according to the status of the wearer—or distinctive insignia of rank in the form of collar tabs and sleeve markings similar to the insignia worn by military personnel.²⁴ The main reason stated for this innovation was its importance for improving discipline and increasing the authority of those in positions of responsibility,²⁵ which is itself significant. But this was not simply a wartime emergency measure since in the majority of cases the decision to adopt this system came near the end or after the formal cessation of hostilities, and there has been no indication that a shift in policy is forthcoming.

The fact that large numbers of Soviet citizens now wear insignia of rank formally designating their position in the hierarchy of income, power, and prestige, must be recognized as giving the most direct, formal, and official sanction to a precise system of social stratification. Thus, in effect, the Bolshevik leaders have restored to the Soviet Union the system of *chin*, or formal civil service ranks, which was a central aspect of the Tsarist system of social differentiation and had traditionally been treated by the Bolsheviks as one of the paramount symbols of class exploitation and stratification.²⁶ In addition, the insignia of rank will probably

serve as a focus around which informal patterns for demanding and giving social deference will develop, and this in turn may be expected to go far in institutionalizing the existing system of stratification.

A third major development was the removal of several economic restrictions which formerly tended to exert an equalizing influence. Among the more striking measures was the abolition of the inheritance tax, in force since 1926, which had provided for taxes graded progressively according to the size of an estate up to 90 per cent of its total value. Under the new law only a governmental registration fee is collected and this fee may not exceed more than 10 per cent of the estate's valuation.²⁷

This new inheritance law must be seen in the context of the Soviet personal income tax structure. Under the scale established in 1943 progressive rates are applied only up to the level of 1,000 rubles of income per month, with a single flat rate of 13 per cent for all earnings beyond that point. Thus, a man earning 6,000 rubles per year would pay 5.2 per cent of that sum as income tax, whereas a man earning 60,000 rubles, or ten times the approximate average annual wage in industry, would pay only 12 per cent of his earnings.²⁸ Incomes of 60,000 rubles per year are by now common in certain segments of the population, and are frequently greatly exceeded. It is significant, for example, that the income tax law of 1940 included provisions

²⁴ For examples see *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta*, 1943, 22, 32, 39; *Pravda*, September 5, 12, 24, 1947.

²⁵ See, for example, the quotation from the 1945 text on *Soviet Administrative Law* cited by V. Gsovski, *Soviet Civil Law*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Law School, 2 Vols., Vol. I, p. 144. Also see the *Information Bulletin*, Embassy of the U.S.S.R., Washington, D.C., Nov. 7, 1943, pp. 33-37.

²⁶ The first major shift in Soviet policy in this respect came with the restoration of regular military ranks in the Soviet armed forces in 1935. See Gsovski, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-143. Special significance, however, attaches to the extension of this practice to status groups in civil life, and particularly to restoration of the term *chin*.

²⁷ *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, 1943, No. 3. See V. Gsovski, "Family and Inheritance in Soviet Law," *The Russian Review*, 1947, Vol. 7, No. 1.

²⁸ A. K. Suchkova (ed.) *Dokhody Gosudarstvennogo Byudzhetu SSSR*, Moscow: Gosfinizdat, 1945, pp. 133-136; K. N. Plotnikov, *Byudzhet Sotsialisticheskogo Gosudarstva*, Leningrad: Gosfinizdat, 1948, pp. 278-282. The new tax law of 1943, in comparison with the previous law, actually provided slight tax relief for those in the lower brackets and a slight increase in the rates for the upper brackets. The striking fact about the law was that it continued in force a tax system involving only the most modest progression in rates for higher income brackets. This pattern was set in the early thirties at a time when there were relatively few incomes over 600 rubles per month, and the general income spread was relatively slight.

for a special tax on incomes in excess of 300,000 rubles made by writers, actors, and other artists.²⁹ Finally, it must be noted that the large special awards such as the Stalin Prizes are tax free, as is the total income of those who hold such awards as Hero of the Soviet Union and Hero of Socialist Labor,³⁰ categories which include many of the country's high income earners.

Since only certain groups—such as the ruling élite, the superior intelligentsia, the highly skilled workers, and some *kolkhoz* members³¹—are capable of accumulating large sums of money, these laws act further to reinforce the stratification system. They do so by protecting large income differentials during the life of the earners,³² and by providing families with the means to maintain their socio-economic position for protracted periods after the death of the head of the household.

As a fourth point here, brief notice must be given to shifts in the relations to the power structure of the various social-class

²⁹ V. P. D'yachenko (ed.), *Finansy i Kredit SSSR*, Moscow: Gosfinizdat, 1940, p. 321.

³⁰ Plotnikov, *op. cit.*, p. 281.

³¹ Special income tax provisions (and inheritance laws) govern peasants on the collective farms. Major segments of the peasantry accumulated very large sums of cash holdings during the recent war through the sale of extremely scarce food products. It was largely to prevent this money from flooding the consumers goods market that the monetary reform of 1947 was carried out. See B. Alexandrov, "The Soviet Currency Reform," *The Russian Review*, Jan., 1949, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 56-61.

³² Probably of even greater significance than the modest direct income tax in protecting existing income differentials is the Soviet system of indirect taxation. The turnover tax—not seen by the consumer since it is included in the price—is levied primarily on consumption goods, about 85 per cent of the collections in 1940 being derived from food and textile products. The importance of this tax is clear when it is recognized that it regularly accounts for about 60 per cent of the total budget receipts of the government and that this budget, unlike those in most countries, includes almost all of the nation's allocations for new industrial capital investment in the coming year. Its impact on personal income is highlighted by the fact that it represents from 50 to 80 per cent of the selling price of most mass consumption items. It appears to be, in its social effect, a regressive tax. Yugow, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-138. For an opposing view see Dobb, *op. cit.*, pp. 360-374.

groups. The 18th Communist Party Congress in 1939 placed members of the intelligentsia on an equal footing with workers and peasants seeking to enter the Party, and in fact since that time the Party has given first priority to the enrollment of intellectuals.³³ This shift in the value system and in the practice of the Communist leaders was also reflected more subtly in the manner in which they evaluated the contribution to the war effort of each of the major social groups. The intelligentsia were at all times given full credit for at least an equal share in the victory, and indeed were at times assigned a foremost role.

* * *

Just as the system of social stratification emerged essentially intact from this period so did the fact of high social mobility. Indeed, severe wartime personnel losses vacated many positions and thus created new opportunities for advancement. In addition, the restoration of the devastated economy and the further program of expansion undertaken in the Fourth Five-Year Plan have encouraged relatively rapid mobility. It is perhaps sufficient to indicate that by 1946 the number of students in higher educational institutions had reached the pre-war levels, after having fallen to about a third of the former enrollment during the early part of the war, and a large expansion beyond that point has been undertaken.

Yet, it must also be stated that during the war decade forces were set in motion which may in time act seriously to restrict social mobility and to transform the present pattern of stratification into a much more closed class system. There are at least five such developments which deserve mention here.

1. **Restrictions on access to educational opportunities:** On October 2, 1940 the Soviet government simultaneously introduced a labor draft of up to one million youths per

³³ See B. Moore, Jr., "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union: 1928-1944," *American Sociological Review*, IX (June, 1944), 267-278; Merle Fainsod, "Postwar Role of the Communist Party," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 263 (May, 1944), 20-32.

year between the ages of fourteen and seventeen for training as industrial workers,³⁴ and tuition fees at higher schools and for the last three years of secondary education.³⁵ Both laws continue in effect and appear to be intended for extended operation.

In terms of human freedom, the state labor-reserves draft serves to restrict the right of millions of Soviet youths to choose their occupation and place of work,³⁶ and the fee system was certainly a departure from standard Soviet practice and ideology—the original decree being in violation of the explicit provisions of the Constitution, since amended to eliminate the discrepancy.³⁷ But specification of the implications of these measures for social mobility must be approached with caution, and certainly the evidence does not support sweeping assertions, such as have been made, that these measures introduce hereditary social status into the Soviet system.

The 1st-bor draft, for example, places prime emphasis on those not attending school, and

³⁴ *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, 1940, No. 37. The initial decree provided for the drafting of boys only, but a later decree of June 10, 1947 provided as well for the drafting of girls in the 15-18 age group, and extended the age of eligible males up to and including 19 years.

³⁵ The following fees were established: for the eighth through the tenth grades of regular secondary and specialized (*tekhnikum*) secondary schools—200 rubles per year in Moscow, Leningrad, and capital cities of union republics, 150 rubles elsewhere; for higher educational institutions—400 rubles per year in Moscow, Leningrad, etc., 300 rubles elsewhere. Students at higher schools for the study of art, music, and the theater must pay 500 rubles. Students studying through correspondence courses pay half fees, as do those studying at comparable night schools. *Sobranie Postanovlenii i Rasporyazhenii Pravitel'stva SSSR*, 1940, No. 27, Sect. 637; 1940, No. 29, Sect. 608.

³⁶ For a description of the structure and functioning of the system see Philip R. Lever, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

³⁷ Article 121 of the 1936 (Stalin) Constitution had provided for "free education, including higher education." (*Konstitutsiya Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik*, Moscow, 1938, p. 87). It was amended by the Supreme Soviet on Feb. 25, 1947, to read: "free education, up to and including the seventh grade. . ." *Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, Moscow, 1947 (in English).

is in part designed to get rural youths off the farms into industry.³⁸ Although most of these youths undoubtedly come from families low in the social-class hierarchy, there is no reason to believe that they would have been upward mobile even if not drafted as industrial laborers. Indeed, the training they receive may increase their opportunities for mobility. Graduates of the six-month factory training schools, for example, are given a skill rating in the third or fourth category, and those from the two-year craft and railway schools are placed in the relatively high fourth to sixth skill categories.³⁹ Thus, the graduates of these schools are placed at a distinct advantage over unskilled workers entering Soviet industry without training. They are, in addition, trained free of charge, provided with room, board, and clothing, and may receive some small cash payment for the value of the goods produced during their training.⁴⁰

As for the tuition fees, it must be recognized that admittance to higher educational institutions remains on the basis of uniform, nation-wide competitive examinations. The law specifies that those with the highest grades among the examinees shall be selected for admission, and that those not accepted in the field in which they took their examination may be admitted to fill vacancies in higher schools in related fields. Students with grades of distinction in their secondary school work are admitted without examination. Persons who served in the recent war are admitted directly, i.e., on a non-competitive basis, so long as they receive a passing grade on the examinations.⁴¹

³⁸ For relevant citations and discussion see Lever, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-45.

³⁹ *Bolshevik*, Nos. 7-8, April, 1943, p. 21, cited by Lever, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

⁴⁰ Order No. 1, Chief Administration of Labor Reserves under the Council of Peoples Commissars, Article 17, provided that one-third of the funds received for goods and services produced by the schools should be paid to the students. *Izvestiya*, October 5, 1940.

⁴¹ Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) and the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the U.S.S.R., of July 11, 1940, No. 1228; Instruction of the Ministry of Higher Education of the U.S.S.R. of February 25,

Students in higher and specialized secondary schools who earn "good" grades, and this apparently includes almost 80 per cent of the total,⁴² are granted stipends by the government. The stipends are graded according to the type of institution attended and the student's year of study, with a bonus of 25 per cent for those with excellent grades in all subjects. Thus, students receiving the smallest sums, e.g. those in the first year of a secondary school for teacher training, can pay the cost of the full year's tuition with two of their monthly stipend payments; a senior in a major university, such as one for training transport engineers, can cover the full cost of a year's tuition with one monthly payment of his stipend if he makes excellent grades.⁴³ In addition, students from many of the national minority groups in several of the union-republics are exempt from tuition payments,⁴⁴ as are those students with good or excellent grades who can prove that they are "needy."⁴⁵ The stipends, furthermore, are

1947. *Vysshaya Shkola*, Moscow, 1948, pp. 81-86.

⁴² Since September 1, 1948, stipends are granted only to students who have either excellent or good grades, with the exception of those in certain important schools, such as those for mining and metallurgy, in which all passing students receive stipends. In 1946 S. Kaftanov, Minister of Higher Education, reported that more than 78 per cent of the students had passed all their courses with grades of "good" or better. Previously, with the exception of the war years, 1940-43, stipends had been granted on a more liberal basis, being given to all with "passing grades. This change has meant some reduction in the number receiving stipends, since in 1939 90.6 per cent of all students in higher schools received them. *Byulleten' Ministerstva Vysshego Obrazovaniya SSSR*, No. 10, October, 1948, p. 7; *Vestnik Vysshhei Shkoli*, No. 11-12, 1946, p. 2; *Vysshaya Shkola*, p. 496; *Kul'turnoe Stroitel'stvo*, p. 115.

⁴³ Students in most secondary schools receive from 80 rubles per month in the first year to 140 in the fourth. In particularly important transport and industrial *tehnikaums* the rates are from 125 to 200 rubles per month. In most higher schools the basic rates range from 140 rubles for the first year to 210 in the fifth, whereas the rates at the most important industrial and transport higher training institutes range from 210 to 315 rubles per month. *Vysshaya Shkola*, pp. 496-497.

⁴⁴ For the relevant decisions of the Council of Peoples' Commissars see *Vysshaya Shkola*, pp. 554-555.

⁴⁵ Decision of the Committee on Higher Schools

not subject to income tax.⁴⁶ Finally, legal provision is made for low cost rooms and meals.⁴⁷ As a result, the stipends should enable many students to cover a very large part of the costs of their education independent of their parents' financial resources.

These reservations being made, however, it still seems justified to conclude that the fee system and the labor draft act to a significant degree to restrict the mobility of some and to facilitate maintenance of status of others. The labor draft, for example, is conducted on a very large scale involving a significant proportion of the eligible youths. Nine hundred thousand boys and girls were to graduate annually from the labor-reserves schools during the years of the post-war Fourth Five-Year Plan, and they were expected to account for two-thirds of the anticipated increase in the labor force during the Plan years. The youths called up are regarded as "mobilized," and are subject to penalties of up to a year of forced labor for desertion from the school or gross violation of labor discipline while in training. And upon graduation they must work for a period of four years at an enterprise designated by the state.⁴⁸

Undoubtedly some segment of this group which might otherwise have gone on to further schooling will find its chance for upward mobility seriously reduced, if not effectively cut off because of the accident of the draft. This remains true despite the fact that a special system of schools for working youths was developed after 1943 to permit those whose education was interrupted by the war, and of course those drafted into the State Labor Reserves, to complete their secondary educa-

under the Council of Peoples' Commissars, October 12, 1940, No. 857, *Vysshaya Shkola*, p. 548.

⁴⁶ Plotnikov, *op. cit.*, p. 281. This applies on amounts up to and including 210 rubles per month.

⁴⁷ Dormitory fees (including bedding) are 7 rubles per month for students at secondary schools, and 15 rubles per month for those at higher educational institutions. In 1938 the proportion of all students living in dormitories at higher schools and *tehnikaums* for training specialists (industrial, transport, and agricultural) ranged from 56 to 80 per cent. See *Vysshaya Shkola*, p. 537; *Kul'turnoe Stroitel'stvo*, p. 127.

⁴⁸ See Lever, *op. cit., passim*.

tion. Instruction in these schools is apparently free. There are forty-four weeks in the school year, with sixteen hours of class instruction and four hours of consultation in each week. Similar schools are established for working peasant youths. Students at the end of the seventh year (incomplete secondary) and those at the end of the tenth year (complete secondary) classes may obtain fifteen and twenty days of leave with pay, respectively, in which to prepare for the nationwide matriculation examinations. If they perform successfully their certificate has equal weight with the diploma from regular secondary schools. These students are at an obvious disadvantage, however, since their instruction is very limited in time, and since they must continue to carry virtually a full time job in production while attending school.⁴⁹ And the youths so affected are most likely to be from families of lower social-class standing because of the operation of the fee system, the labor draft, and other factors not touched on in this paper.

Similarly, there is no doubt that the fee system will place some segment of the eligible youth at a disadvantage in obtaining a higher education in competition with other youths of only equal or even inferior aptitude whose parents can spare the loss of their earning power, support them, and provide them with the money to pay the fees. It is significant that of the students who dropped out of higher schools in the Russian Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) between the school year 1940-41, during which the fees were introduced, and 1942-43, some 20 per cent left due to "the sifting out in connection with the introduction of fees for tuition and the changes in the method of allotting stipends."⁵⁰ Although the system for allocating stipends was liberalized once again after 1943,⁵¹ and although the magnitude of the percentage of withdrawals given above was undoubtedly af-

fected by wartime financial strains,⁵² there is no mistaking the initial impact of the introduction of the fee system.

But beyond this direct effect, the tuition fees act more subtly to permit a class influence on that type of social mobility which is based on the acquisition of higher education. Although the tuition fees are the same for regular (academic) and technical or specialized secondary schools, no stipends are granted to students in the academic secondary schools.⁵³ Under Soviet law graduates of academic secondary schools are permitted to enter higher schools directly if they qualify. But only 5 per cent of the graduates of the technical and specialized secondary schools are permitted to do so, the remainder being obliged to spend three years "in production" as technicians, teachers, etc., according to their speciality.⁵⁴ Thus of those entering higher schools in 1938, 58.8 per cent came from regular secondary schools, 12.9 per cent from technical and specialized secondary schools, and 22.9 per cent from the *rabfak* (workers' faculty), i.e., special schools for preparing working and peasant youths and adults whose education had been interrupted for admission to higher educational establishments.⁵⁵ The *rabfak* appears to have gone out of existence during the war, and has apparently been replaced by special secondary schools for working urban and peasant

stipends. In 1943 the pre-war system of granting the stipends to all students who made passing grades was restored. See fn. 42 above. *Pravda*, October 3, 1940, *Vysshaya Shkola*, p. 496.

⁵⁰ In the first war year in the Russian Republic 130,000 students, almost half of the enrollment in higher schools and teachers' institutes in the R.S.F.S.R., withdrew for various reasons. In the school year 1943-44, as judged by a small sample of the schools, 26 per cent of the enrollment, then much reduced, left the schools. Of these only 2.5 per cent were dismissed for non-payment of fees or left for reasons of their "material conditions," and 11.3 per cent because of family obligations other than illness in the family. *Narodnoe Obrazovanie v RSFSR v 1943 gody*, p. 42. *Narodnoe Obrazovanie v RSFSR v 1944 gody*, p. 72.

⁵¹ *Vysshaya Shkola*, pp. 496-497.

⁵² Those who have served three years on active military duty may substitute such service for the requirement. *Vysshaya Shkola*, p. 83.

⁵³ *Kul'turnoe Stroitel'stvo*, p. 127.

⁴⁹ *Narodnoe Obrazovanie* (compiled by A. M. Danev), Moscow: Uchpedgiz, 1948, pp. 247-265.

⁵⁰ *Narodnoe Obrazovanie v RSFSR v 1943 gody* (Otchet Narodnogo Komissariata Prosvetshcheniya RSFSR), Moscow, 1944, p. 42.

⁵¹ In October, 1940, it was provided that only students making excellent progress should receive

youths described above. Students from the less well-to-do homes are obviously more likely to gravitate toward the technical and specialized secondary schools to become eligible for the stipends.⁵⁶ In 1938 for example the social composition of the students in technical and specialized secondary schools was as follows: workers and their children 27.1 per cent; employees, specialists and their children, 16.1 per cent; collective farmers and their children, 49.8 per cent; and others, 7 per cent. A comparable distribution for the regular secondary schools is unfortunately not available, but these figures will be seen to differ sharply from the social composition of the student body in higher educational establishments as given below.⁵⁷ It would appear, therefore, that there is a much higher probability that students from less well-to-do homes will find their attendance at a higher school long postponed, if not put off indefinitely, while their age mates from richer homes are pursuing their higher education.⁵⁸

2. Changes in the inheritance taxes: The new inheritance and income tax laws, mentioned above, when combined with the fact that some members of Soviet society now earn cash incomes of up to 100,000 rubles—quite apart from the valuable services they may obtain free, such as assignment to a desirable apartment or the use of an automobile—make it possible for some families to have large sums of cash savings.⁵⁹ Such sav-

⁵⁶ There is, of course, a "cultural" factor operating here as well. Students of parents in the intelligentsia are more likely to be oriented in childhood toward the academic secondary schools, and are more likely to be better qualified to pursue such courses.

⁵⁷ *Kul'turnoe Stroitel'stvo*, p. 114.

⁵⁸ It appears that of those graduating from the regular or academic secondary schools about 75 of 100 graduates succeed in entering higher schools, but of the graduates of the specialized secondary schools only 13 of 100 are able to go on. Estimates based on data given in *Kul'turnoe Stroitel'stvo*, pp. 109, 111-112, 127.

⁵⁹ In 1935, the last year on which adequate data has been published by the Soviet government, 64 per cent of all depositors had savings accounts of below 25 rubles, and these represented less than 6 per cent of the value of all deposits; in contrast, less than 3 per cent of all depositors had accounts of more than 1,000 rubles, but these represented almost 43 per cent

ings receive interest at the rate of 3 per cent, or 5 per cent if deposited for fixed terms, and this interest is not treated as income for tax purposes.⁶⁰ In addition, families may accumulate significant quantities of physical property in the form of houses,⁶¹ and household and personal goods, easily convertible to liquid assets because of the Soviet goods scarcity. Although this fact does not necessarily restrict the upward mobility of other individuals, it does to some degree prevent or forestall the downward mobility of some individuals whose earning power would reduce them to a much lower standard of living if they were dependent on it alone.

3. The tendency to make access to certain desirable statuses dependent at least in part on birth: For example, it appears that in admitting boys to the recently created military cadet (*Suvorov* and *Nakhimov*) schools for training the Soviet equivalent of "an officer and a gentleman," preference was given to the children of high officers.⁶² At a lower point in the social scale the regulations governing admittance to the State Labor Reserves Schools for training railroad workers provide that preference shall be given to children whose parents are railway workers. Thus, a provision which makes access to an occupational status partially dependent on kinship has now been made a part of Soviet law.⁶³ Such provisions by no means freeze

of the value of all deposits. This pattern apparently still prevailed in 1940, with a very large percentage of the total deposits in accounts of over 3,000 rubles. *Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitel'stvo SSSR*, Moscow, Tsunkhy, 1936, pp. 668-669, Plotnikov, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

⁶⁰ The currency reform of 1947 served, however, as a progressive tax on these savings accounts, since savings of up to 3,000 rubles were refunded on a 1-1 basis, those from 3,000-10,000 on the basis of 2 new rubles for 3 old, and sums above 10,000 on the basis of 1 new for 2 old rubles. See B. Alexandrov, *op. cit.*

⁶¹ Use of such houses for income purposes through rental is of course sharply circumscribed by the legal proscriptions against "speculation."

⁶² See Gsovski, *Soviet Civil Law*, Vol. I, p. 147, citing *Krasnaya Zvezda*, August 22 and December 1, 1943.

⁶³ Article 4, Order No. 1, October 4, 1940, Chief Administration of Labor Reserves under the Council of Peoples' Commissars. (*Izvestiya*, Oct. 5, 1940). Up to 1943, of course, provisions of this type were used

anyone in the social-class position into which he is born. But by restricting access to desirable training opportunities on the basis of kinship they give preferential advantage to some in maintaining the class position of their family, and by thus reducing the number of training opportunities open to all they indirectly restrict the mobility of others who might seek to acquire that training.

4. The tendency to draw individuals for important managerial posts predominantly from the ranks of those trained in the regular programs of secondary and higher technical education:⁶⁴ During the first decade of Soviet rule, and particularly during the first years of the Five Year Plan, large numbers of adults who were regarded as politically reliable were rapidly trained and then advanced to high managerial positions. In the last decade the personnel newly entering into the ranks of management in Soviet industry have tended to come almost exclusively from among the graduates of Soviet higher schools. The Party ruled in 1941, for example, that the position of foreman, lowest rung in the administrative hierarchy, should be filled predominantly by persons possessing specialized technical training—skilled workers being utilized only when engineers and technicians are not available.⁶⁵

to keep children of the disfranchised former "ruling" classes from obtaining a higher education.

⁶⁴ For a description of the development of Soviet policy on this question see Solomon M. Schwarz's analysis in *Management in Soviet Industry and Agriculture*, pp. 104-124. Mrs. Schwarz's conclusions go beyond what is warranted by the available data, and should therefore be used with caution.

⁶⁵ See the address of Malenkov to 18th Party Conference and the Resolutions of the Conference, *Izvestiya*, February 16 and 19, 1942; also see *Plano-vye Khozyaistvo*, No. 7, 1940, p. 19. This ruling should not be misunderstood, however, as being designed to inhibit the mobility of skilled workers. Its intent—as against its effect—was to secure persons of a higher technical skill at the working level, to get the technically trained out of offices and down to the production level, and to give recently graduated engineers first-hand practical experience. It should also be noted that in 1940 of the "directors of shops" in industry, a position far above that of foreman, only 22 per cent were specialists with higher education. But 32 per cent of the *assistant* shop directors had higher education, indicating the nature of the trend.

Insofar as political and social conditions permit it to do this, the regime is of course acting logically and rationally. But the fact does remain that movement from the status of worker to high managerial positions within the *same* generation, the Soviet equivalent of the American dream of rags to riches, is now becoming less usual whereas it was commonplace, if not the standard practice, in an earlier period. In this sense and to that degree social mobility has decreased in the Soviet Union in the last decade.

5. The strengthening of the family: The Soviet regime has sought to rehabilitate and strengthen the family through a series of measures inaugurated in 1936 and considerably extended during the wartime decade.⁶⁶ If we accept the proposition that strong emphasis on kinship ties in any social system acts to inhibit social mobility, then the measures adopted warrant at least the presumption that as the family is strengthened in the Soviet Union kin relations will play an increasingly important role in determining Soviet youths' opportunities for mobility. It should be noted that stories about persons in responsible positions exerting influence to favor their kin have appeared with considerable frequency in recent years, both in the Soviet press and in the reports of first-hand observers.

* * *

It would appear that the Communist regime has not been highly successful in preventing the stratification of society into social-class groups, and is certainly a long way from having eliminated them. In contrasting these facts with the relevant doctrines of Soviet ideology, however, it must be recognized that Lenin was very explicit in stating that inequality of reward would persist—and be protected by the state—for a protracted period after the revolution transferred ownership of the means of production to the workers.⁶⁷ But Lenin certainly did not envision

⁶⁴ See Alex Inkeles, "Family and Church in the Post-war USSR," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 263 (May, 1949), 33-44.

⁶⁵ Vladimir I. Lenin, *State and Revolution*, New York: International Publishers, 1935, pp. 75-78.

anything like the present *pattern* of stratification, nor did he imagine that the differentiation would be nearly as intensive as that currently manifested in the Soviet Union. He assumed, for example, that all persons in administrative positions would receive the same salary as an average worker.⁶⁸

It seems relevant to state, therefore, that Lenin seriously underestimated the degree to which strong tendencies towards social differentiation inhere in the organization of modern industry and mechanized agriculture. Indeed Lenin assumed that the development of this complex organization of production, with its attendant rationalization and routinization of function provided the necessary basis for social equalization.⁶⁹ Actually, Soviet experience indicates that the very fact of modern large-scale production—involved extreme division of labor, precise differentiation of function, emphasis on technical competence, and elaborate hierarchies of authority and responsibility—provides a natural basis for the development of distinct social groups.⁷⁰

Such differences in the relations of individuals to the productive process tend to yield inequalities in economic reward because of the differential position of certain persons in the labor market. This was particularly marked in the Soviet case, where the initial economic backwardness of the country combined with the exceptionally rapid tempo of industrialization to produce an extreme scarcity of skilled labor and technically trained personnel. The occupational structure, furthermore, is so important a focus in contemporary large-scale social systems that occupational status can serve very largely to determine the *general* social status of individuals. It requires only the appearance of distinctive patterns of speech, manners, and dress, differential patterns of association, and social group consciousness, to lay the foundation of a system of stratification based on

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

⁷⁰ For a fuller discussion of this point see Barrington Moore, Jr., *Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power: The Role of Ideas in Social Change*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press (in press).

social-class groupings. Once established, such stratification, as Max Weber indicated, "goes hand in hand with a monopolization of ideal and material goods or opportunities in a manner we have come to know as typical."⁷¹ Thus, in the Soviet case, as stratification has become institutionalized there has been a noticeable tendency for social mobility to decline and for the system to become less an open class structure.

These facts must in part be attributed to the decreasing opportunities made available by the economic system as it passed beyond its initial period of enormous growth and approached a more modest and stable rate of development. Soviet university officials, for example, report that the number of applicants for each vacancy in the higher schools grows greater every year. Full weight must also be given, however, to the fact that there is now a large group of people who have achieved high status by means legitimate within the existing social system, and who wish to pass some of their benefits and privileges on to their children. This creates strong pressures for the establishment of conditions which make it easier for children from this group to maintain or improve their position and simultaneously constitute obstacles to effective competition from the children born into families lower in the scale of stratification. It is certainly not accidental that since 1938 the Soviet Union has not published statistics on the social composition of the student body in higher educational institutions, since at that time—even before the introduction of school fees and the labor draft—it was already true that children of the intelligentsia and employees constituted 47 per cent of the student body although the group made up only some 17 per cent of the total population.⁷²

None of this is meant to imply that there are any absolute reasons why stratification could not have been kept at a minimum and mobility at a maximum in the Soviet Union. However much the "objective" conditions which existed may have structured the situa-

⁷¹ Gerth and Mills (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 190.

⁷² *Kul'turnoe Stroitel'stvo SSSR*, p. 114.

tion in favor of the course adopted, it was nevertheless a choice among alternatives. For even granting that the speed of industrialization severely limited the supply of consumers goods and the simple necessities of life,⁷³ this merely posed in more acute form, but did not answer, the question: "Who will get what share?" The decision made under Stalin's guidance was in the direction of maximizing the rewards of the relative few whom Stalin defined as crucial to the productive process, and who were in tremendous demand because of the shortage of skilled hands. But there was always the alternative of spreading the available resources in a relatively uniform, albeit thin, manner.

Yet the Soviet leaders today remain formally committed to the goal of attaining a classless society. What then is the prognosis for the future development of the present structure of stratification? An unequivocal answer appears warranted. The present system of stratification seems to be not merely stable, but is of such an order that it would probably require a new social and political revolution to restore the kind of dynamism necessary to create even an approximation of a classless society as defined in classical Marxism terms.

To state that the system is highly stable is by no means to indicate that the particular individuals in the intelligentsia and other favored groups have absolute security in their positions. For the ruling political élite at the head of the Party recognizes the ever-present possibility that group-consciousness might develop in these favored strata with the implied threat of a challenge to the authority of the present leaders. This possibility is met in part by the incorporation and absorption of groups like the intelligentsia,

foremen, and Stakhanovites into the Party,⁷⁴ where their members can be indoctrinated, subordinated to the Party's discipline and purposes, and carefully watched. It is also met by maintaining what appears to be an almost calculated degree of relatively constant instability—by means of rapid and sudden turnover in personnel, by intensive criticism, purging, and at times police action, and by consistent bidding up of the lower strata. But although these measures introduce an additional element of dynamism, and aid the top leaders in controlling some of the potential consequences of their policy, they do not represent in any sense an attack on the system of stratification *as a system*.

The reasons for this inhere in the very structure of contemporary Soviet society. For the social classes which are currently most highly rewarded in income, status, and power are precisely those social groups on which the present regime relies most heavily as its basis of social support. A new program aimed at social equalization could, therefore, be accomplished only at the expense, and hence with the alienation, of those groups on whose support the regime rests. Any such effort would consequently subject the whole system to real jeopardy. The interest of the ruling élite in social stability as a foundation for its programs of internal and foreign expansion is such that it seems most unlikely that it would undertake a program designed to effect one phase of its ideological goals at the expense of the stability of the system as a whole. It may in fact be said that despite recurrent affirmations of the aim of achieving a classless society, this goal can no longer be realistically regarded as one towards which the present leadership is actively and effectively oriented. Indeed, there is no absolute reason to assume that the present rate of social mobility, which probably equals that in the United States and possibly surpasses it, will be maintained. But if it is not, major consequences for the structure and functioning of Soviet society as now "traditionally" constituted may be expected.

⁷³ The decision to industrialize at so rapid a tempo was itself not inevitable. Industrialization based on a significantly lower rate of investment, particularly if combined with greater emphasis on consumers goods industries, would have had a profound effect on Soviet internal conditions. In particular, it would have made it possible to have much less intensive economic stratification, since the striking aspect of the Soviet system in this respect is not the absolute level of luxury at which the richer groups live but rather the relatively low level at which the population as a whole finds itself.

⁷⁴ See fn. 33 *supra*.

POLARITIES AND THE IMPAIRMENT OF SCIENCE

CLAUDE C. BOWMAN

Temple University

I

IT FREQUENTLY happens that the sociologist studies social phenomena while participating in them. As a member of society he is subject to the shaping and distorting effects of his particular environment; his mentality is given form and direction by various influences in subtle and unconscious ways and, even when he consciously reacts against these, the very intensity of the reaction represents homage paid to the original indoctrination. In the perspective of history it is probably true that the ideal of objectivity in the social sciences cannot be attained but there are, nevertheless, certain sources of bias in contemporary society that can be identified and analyzed in order to effect a closer approximation to the ideal. It is in this latter area that the present discussion lies.

The particular source of bias that engages our attention is the phenomenon of "polarity." As the term is defined here, polarity is a condition of marked cleavage and opposition in society. Attitudes and interests are said to be polarized when they cluster about two opposite poles. Such polarizations, with all their intellectual, emotional and social effects, are the products of competition and conflict. On the level of philosophical verbalization, ideology is opposed by counter-ideology. The counter-ideologist, instead of examining an issue on its own merits, scrutinizes the opposing doctrine to discover points of disagreement. His mood is that of conflict; consequently, he builds a series of negatives against the affirmations of his opponent. The prevailing spirit of the polarity is that of the debate or of the contest between rival lawyers.¹

¹ "Polarity" is akin to the Hegelian dialectic. "The term dialectic as originally used in Greece meant the process of getting at the truth through a debate carried on by opposing sides. For Hegel as

Polarity is the product of social interaction. As cleavage develops, each group of advocates expresses its point of view and this stimulates the other side to further disagreement. In this manner the opposition between in-group and out-group deepens and proceeds on its own momentum. Emotions of loyalty and hostility are generated and these give rise to prejudice. In international relations, for instance, the cleavage between the United States and the Soviet Union has become so pronounced that each tends to oppose automatically whatever the other proposes, irrespective of the consequences.

Social scientists, following standards of objective scholarship, try to avoid partisan commitments yet it is easy to fall into the traps set by prevailing polarities. What types of polarities have impaired objectivity in sociology? How have they arisen? What are the prospects for the immediate future? These questions will be considered in relation to the development of sociology in the United States.

II

First of all, let us examine the polarity of practicality and scholarly detachment. In their efforts to develop a new science, American sociologists reacted against the culturally sanctioned predilection for knowledge possessing an immediate utility. More particularly, they had to combat two pronounced tendencies that hindered progress

for some of the other post-Kantian philosophers the movement of experience itself represents a sort of logical debate carried on by reality, with a logical thesis being opposed by the logical antithesis and yielding thereby an endless movement toward a higher synthesis." ("Materialism," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, The Macmillan Co., 1933, Vol. X, p. 213.)

We do not use the term "dialectic" for two reasons. (1) As developed by Hegel, it is a principle of logic, whereas our orientation is sociological. (2) It has become intimately identified with a particular ideology, namely, Marxism.

toward objectivity—reformism and pragmatism. The first of these, arising chiefly from religious sources, includes sporadic efforts at reform which make up in moral fervor what they lack in sound knowledge. The crusades against municipal corruption, prostitution and the liquor traffic are cases in point. The antagonism of scientific sociologists to such programs of action was natural and inevitable. Moral reformers seldom bother to study the complex factors related to the problems which they attack, claiming to know intuitively the facts of the case and how these should be evaluated. Then, in the name of morality, they demand immediate action against the evil and the evil-doers. These qualities of dogmatism and audacious ignorance are bound to irritate the scientist. Perhaps, too, the antipathy of sociologists for reformers may also represent a projection of the struggle against reformist tendencies operating within the would-be scientist's own personality.

The pragmatism of the American *ethos*, with its distrust of theory and its respect for action, constitutes another tendency against which an objective sociology was forced to rebel. The laborious endeavors of early sociologists to lay the foundations of a new science frequently met with popular impatience—often echoed by fellow-sociologists—for immediate, "practical" results. This impatience of the layman was augmented by the ideology of *laissez-faire* individualism that stressed individual effort rather than a sociological approach to human problems.

A polarity developed as leading sociologists reacted strongly against the popular orientation of narrow practicality. The very word "reform" became a term of reproach. Those who maintained a scholarly detachment were called "pure" in contrast to the "applied" sociologists—the latter, presumably, being impure. This reaction was to have been expected and, in the early period, it was probably salutary for the new discipline. It indicates high aspirations to be scientific and a correlated desire to avoid the warping influences of the environment. The reaction against a highly practical framework of thought was also stimulated by the desire of

sociologists to break away from an earlier connection with social work and philanthropic activities.

Yet, aside from these advantages, the swing of the pendulum from a practical orientation to detached objectivity had other effects that were not advantageous. Objectivity was often achieved through isolation from the dynamics of social life and, where this occurred, scholarship degenerated into sterile intellectualism. Knowledge which is the product of an Olympian detachment is not necessarily free from bias and its very remoteness may indicate a failure to come to grips with the realities of the social process. Scholarly detachment in the social sciences has yielded results that are highly speculative and over-generalized; such processes of thought represent something akin to a systematic kind of day-dreaming rather than to science. Thus, in their reaction against a narrowly practical approach, many sociologists landed in an equally narrow orientation of scholarly detachment and steadfastly refused to contaminate their "purity" by making investigations of practical significance.

Actually, American sociologists have never aligned themselves solidly on the same side of this controversy. While some were remote scholars disregarding the pragmatic value of their work, others, who may have entered the profession by a religious-moral route, were the ideological descendants of the moral reformers. Then, in a middle position between these extremes, were those applied sociologists who had also reacted against reformism and popular pragmatism but not to the extent of avoiding all traffic with questions of policy. A survey of the professional literature published during the Twenties and Thirties will reveal the accusations and counter-accusations made by the representatives of these various "schools" of thought.

In the study of crime, population, race, the family and other problems, some applied sociologists did make efforts to link research findings, such as they had, to the development of policy but the nature of the relationship was often quite obscure. Though

many others contributed to a clarification here, it remained for Gunnar Myrdal to present a formulation that was clear and explicit to an unprecedented degree:

The aim of practical research—starting out from the data revealed by theoretical research and from sets of explicitly stated, concretely specified, alternatively assumed, hypothetical value premises which are relevant, significant, and attainable—is . . . to show precisely what should be the practical and political opinions and plans for action from the point of view of the various valuations if their holders also had the more correct and comprehensive factual knowledge which science provides.²

This formulation prepares the way for a closer relationship between research and policy-making; in practical research it is the explicitly stated, alternatively assumed value premises which bridge the gap between the two areas. Applied sociologists can be evaluative without any sacrifice of objectivity—in fact, as Myrdal points out, this deliberate and open relationship between science and value premises *enhances* objectivity by eliminating the hidden biases usually to be found in social interpretation.

Today there are plenty of signs on the horizon that we are veering away from fruitless disputes about the nature and scope of a scientific sociology toward comprehensive research programs related to issues of social policy. These programs usually involve the cooperation of several social sciences, for significant problems show no respect for the traditional lines of demarcation separating the disciplines. The research carried on during the recent war brought a number of sociologists into intimate contact with policy-makers and with the complex dynamics of social life. As sociology comes of age, the old polarity of the practical *versus* the scholarly is disappearing. Theoretical research, detached from all relationship to policy-making, will always be of fundamental importance but it is no longer considered to be the sole alternative to the biases of reformism. It is now recognized

that research with a practical orientation can be equally objective.³

III

The next polarity to be considered is the opposition of ethnocentrism and anti-conventionalism. Ethnocentrism is the attitude that the approved beliefs and practices of one's culture are superior to those of other cultures. The person of ethnocentric bias judges other groups by his own standards because he is emotionally attached to these standards and because he knows no other standards by which to judge social events. This mental outlook is a common attribute of mankind everywhere, serving to maintain group

²The following statement is significant in this connection: "Since the war, the Research and Development Board which reports directly to the Secretary of Defense has established a Committee on Human Resources. This is a recognition, both by scientists and the military, of the fact not only that social and psychological problems are crucial in modern war . . . but also that they are now amenable to scientific study. In the peace-time Army, Navy and Air Force there may be a good many officers, especially among those teaching in Service schools or among those developing new training or personnel plans, who can find in the Army's experience, as recorded here and there in these volumes, an idea which they can translate into a program of experimentation for the future." Samuel Stouffer and others, "The American Soldier: Adjustment during Army Life" (Vol. I, *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*), Princeton University Press, 1949, pp. 3-4.

Cf. Alexander H. Leighton, *Human Relations in a Changing World*, E. P. Dutton and Co., 1949. Leighton (pp. 147-173) stresses the differences between the roles and concepts of policy-makers and social scientists, thereby implying that cooperation is possible but not nearly so easy and frictionless as some may imagine.

Several sociologists have analyzed their experiences—and frustrations—in doing government research during the war. J. L. Woodward, "Making Government Opinion Research Bear upon Operations," *American Sociological Review*, IX (Dec. 1944), 670-677; Robin Williams, "Some Observations on Sociological Research in Government during World War II," *American Sociological Review*, XI (Oct. 1946), 573-577.

For a careful analysis of the variety of possible relationships that can exist between social science and policy, consult Robert K. Merton, "The Role of Applied Social Science in the Formation of Policy: A Research Memorandum," *Philosophy of Science*, XVI (1949), 161-181.

²Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, Harper and Brothers, 1944, pp. 1060-1061.

loyalty and a high level of morale. It results from indoctrination and from habituation to the regular demands of the culture.

In the zealous attempt to neutralize the biases of his own culture, the student of society may over-compensate in naive fashion and fall into anti-conventionalism. In this latter framework of thought, adverse criticism is mistaken for objective analysis. Ethnocentrism implies that the *mores* are "right"; but anti-conventionalism suggests that they are "wrong," thereby fostering an iconoclasm that deviates markedly from objectivity. The latter orientation has been, and still is, quite common among sociologists.

This tendency to bend over backwards into anti-conventionalism is encouraged by a faulty interpretation of cultural relativism. It is a cardinal principle of relativism that the *mores* and institutions of a people shall be analyzed and evaluated in relation to the various relevant factors in the total culture. By this standard the moral rules and ideals of our culture are no longer absolute imperatives; they are redefined as sociological imperatives whose functional utility is to be judged by pragmatic criteria. This shift from a religious-moral ideology to relativistic thought does not undermine the imperatives of the culture but, at first sight, *it seems to do so*. For those who fail to grasp the full significance of relativism, the shock of discovery often leads to a thorough-going attack upon the moralistic indoctrinations of childhood. In this stage of rebellion it may not be realized that the moral imperatives of culture remain as forces in experience, even though, by re-definition, they cease to be fixed, universal principles buttressed by supernatural sanctions.

Yet the rise of anti-conventionalism is not a development with purely intellectual origins. It is an attitude that reflects antagonism to the social order. Indeed, in the perspective of history, it may be nothing less than a harbinger of revolutionary change in contemporary society. Crane Brinton, in making a comparative study of four revolutions, considers the "desertion of the intellectuals" to be a symptom of the upheavals that were to come.

. . . in a society markedly unstable there seem to be absolutely more intellectuals, at any rate comparatively more intellectuals, bitterly attacking existing institutions and desirous of a considerable alteration in society, business, and government."⁴

The intellectuals of the pre-revolutionary period lift their voices in ethical protest against the evils of the existing order, the everyday world appearing to them as a vulgar struggle among cynical and greedy creatures. Especially in the modern "sensate" world with its far-flung competition for wealth and power, idealists are acutely conscious of the discrepancies between ideals and social practice. Yet, while influenced by the Christian ideology, the intellectuals of modern times are not satisfied to contemplate the eventual peace and justice of heaven. Instead, they inveigh against injustice and help to build the ideological foundations of a new order here on earth.

Moreover, the social position of intellectuals in contemporary society is conducive to antagonism against the prevailing order. Academic intellectuals, in particular, live in dignified obscurity, silently struggling to maintain a standard of living that they can ill afford, and, in a world of economic and political giantism, their power and influence appears to be pathetically small. While formal obeisance is paid to scholarship upon occasion, the significance of scholarly effort is usually obscured in the on-going affairs of men. As a consequence, intellectuals—writers, teachers and preachers—are marginal persons in America: they are given a kind of remote respect but seldom assigned roles of leadership in the community. This social position of relatively powerless marginality is significant in accounting for anti-conventionalism among sociologists. It explains how the critical spirit—a *sine qua non* of all science and scholarship—easily degenerates into the carpings of a disgruntled element in society.

It may be added that, as teachers, sociologists are in constant association with

⁴ Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, W. W. Norton and Co., 1938, p. 56.

young people who, being often in a stage of adolescent or post-adolescent rebellion against adult society, encourage iconoclastic interpretations. This may augment anti-conventionalism.

Hostility to the *status quo* takes several forms. As indicated above, it may appear as iconoclasm, a kind of intellectual game played in classrooms or with one's friends, with malice toward some but without any definite philosophy or program of political action. This species of anti-conventionalism easily turns into a detached dilettantism that remains aloof from the intellectual, moral and esthetic standards of the "masses." On the other hand, anti-conventionalism is often linked to political purposes and organizations that range from a middle-of-the-road position to extreme radicalism. For those social scientists who identify themselves with such programs of political action the impairing influence of an anti-conventionalist bias is augmented by the ideological involvements of politics. Such deviations from objectivity are likely to be greater in those organizations and movements which demand strict, unquestioning adherence to their principles and policies but they are not easily avoided even in those which do permit greater freedom of thought.

If our analysis of this polarity is valid, it would appear that strong opposition to culturally sanctioned biases reflects something more than pure disinterestedness. Criticism of ethnocentrism is no guarantee that objectivity has been attained. Such criticism may indicate, instead, a rationalized hostility toward the society in which the critic lives. To be sure, the critical writings of hostile ideologists are not wholly devoid of intellectual merit—as suggested above, these are symptomatic of widespread discontent with the *status quo*—yet they fail to satisfy the exacting criteria of science. Consequently such "sociology" is nothing more than a closely reasoned type of propaganda consistently antagonistic to the existing order.

IV

Public awareness of prejudice against "minorities" is probably greater than ever before in our history. Discriminatory prac-

tices seem to be declining gradually although, to be sure, these changes in *mores* and laws do not take place rapidly enough to satisfy militant groups who chafe at the discrepancies between practice and stated ideals. Perhaps the majority of sociologists specializing in the study of ethnic groups and problems were motivated originally by a reform interest. A cultural tradition including both democratic and Christian ideals readily fosters humanitarian efforts to improve the condition of the "underdog" and undoubtedly a number of persons entered sociology by this route.

Yet this very motive, however laudable from an ethical point of view, has served to bring into existence another polarity which vitiates objectivity. In this instance it is *prejudice versus humanitarianism*. We do not mean to suggest that humanitarianism arises entirely as a counter-movement to prejudice, for, as indicated above, the humanitarian sentiment has deep cultural roots of its own. Our theory is that the *mores* of social prejudice have given rise to a countertendency which re-enforced the humanitarianism of tradition. This process of polarization probably began in the early days of slavery but, during the last several decades, it has reached a new intensity of thought and action.

Identification of the sociologist with the cause of social democracy is a distinct handicap to science. The ideal scientist is tough-minded and skeptical, ever searching for relevant evidence. In these respects he is at the opposite end of the scale from the reformer filled with moral indignation against injustice—tender-minded, endowed with a firm faith in his cause, seeing only those facts that serve his purpose.

It is difficult to maintain objectivity in the midst of ideological conflict, for partisans on both sides want to know where you stand. In the case of the controversy between conventional prejudice and humanitarianism, sociologists are likely to be attracted to the latter side and, as this occurs, distortions of interpretation soon appear. Indeed, the study of ethnic groups in this country suffers from a conspicuous lack of robust skepticism that challenges humanitarian assumptions. Take,

for instance, the emphasis upon environmentalism commonly found in sociological interpretation of racial differences. This emphasis is popular with humanitarians because it implies that there is an underlying equality in various capacities and it is only differential opportunities that produce differential achievement. Actually, the evidence is far from conclusive and open-minded scientists working in this area will continue to entertain the hypothesis that racial differences in various kinds of achievement may have some hereditary basis too. As opportunities for Negroes and Whites become more nearly equal, we may be able to find new evidence bearing upon this issue. A gigantic experiment is taking place in the United States. From it the sociologist can learn a great deal—provided he refuses to wear humanitarian blinders.

Similarly, the scientist may hesitate to speak or write freely about other groups for fear of being "misunderstood." In an emotionally charged situation of ideological conflict, where minorities are struggling for equal rights, the American sociologist is loathe to say anything that might be construed as opposition to, or even neutrality toward, a struggle which elicits the sympathy, if not the active support, of all democratic idealists. In particular, he is reluctant to advance interpretations of ethnic behavior that could be distorted by those laboring under a sensitivity resulting from their unsatisfactory status in American life. Those with strong humanitarian feelings can always find excuses for the behavior of racial and religious minorities; yet this imperative toward exculpation introduces a factor of bias that impairs the work of science. From an objective point of view all factors in the situation must be examined, including those traditions and characteristics of various ethnic groups which give offense to others. Humanitarianism may be nothing more than prejudice in reverse. As such, it obstructs scientific progress.

V

There is another polarity of vast cultural significance which has ensnared many an unsuspecting sociologist. We refer to the

conflict between religion and irreligion. The modern revolt in the Western world against the traditional religions has been an inevitable accompaniment of a far-flung secularization resulting from the rise of science. The conflict between religion and science is at least three hundred years old—psychologists and sociologists are the last to enter the arena in an ancient struggle that has already enlisted astronomers, physical scientists, and biologists.

The development of the social sciences represents one phase of modern secularism. In a context of social-science naturalism, supernatural beliefs are viewed impersonally as data for analytical study rather than as sacred elements in a religious faith to which the scientist is attached. Rivalry between religion and sociology developed naturally, for both offer interpretations of man and society. The scientist rejects supernatural causation as outlined in theological doctrines but, on the level of naturalism, he too seeks to explain human behavior, past and present. It is not accidental that many ministers turned from theology to sociology in the early decades of the present century, for the sociology of the period was often indistinguishable from social ethics; and it was therefore relatively easy for a person of theological training to effect the transition, especially if he had been nurtured in the "social gospel."

The polarity of religion and irreligion, as it relates to the present discussion, became crystallized when sociologists began to work toward a strictly scientific orientation, wholly divorced from supernatural and ethical pre-conceptions. In the effort to free themselves from religious influences, many veered in a counter-ideological direction. Iconoclasm was common and some "sociologists" became militant atheists. This tendency was encouraged by the "de-bunking" spirit of the nineteen-twenties and by the frequent hostility of religious organizations to the new science. Yet, now that our discipline has advanced beyond the stage of adolescent rebellion against theology, a more objective approach to institutionalized religion is both possible and desirable. In recent years a sociology of religion is beginning to emerge

in this country. This emergence was probably delayed several decades because American sociologists became enmeshed in a counter-movement against religious orthodoxy. Here, as in the other polarities, participation in ideological controversy has impaired the growth of objectivity.

In the study of religion a kind of schizoid mentality is demanded, for the sociologist is required to analyze a *Weltanschauung* which does violence to the conceptual framework of science. The traditional outlook of the religions represented in our culture is compounded of supernatural designs, mystical beliefs, and moral dogmas—all of which are contrary to the logic of science. The imperatives of scholarship here are similar to those encountered in the study of propaganda, where the most obvious distortions of the truth are analyzed by a social scientist whose professional standards stand in direct contradiction to the techniques and purposes of the propagandist. Unfortunately for the development of a sociology of religion, this distinction seems to have been understood more clearly in regard to propaganda. Perhaps the uncertain status of their own discipline in the hierarchy of science combined with the traditional power and influence of organized religion have been forces tending to arouse, up until recently, a combative mood in many sociologists; but, while ideological combat is dramatic and entertaining, it obstructs the proper work of science.

This combative mood may have been stimulated further by the struggle to gain emancipation from early religious training. This would vary from person to person, of course, but, in some degree, it is a common experience. The religious-moral ideology of the culture is deeply pervasive. It attributes human problems to the malevolence of wicked men who should be held personally responsible for their conduct; and such personal virtues as "sincerity" and "honesty" are considered to be the crux of social amelioration. The embryonic sociologist, reared under the influence of this philosophy, may expend considerable effort—and emotion—in building a new conceptual system. Possibly, in their attacks upon religion, some

students of society are still fighting against an authoritative parent or other authorities of their youth. In any case, the "attack" orientation indicates a bias that has hindered sociology in attaining full status as a scientific discipline motivated by ideals of free and responsible scholarship.

There are some vague indications that a resurgence of religious interest has occurred in this country. If this is the trend, it is probably related to the widespread fear and insecurity brought on by international tensions in an era of unprecedented technological advances. If a new intensity of religious belief does develop, sociologists may be drawn into the polarity once more—but this time on the side of religion. Two prominent social scientists, one a historian (Arnold J. Toynbee), the other a sociologist (Pitirim Sorokin), have aligned themselves unequivocally with religion and, as time goes on, there may be others. Yet the same polarity of religion *versus* irreligion remains to impair objectivity, no matter whether the ideological commitments of the social scientist are on one side or the other.

VI

The pragmatism that permeates our culture makes it very easy and very tempting to become involved in political ideologies that subvert the aims of scientific scholarship. Dichotomies are encountered on every hand. We voice the aphorism, "there are two sides to every question"; and this is reinforced by a two-party system that pulls citizens into rival factions. The popular media—newspapers, magazines and the radio—also encourage polarized thinking. Whether the issue be health insurance, fair employment practices, aid to Europe or any one of a hundred political issues, a simple "pro" and "con" type of thinking is evident. Yet, as suggested earlier, in so far as the scientist sinks into partisanship, he changes into an ideologist and his distinctive contribution is lost in the swirl of oratory and social metaphysics.

Issues of domestic politics will continue to evoke arguments and counter-arguments but the most significant cleavage in contem-

pora
of t
Mos
divi
lous
high
be a
leng
neve
in th
to th
duplic
side.
patri
with
proce
tis

TH
given
anti-
consi
We
muni
claim
social
ganda
purpo
antith
scienc
out h
mised
spite
upon
to be
ideolo

He
opini
good
tains
to a
society
that r
that
thought
specul
the cr

* De
tific
dom
74-102.

porary society centers about the relations of the United States and the Soviet Union. Most of the peoples of the earth are now divided into two gigantic regions living perilously in unstable accommodation. If this highly charged situation persists, there may be a siege upon the intellect that will challenge the integrity of the social sciences as never before. The antagonism to communism in this country is a normal in-group reaction to the existing cleavage and it is undoubtedly duplicated, if not exceeded, on the Soviet side. If the cleavage continues to deepen, patriotic sentiments will assert themselves with increasing vigor and, in this cumulative process of conflict, the work of social scientists can hardly remain unaffected.

The polarity in international relations has given birth to two biases that are twin-born: anti-communism and ethnocentrism. Let us consider, first, the rise of anti-communism. We do not propose to defend Soviet communism in theory or practice. Despite the claims of loyal Marxists, their "scientific" socialism is, in reality, a system of propaganda designed to advance a revolutionary purpose. As such, its whole approach is antithetical to the ideals and purposes of science.⁶ The sole concern here is to point out how the social sciences can be compromised by current ideological prejudices. In spite of the political pressures operating upon him, the social scientist cannot afford to become attached to an anti-communistic ideology.

He must resist the prevailing climate of opinion against communism for the very good reason that communistic ideology contains views of social reality that are essential to a full-bodied orientation to the study of society. It is an inadequate epistemology that rejects ideological thought so completely that the partial insights inherent in such thought are lost. As a set of dogmas and speculations, an ideology does not satisfy the criteria of science. Yet this recognition of the inadequacies of ideological formula-

tions does not necessitate total rejection by the social scientist. Sociologists are indebted to Karl Mannheim for a systematic development of this vital point. He has shown that, while, in order to prevent bias, every view must be equated with the social position of the observer, it must also be recognized that the views emanating from special roles or positions in society bring to light social insights that would not be apparent otherwise.⁶ For this reason sociologists, in their quest for a balanced and comprehensive interpretation, will glean as many elements of understanding as possible from each ideological slant in the total situation.

The problem of prostitution provides a suitable illustration. What leads a girl to become a prostitute? Even a casual acquaintance with American sociology reveals a pronounced predilection for psychological interpretation. Sociology and social psychology have been closely related in this country; and this emphasis has been augmented by a strong interest in psychiatric, especially psychoanalytical, theories. This psychological slant suggests an answer to the question in terms of personal motivations (W. I. Thomas' "four wishes," for example). The communist theorist, however, approaches the question from an economic angle. The woman is a prostitute because her income is inadequate; because she is not trained for a useful occupation; because she is exploited by those who seek profits in commercial prostitution. Actually, every facet of this economic approach can be utilized as an hypothesis to stimulate and guide research. As objective social interpretation, communist ideology is obviously defective; but as a rich source of hypotheses it is invaluable. This value is all the greater because of the predisposition of American theorists for psychological interpretation.

Thus, the current polarity in world affairs has fostered an anti-communist bias which, like all bias, is detrimental to science. At the same time the political division also intensifies ethnocentrism. This is even more dele-

⁶ Dewey has exposed thoroughly the anti-scientific character of Marxism. Cf. John Dewey, *Freedom and Culture*, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939, pp. 74-102.

⁶ Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (trans. by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils), Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1936, especially pp. 49-96.

rious to science than prejudice against communism, for ethnocentric bias can impair the entire pattern of social thought. If active sentiments of patriotism are aroused whenever sociological issues are raised, then the prospects for objectivity become progressively dimmer. Complete immersion in one culture induces mental stagnancy and the triumph of habit and prejudice over creative thought. The problem of ethnocentric bias plagues the social scientist continually and, in view of the "cold war," it is likely to assume even greater proportions in the immediate future.

This trend is clearly evident in this country. (We do not have access to the same kind of information concerning the Soviet Union.) It is quite apparent that the in-group has become far less hospitable to non-conforming opinions. Overt expressions of loyalty are demanded. New laws aimed at "subversive" activities have been passed and many more are now pending in state and national legislatures. Prominent educators and teachers' organizations have taken the position that communists should not be allowed to teach in the schools.⁷ Yet more important than these specific forms of control is the rise of an oppressive spirit of caution and fear that threatens to impair social-scientific work. It is a cultural climate that is not conducive to the best efforts of trained intelligence.

VII

With the current popularity of psychiatric concepts, both professionals and laymen usually locate bias in the emotional structure of the individual. Such biases are said to result from instincts or from patterns of early family relationships. As the environment is explored further, sociological sources of bias are found in various group membership—class, race, religion, occupation, nationality, culture. Beyond these fairly obvious sources there are environmental influences of a more subtle and elusive character that also impair social-scientific interpretation. We have analyzed five polarities

that seem particularly significant in the American setting: practicality vs. scholarly detachment, ethnocentrism vs. anti-conventionalism, prejudice vs. humanitarianism, religion vs. irreligion and communism vs. anti-communism. The warping influences of polarities are not magically expunged by identification and analysis but this is the first step toward greater objectivity.⁸

We have laid stress upon these polarities as sources of bias. Yet, in order to lend symmetry to the account, it should be added that *ideologies can be utilized as raw material from which new hypotheses are constructed*. This was pointed out in the discussion of communism and anti-communism. Other examples are not difficult to find. Both sides of the prejudice-humanitarianism polarity can furnish numerous hypotheses to stimulate and guide pure research. Even an anti-conventionalist slant will provide tentative insights that challenge conventional beliefs and suggest new lines of thought.⁹ In the quest for knowledge the sociologist cannot afford to close his mind against those ideologies which offer plausible interpretations of social phenomena, no matter how great the popular prejudice. These are a main source of hypotheses—and science without hypotheses is like a ship without a rudder.

In practical research ideologies also have an important utility. Here, as suggested by Myrdal in the passage quoted earlier, existing ideologies can furnish alternative sets of value premises that enable the scientist to participate in a process of evaluation which is both explicit and objective. In this manner the gap between theoretical research and

⁷ It may be noted that these polarities do not constitute a pattern of consistency. We have discussed, on the one hand, scholarly detachment and, on the other, humanitarian commitments; ethnocentrism in one case and anti-conventionalism in another. The point is that different sociologists may be involved in the various polarities analyzed here; or the same sociologist may exhibit different biases at different times.

⁸ The writer used this approach in a recent analysis of heterosexual relations. Cf. "Cultural Ideology and Heterosexual Reality: A Preface to Sociological Research," *American Sociological Review*, XIV (Oct. 1949), 624-633.

⁷ Cf. recent annual reports of the American Civil Liberties Union for documentation on these trends.

the problems of social policy-making can be bridged effectively.

Yet, in the preceding account, we have emphasized the ways in which ideological polarities impair the development of science. The

foregoing analysis falls within the special area designated as the sociology of knowledge. Accordingly, we have applied a sociological frame of reference to certain methodological problems of our own discipline.

INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL RELATIONS*

BYRON L. FOX

Syracuse University

CULTURAL relations in the sense of contacts between peoples and nations go back thousands of years, but are now taking on added importance because of revolutionary changes in man's social life. Unprecedented developments in relations among nations are due to such factors as the growing economic interdependence of nations and the transformation of communications, especially the mass media. The accepted fields of international relations—international law, international organization, and international politics—may well be supplemented by the study of international cultural relations.

The term international cultural relations has been selected for use even though any meaning assigned to it is bound to involve confusion and inconsistency. In the anthropological sense, international cultural relations include social contacts of any conceivable kind. As used here, the term covers processes involved in educational exchanges (formerly called "cultural relations" by our government), and information, propaganda, and psychological warfare activities.

The activities and programs which make up an important part of the subject matter of international cultural relations are of several types: official programs of governments, activities of international organizations such as UNESCO and other specialized agencies of the United Nations, and international activities of private or voluntary organizations. Going beyond mere description the sociologist may analyze the subject matter

in terms of the significance of its relationship to political action and pressures, economic aspects, and the efforts made at the several levels to direct cultural relations toward specified objectives. Case studies of individual nations may be projected; thus the Soviet Union would be viewed as a "problem" in international cultural relations. Though not obvious at first sight, the United States may also be regarded as a "problem" in international cultural relations.

An appropriate frame of reference must be established to orient such research, because it is a frontier operation in the sense that it must push beyond a national to a world orientation. During the time the writer worked with the cultural relations programs as an officer in the U. S. Department of State, the question was brought home to him repeatedly, to what extent sociological concepts, previously employed at the local or national level, could be employed at the international level. Such an experience suggests that purposeful and effective orientation should take account of several points.

1. International understanding as a problem involving value clashes

It is commonly taken for granted that international understanding is a desirable and worthy aim; it is assumed equally that whatever undermines international understanding is undesirable. For purposes of analysis it is more meaningful to view the desire for international understanding as a problem involving value clashes.¹ Most

* Paper read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society held in New York, December 28-30, 1949.

¹ See Richard C. Fuller, "The Problem of Teaching Social Problems," *American Journal of Sociology*, 44 (1939), 415-435; also John F. Cuber and

people are against war as they are against sin, but war and the threat of the use of force are included in the foreign policy of each nation as part of the "real" patterns governing the relations of nations with each other. Not even in the United States has public opinion led to the renunciation of war but only to moral condemnation. The Hiroshima bombing was rationalized and did not disturb the conscience of many Americans. Opposed to the acceptance by many Americans of the bombing on the practical ground that it saved the lives of American soldiers and possibly shortened the war, there were strong protests lodged by a number of religious groups, condemning the bombing of non-combatants as particularly repugnant to the moral sense, even in modern warfare.

Value clashes, representing the existence side by side of conflicting patterns, must be taken into account in dealing with what are ordinarily referred to as efforts to promote international understanding. It needs to be recognized further that these value clashes contribute not only to creating the condition, but also to frustrating its solution. For example, protecting the American way of life includes the necessity for maintaining military defenses to keep the peace. This generates fears in other nations as to our intentions, producing behavior that in turn provides justification for the steps deemed necessary for our protection.

In the opinion of many observers, the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union form the "number one problem" in the world today. Considered from the standpoint of the United States, inherent in these tensions are certain striking value clashes representing the product of our cultural past and the present moment in history:

- (a) There are conflicts in ideologies at the world level; this is the familiar "Communism vs. Capitalism."
- (b) Within the United States there is a conflict

Robert A. Harper, *Problems of American Society: Values in Conflict*, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1948, pp. xi-xviii, 25-38, 324-328.

in values—traditional laissez-faire-individualism-isolationism *vs.* the planning-international participation idea; this leads to a conflict as to whether we should participate in world affairs or whether we should try to stay out of European "messes."

- (c) There is incipient conflict over the question as to whether we should share our resources and power with other nations in ways implied in our democratic tradition *vs.* the use of our power for further expansion and domination ("imperialism").
- (d) Also there are clashes as to solutions. As reflected in our foreign policy during the past few years, it may be said that we have been moving in four different directions.²

Toward a *one-world*: through cooperation with the United Nations, leading to world government.

Toward a *two-world*: through such devices as the Atlantic Pact and our rearming of Europe as an ally.

Toward a *three-world*: by building up a "third force" in Europe through the Marshall Plan to serve as a buffer between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Toward a *no-world*: by hanging onto the traditional policy of isolationism, and trying to cure world problems through preventive war.

- (e) There are disagreements among social scientists as to the relation of their disciplines to this "number one problem," and the precise methods by which it is to be attacked.

² See Joseph C. Harsch, "Does Our Foreign Policy Make Sense?" *Headline Series*, Foreign Policy Association, Number 60, May-June, 1948, p. 17. Also Robert M. MacIver, *The Web of Government*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947, pp. 394-395.

2. *Further development of the cooperative approach among social scientists*

Stimulated by the War, increasing attention has been given to the area approach in the study of international relations. Teams of social scientists, employing a combination of techniques and concentrating on one part of the world, are able to achieve insights that make an important contribution to an understanding of international processes. This approach is accepted by many colleges and universities as a proper field for study and research.

In addition to the area approach there is what may be called the cross-cultural process approach, which cuts across the area researches and draws upon them for much basic data. This approach involves extending the collaboration among social scientists which has already shown a beginning, applying in a new orientation familiar concepts such as culture pattern, social process, purposive social change, and power transformation process.

3. *Undetected biases of social scientists*

Lying beyond the familiar forms of ethnocentrism, it may be that there are within ourselves less easily discernible biases, including the fact that the concepts of science and ethnocentrism are products of our Western culture. Our scientific logic is based on an historical development which underlies our commonly accepted ways of thinking and behaving. The conclusions derived from this logic are also culturally conditioned, including underlying assumptions about the prerequisites to a working world order. Most American sociologists probably hold about the same range of opinions regarding the possibility of achieving a world order through purposive direction as do other Americans.

While American sociologists apply fairly well tested methods to the analysis of American society, it may be suspected that when they deal with international relations they unconsciously transfer untested assumptions which have not been subjected to careful scientific investigation. An interesting question for research would be the extent to which the sociologist in analyzing the inter-

national aspects of the social processes escapes the biases of the man on the street. Further, there is the danger of assuming that because the social scientist is aware of biases that exist, he is therefore not subject to or influenced by them.

Instead of being lulled by the myth of our own objectivity, it may be more profitable for social scientists to seek out and identify inevitable but usually unnoticed biases. It is acknowledged that anthropologists have been attempting to do this for a long time and in many cases with a reasonable degree of success, though at least one critic has recently charged the so-called "New Anthropology" with being culture bound itself.² It is also true that some of the insights familiar to anthropologists are currently being "rediscovered" by members of other disciplines.

Perhaps unrecognized bias is found in such a book as Northrop's *The Meeting of East and West*.⁴ He has provided a thorough and provocative analysis of the great cultural traditions of the East and West, with proposals as to how these can be brought together on common ground. This approach is "logical" to the Western mind, with the main emphasis upon integration and synthesis of the philosophies of the "great nations." The "great" are those that are now most important politically—the West—and those with a recognized cultural past, but not the other peoples of the world. In his analysis Northrop does not take adequate account of the fact that the concepts of integration and synthesis are Occidental. The result is that although explicitly he speaks of integration and synthesis, implicitly he seems to mean adjustment of other cultures, including the Oriental, to Occidental rather than a mutual assimilation. Northrop's position thus appears to be ethnocentric in its formulation of the problem and in the solution proposed.

² Robert Endleman, "The New Anthropology and Its Ambitions: The Science of Man in Messianic Dress," *Commentary*, 8 (September, 1949), 284-291.

⁴ F. S. C. Northrop, *The Meeting of East and West: An Inquiry Concerning World Understanding*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946.

An example of a more successful formulation is found in Taylor's *Richer by Asia*,⁵ and this greater success is correlated with a clearer awareness of ethnocentrism and a greater ability to escape from it. The book describes the process by which Taylor learned to respect the values of another people—the people of India. Because of this new insight he was able to re-examine his Western heritage specifically in terms of an awareness of the "delusions" which he finds existing among the Western peoples as they do among other peoples, and which form barriers to the achievement of "one world." In the process he became conscious that the accepted Western categories of thought do not fit into those of the Orientals. This lack of congruence is what we mean when we speak of the "inscrutable" ways of the Orientals. What we may miss is the fact that though their thought-behavior ways are different from ours, there is an underlying logic which to them is perfectly "natural" and "common sense."

One illustration suggests how categories of thought in our culture do not match those in the Indian culture. Taylor says that we tend to think in terms of being "right" and being "wrong" as opposite, absolute, and all-important categories. "With us truth, faith, right belief are absolutes, finally and immutably revealed."⁶ It follows that the person who holds "wrong" beliefs is regarded as a community menace; further, there is no moral basis for compromise—efforts in this direction may be labeled "appeasement," which is held to be sinful and dangerous. The point is clear in the popular saying, "I'd rather be right than be President."

To the Indians, on the other hand, more important than being "right" is the principle of adjusting to others whom one considers "wrong" but with whom he realizes he must get along. The principle of accepting differences, of finding a *modus vivendi* therefore takes on more significance than merely being "right"; that is, the idea of harmony in relationships takes precedence over "rightness."

⁵ Edmond Taylor, *Richer by Asia*. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1947.

⁶ Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

Even though there have been sharp differences in religion and race, the Indians have demonstrated over a period of thousands of years the ability to adjust differences and live in relative harmony as compared with the West. This has in the recent past been changed to some extent as a result of Occidental influence. In the West, by contrast, war periodically arises to settle the question of who is really right—and rarely does.

These differences in thought categories may be considered in terms of certain culture elements present in the East, which are almost absent in the West (for example, harmony taking precedence over being right). In the same way, there are culture traits found in the West which are either absent or exist in different form in the East (for example, parliamentary democracy and science).

Comparing the two cultures, it is clear that certain components are present in each that are lacking in the other, and certain elements lacking in the first are present in the second. A very interesting analysis has been made of Japanese culture in terms of the effects of the absence of certain culture elements.⁷ It would be equally possible to describe Occidental culture in terms of culture elements which are absent, and such an exercise might provide a healthy corrective to ethnocentric attitudes. This analysis might then be related to the dominant foci of the culture (in Western society, for example, political organization, science and technology).

Taylor sees the possibility that the East may contribute to implementing the political ideas of the West, which it is incapable of implementing alone, through culture elements that are absent or underdeveloped in the West.

Superficially this may appear to be similar to the solution proposed by Northrop, that is, a synthesis and integration at the world level. The crucial difference appears to lie in the role assigned by Northrop to a "scientifically

⁷ Douglas Haring, "The Challenge of Japan's Ideology," in Haring and associates, *Japan's Prospect*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946, pp. 259-286.

grounded philosophy," which assumes the universality of the thought categories of science.

This version of synthesis and integration, conceived in the logic of Western science and with the assumption that this logic is a universal, lies in the mind of Western man. It is intellectualistic in maintaining that a more inclusive social organization at the world level will be possible only after agreement on "fundamentals" or basic ideas is reached. International understanding would develop along lines assumed *a priori* to be necessary, logical, and adequate—as judged by the scientist and philosopher with a western mind set. Such a logical construct may prove to have no necessary relevance to the realities of social change at the world level.

Another view, which may be called the accommodation-assimilation theory, seeks to avoid the possible ethnocentrism of Western scientific logic by dealing with the factors that lie in the culture process at the world level. These include, but are not adequately encompassed by, a logical view of the world process derived from Western science and philosophy. According to the accommodation-assimilation view, a more inclusive social organization may come about at the world level through the merging or fusing of culture elements, but not necessarily in ways which are determinable in advance by the logic of our Western cultures. From this standpoint, it is possible to have "one world without one mind," at least in the sense of *a priori* concurrence of ideas.

To avoid the pitfall of Western logic in this analysis, it should be recognized that it is possible that the world process will move along the lines of both integration-synthesis and accommodation-assimilation, perhaps in combination with others that are not now determinable.

Failure to detect subtle and insidious biases like those described above may lead social scientists to overlook the dynamic possibilities of accommodation and assimilation as world processes, even though they have studied these processes within the nation-state system in meticulous detail. The terms accommodation and assimilation are

here used in the sociological sense, as meaning mutual interaction, rather than the invariable adjustment of one element to the other.

A false distinction is often made with regard to the operation of these processes at the two levels. In popular thinking this takes the form of comparing and contrasting an idealized pattern assumed to be the usual form in smaller group interaction with the present actual pattern in the larger world situation. It is often taken for granted that before we can have world cooperation a condition must be achieved in which group processes will operate in the way they are assumed to operate as actual every day norms in smaller groups. Thus it is maintained that there must be common interests with the virtual elimination of conflict before we can have an international order. This position ignores the fact that in most smaller groups there are, over and above the minimum of common interests serving to hold the group together, many imperfectly accommodated and unassimilated differences which periodically break out or threaten to break out as conflicts.

Our thinking about social processes at the world level is hampered particularly by one form of our ethnocentrism, which is the common assumption that a world of nation-states is the "natural" pattern, and the nation-state the "logical" unit. Whether we can get rid of war, which obviously would require a radical change in political structure, and whether world government is "practical" depend upon possible changes in this assumption. Such changes cannot be contemplated until the initial assumption is recognized and questioned.

If the biases described above are recognized and their effects neutralized or at least minimized, interpretations of international cultural relations will be based on components which may transcend the accepted logical categories of Western culture—and perhaps even our Western science. Such an approach does not promise that Western science and philosophy will serve as the universal solvent to dissolve cultural differences conducive to conflict and thereby guarantee

integration at a world level. It does, however, offer the possibility that by detecting culturally produced blind spots, social science may be more effective in implementing the process of accommodation and assimilation at the world level. This approach implies that the social scientist would consider even his own past conclusions and research as data to be thrown into the hopper for analysis in studying international relations—in a sense recognizing himself as part of his data, instead of assuming that he is the Olympian observer.

4. Responsibility of American social scientists

In the field of international cultural relations the special function of the social sciences is to understand the multiple forces at work, to interpret the ways in which they interact, and to predict how they may interact in the future. All of this is within a point of view which recognizes as a continuing need the search for the effects of blind spots induced by the fact that the social scientist is an American and a Western culture area product.

American social scientists have a responsibility for interpreting the dominant position of the United States, with a perspective different from that of the statesman or politician. The United States is acknowledged to hold the initiative in world affairs, a position which carries with it opportunity, responsibility, and complex psychological repercussions involving the interacting attitudes of others and ourselves toward our current role in world affairs.

Indicating the difficulty of the role of the social scientist in a situation where undetected biases further complicate the more obvious forms of ethnocentrism, we may take a specific current example for analysis. It is increasingly recognized that an impasse has been reached between the United States and the Soviet Union over the control of atomic energy. Our government, having submitted the so-called Baruch plan several years ago, is standing firm on the "majority plan" which has been accepted by over forty members of the United Nations. The Department of State, along with the President, and prob-

ably most Americans, seem to accept as fact that we can do no more than sit back and wait for the impossible: acceptance by the Soviet Union of our proposal, which appears as unlikely as our acceptance of theirs.

Late in 1949 it was reported that our Department of State, influenced by the demands of "key" Americans and organizations, might bring the matter of atomic energy control up for reconsideration by formulating a revised plan as a basis for resuming the hopelessly stalemated discussions. Perhaps in part this occurred as a result of the publication of a report by the American Friends Service Committee dealing with the possible reduction of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.⁸

The analysis made by the working committee of Quakers that produced the report and proposals involves assumptions which rest on "facts" and "principles" cited by the authors as well established by the social sciences. The position taken is that it is possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to find a basis for peaceful coexistence; further the report denies that war between the two nations is inevitable.

Most social scientists writing in this field—the "experts"—both in our universities and in our Department of State, come to conclusions differing from those of the Quakers; some come to an almost opposite set of conclusions. These conclusions in turn are based on "facts" and "principles" involving a set of assumptions different from those of the Quaker committee. The able review of the Service Committee report by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., illustrates the second set of assumptions and the conclusions based on it.⁹ Clearly, "facts" and "principles" are applied in each of the two analyses in accordance with underlying assumptions, and the conclusions derive from these assumptions as well as from the documenting data. The question then arises, to what extent are our "facts"

⁸ *The United States and the Soviet Union: Some Quaker Proposals for Peace*, a report prepared for the American Friends Service Committee, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949.

⁹ *New York Times Book Review Section*, November 27, 1949.

and "principles" provincial? Further, to what extent can we be sure that present "facts" and "principles" of the social sciences are free from the effects of undetected biases?

The purpose here is not to establish the correctness of either set of conclusions referred to above, but to raise the question as to the role of American social scientists in the field of international cultural relations. They have studied and analyzed conflicts in smaller groups and the processes through which over a period of time conflicts are resolved. To what extent are American social scientists bringing the same empiricism to bear at the world level, that is, giving the data a chance to reveal the points at which the world process parallels the process in smaller

groups, as well as the points at which there are differences?

If American social scientists, transcending possible undetected biases, are able to analyze cross-cultural processes at the world level, they will be in a position to contribute not only to a greater understanding of processes and mechanisms at the international level, but also to the purposive direction of world processes toward specified objectives. This is one way in which they can share in testing the hypothesis that it is possible to build a society in which other institutions and processes will replace violent forms of conflict.¹⁰

¹⁰ Robert S. Lynd, *Knowledge for What?* Princeton University Press, 1939.

SHARED VALUES IN COMPLEX SOCIETIES*

DAVID F. ABERLE[†]
Harvard University

HERE is a significant trend in contemporary social theory which strongly emphasizes the crucial importance of a shared system of ultimate values as an ele-

ment in any society.¹ This trend grew out of a polemical orientation to certain alternative theoretical formulations, only one of which need concern us here: the tendency to treat the ultimate ends of individuals in a social aggregate as random and to assert that social integration is achieved through the action of

* Paper read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society held in New York, December 28-30, 1949.

† The opportunity to participate in a series of discussions on the problem of values sponsored by the Social Science Research Council afforded much of the stimulation which led to the present paper. It is evident that the writer is also heavily indebted to a considerable body of theory on values, culture and its patterning, and social integration. Among the more important sources have been:

Ruth F. Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*, New York, 1934;

Albert K. Cohen, "On the Place of 'Themes' and Kindred Concepts in Social Theory," *American Anthropologist*, n.s., vol. 50, pp. 436-443, 1948;

Clyde Kluckhohn, "Patterning as Exemplified in Navaho Culture," in *Language, Culture, and Personality*, Leslie Spier, ed., Menasha, Wisconsin, 1941;

Clyde Kluckhohn and Florence Kluckhohn, "American Culture: Generalized Orientations and Class Patterns," in *Conflicts of Power in Modern Culture*, 7th Symposium (1947) of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, pp. 106-128;

Morris E. Opler, "Themes as Dynamic Forces in Culture," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 51, pp. 198-206, 1945;

Talcott Parsons, "The Place of Ultimate Values in Sociological Theory," *The International Journal of Ethics*, vol. 45, pp. 282-316, 1935; Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, Ch. 1, New York, 1937.

I am grateful for suggestions and criticisms to Professors Edward A. Shils, Talcott Parsons, Alex Inkeles, Francis X. Sutton, and Marion J. Levy, Jr.

¹ By a value is meant an effectively charged idea or attitude in terms of which objects, events, actions, individuals, etc., are judged on a scale of approval-disapproval, whether the approval and disapproval are moral, aesthetic, hedonic, or in terms of some other dimension. By a *shared* value is meant—for present purposes—one held in common by a plurality of individuals. By a *system* of values is meant a set of such ideas or attitudes which have a logical, meaningful, or affective consistency. The question of "internalized" vs. "simply verbalized" values is largely left untreated.

individuals pursuing their idiosyncratic ends rationally.² Though the concept of a shared system of ultimate values is of great importance for social analysis, there is occasionally a danger that it may gloss over significant problems. Particularly when we examine complex societies we are likely to stress those qualifications which we always introduce in asserting the general proposition regarding shared value-systems. Thus we ordinarily note that the system of values is only "shared to a certain extent" by the members of a society, or that it is only integrated "to some degree." Such qualifications are usually introduced to prevent quibbling empirical exceptions from inhibiting a significant theoretical development. After all, even in speaking of a simple homogeneous society we would be little disposed to insist either that the value-system is perfectly integrated, or that it is shared in all its parts to the same degree by all members of the society. Yet when we turn to a complex society such as that of the United States, these qualifications do not seem to exhaust the statements we would like to make about American values in all their diversity. We can find significant and systematized values that are shared by a very large sector of the population, but there are a large number of values which do not seem to be shared by the total population, or even by a considerable part of it. In what sense do the Western cowboy and the Eastern dairy farmer, the upper-upper of Yankee City and the lower-lower of Chicago, the Negro and the White in the South, the Irish Catholic, the Swedish Lutheran and the Polish Jew share a common value-system? Are we to take the total value-systems current in these groups and reduce them to a lowest common denominator and call this rather thin product the common value-element of American society?³ Or are

² For a discussion of the range of considerations which gives values a crucial role in a theory of social action, see Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action*, New York, 1937.

³ There is also the possibility that a number of value-systems which are in many respects heterogeneous may nevertheless fall within a particular type of "cultural orientation" typical of the Western world and not of other societies. Cf. Florence

we to assert that each of these diversified value-systems is logically implied in the most general value-system of the society—in which case it is hard to see why they should be diversified? Or are we to refer to all cases of divergence as evidences of malintegration in the society? There are, of course, important elements of malintegration in American society which involve, among other things, value-conflicts. The tension surrounding the American Negro's status can be profitably analyzed in part by reference to value-conflicts. But not every case of value-differences is to be understood in terms of malintegration.

It would seem, therefore, that a greater richness might be available to us in our analyses of value-systems in complex societies if we were to use other approaches than the search for the most general or the most universal values, important though that search undoubtedly is. While this paper cannot set forth the systematic tools for another type of analysis, it can, perhaps, by example, foreshadow such a systematic approach.

The general focus of this paper will be on the integration of sub-systems with diverse values, within the total social system.⁴ Let us take as given the fact of our own complex, industrialized society, with its highly diversified roles and role-systems, with all its regional, ethnic, and religious diversity. For our purposes there are two salient features of this society: first, that any individual actor occupies several roles in several role-systems, and second that any actor participates in only a few of the role-systems of the total society. Given these circumstances, under what conditions does social integration demand the sharing of values, and under

Kluckhohn, "Dominant and Substitutive Profiles of Cultural Orientations: Their Significance for the Analysis of Social Stratification," *Social Forces*, May, 1949.

⁴ It must be noted that the role of shared values as an integrational principle within each sub-system is identical with the role of shared values within the total social system. There is no intent to attack the general proposition that one essential element in integrating the action of a plurality of individuals is a shared value-system.

what conditions does it permit the diversification of values which in fact exists? By integration we refer to the capacity of the society to operate as a somewhat integrated totality, without degeneration into frequent open conflict, or breakdown into a series of independent smaller systems—to mention two types of departure from integration which are important for present purposes.

Perhaps no general useful answer to these questions can be provided. But the analysis of a somewhat simplified and idealized example may be of utility. Let us take the case of the Catholic, Protestant and Jewish faiths in this country, and try to examine the ways in which their diverse value-systems may co-exist in our particular kind of society. In doing so we shall have to simplify the case greatly, and also overlook certain malintegrations which in fact exist.

Let us begin with the churches themselves as social systems. The members of these churches, in their roles as church members, must share, within each faith, a common set of values (with the usual qualifications), or the organizations in question will be seriously unstable. Thus we have groups of people who share value-systems which differ from group to group. We must now ask, first, in what sense must the churches as organizations share common values in order to engage in coordinated action; second, in what sense the members of each church must share values with members of the others, in order for them to engage as individuals in coordinated action in extra-religious roles; and last, whether the values which must be shared for such coordinated action to occur set limits on the value-systems which these churches can conceivably hold.

It is possible that the churches might not engage in joint action, in which case we would have other problems for analysis than those which in fact confront us. But they do actually join for many purposes, including charitable programs, organized reform, and others. In addition, they meet in the context of the "interfaith" or "tolerance" meeting, a practice directly related to the very heterogeneity of our society, though by no means arising solely out of differences in religious

orientation. When individuals acting in their roles as representatives of their respective church organizations gather for these or other joint action purposes, they must, at least overtly, share the value of religious toleration. They need not have marked enthusiasm for the values and beliefs of churches other than their own; indeed an overvaluation in this direction would raise problems of recruitment and perpetuation for each church as an organization. Should a church militantly oppose toleration in this sense as a value, it could not operate in joint action with other churches—and certainly could not engage in "interfaith" or "tolerance" activities. (This is by no means to say that *therefore tolerance will necessarily be found in our society*. Its total absence, however, would create very serious problems of integration.) But if toleration is to be sustained as a value, and joint action is to be carried out, this value has implications for the values of the component churches. Thus, if a central value of one church were an abomination to another, they could not engage in joint activities as organizations. The bounds of such abominations are somewhat difficult to determine. Priapic rites and their associated sexual attitudes, cannibalism, polytheism as it is found in primitive societies, gods endowed with all-too-human frailties—these behaviors, beliefs and values would certainly clash seriously with the values of Catholics, Protestants and Jews, and it is, to say the least, unlikely that religious groups which practiced and believed along these lines could conceivably share in interfaith meetings with our churches. Yet the Jewish denial that Jesus was the Messiah does not preclude Jewish participation in such groups, for many and complex reasons.

This last problem cannot be gone into at length, but certain lines of inquiry that might prove profitable can be pointed out. The value of toleration has its place not only in the context which we have been examining, but in the central values of the socio-political system in which we live. Even if a particular faith did consider the Jewish attitude toward Jesus reprehensible, the complex of forces and balance of power is such

as to render it inexpedient to profess out-and-out opposition to the Jewish church. The possibility that members of a church may only profess tolerance, but may act for expedient reasons must remind us that shared values are only one factor which permits action to be integrated. It is true that a society in which individuals pursue their ends in ways governed only by norms of expediency is unthinkable; nevertheless, expedient action can be a part of the action-system of a viable society. Lastly, of course, the effect of secularization, and the intensity with which sacred values are adhered to is of importance.⁵

Our analysis thus far would indicate, then, that if the churches, or rather their members acting in their roles as representatives of the churches, engage in joint action, they must at least profess a minimum value of tolerance. On the one hand, this value permits a considerable diversification of the value-systems of these churches, but on the other, it sets limits, however indefinite, on the nature of the value-systems of the participating church organizations.

Church members, however, do not meet one another only in religious roles. There are many other role-systems in which they engage. Our society has a political, a market, and an occupational system in which universalistic criteria play an important part. It has an open class system and its patterns of marital choice are based on romantic love. Members of diverse religious membership are involved in political, market, job, social (in the non-technical sense of the word) and marital relationships. Marriage and "social" life involve primary relationships; in the other cases there may be more ramified and remote organizational ties.

Under these circumstances, the values of the individual in his role as a member of the church must not be such as (a) to exclude him from all these spheres of secular activity, or such as (b) to create serious problems of

⁵ It must be noted that tolerance on the one hand requires a certain degree of secularization, and on the other furthers the process of secularization—or at any rate reduces the possibility of extremism in religious matters.

integration with members of other churches with whom he participates in non-religious role-systems. If a man belonged to a religion that looked with horror on profits, he could not comfortably occupy the role of entrepreneur. If he were a caste Hindu, he could not comfortably act as a butcher. The non-religious role-systems which he could share with members of other churches would be correspondingly reduced. While it is not necessary that he be free to engage in every conceivable role in the society with members of other religious sects, his total exclusion from such role-systems would, if carried to its logical conclusion, result in the disintegration of the social system into a series of theocratic states. Carried rather less far, it would result in a kind of compartmentalized system rather different from the present one.

But even if the value-system of a particular church permits its members to participate in a variety of secular role-systems, there may still arise problems of integration. For example, if one church were to take the value-position that solidarity with members of that church was overwhelmingly more important than any other obligation, then a variety of non-religious role-systems would be thrown into an intolerable state of indeterminacy. In the sphere of market activities, members of such a church might feel free to cancel contracts or break verbal agreements with members of another church. These considerations, like those introduced earlier, set limits on the kinds of value-systems which can be held in two role-systems with overlapping membership. Since in our society individuals are involved with one another in religious and secular roles, the prescriptions for life in this world which are afforded by the value-systems of the various churches must be to some degree compatible with the other roles in which individuals are engaged, and with the value-systems that govern those role-systems. (It is, of course, possible for secular values to outweigh religious values, but if this tendency is carried to its logical conclusion, the churches will be faced with problems of integration and perpetuation, and the social system under analysis will be correspondingly altered.) There

is thus a range within which the value-systems of the churches and those of the occupational sphere may vary, but that range is not infinite if the social system is to remain integrated. The same type of analysis might be carried out with respect to marital, "social" and other role-systems. In these instances, the absence of such phenomena as hypergamy and the importance of commensality would serve to remind us that other types of integration than those of our own society are conceivable and possible—for example, in a caste system such as that of India. Still, the type of analysis would be similar in other cases.

Before turning to further considerations, we may sum up the conclusions thus far arrived at. The churches involved need not at all have a total value-system in common. Their members, whether acting as representatives of the church in interfaith activities, or acting in non-religious roles in ways that are compatible with their total definition of "the whole duty of man," must share certain crucial values with one another. The values of each system of roles sets limits on the other. But even these limits permit a rather looser integration of the total social system and a greater diversity of sub-system values than would be implied if we were to seek only for the common values shared by all the component individuals in all of their roles. It must be pointed out that this analysis has focussed *only* on the integrative aspects of the picture and has deliberately ignored large-scale problems of strain. It is by no means clear, however, that the strains arise out of heterogeneity alone. They may arise out of the *kinds* of values in the various sub-systems, and out of a variety of other factors.

The fact that individuals participate in several role-systems raises the possibility of still other modes of integration than those already mentioned. Certain individuals stand as "middle-men" in the system, sharing, without particular strain, certain values in each of two role-systems in which they act as an articulating link. A Western ranch owner may share a set of values with respect to appropriate masculine behavior with his

ranch hands, who may have a dislike for the "market mentality," and share another set of values with respect to the market, with cattle buyers in Chicago, with whom he also maintains periodic face-to-face relationships. The cattle buyer and the cowboy may have little in common in many ways, but their activities can be articulated, nevertheless, without unendurable tensions for the ranch owner. The roles he plays are separated in time and space. Were the buyers to visit him on the ranch, he might feel quite uncomfortable for a time, but this is not a necessary feature of his situation. There are, of course, thousands of such "middle-men" in the total society, plus thousands of situations where the links are so much more attenuated that individuals who could not interact without serious stress are so insulated from one another as to create no problems.

It is also well worth mentioning that the "mediator," who occupies a rather different position from that of the "middle-man," may be a potent force in integration. Such a person may serve to interpret the values of one group to another, or to arrange compromises. He may hold a standard position in one or more of the potentially opposed groups, or may have a rather special role which is said to be "outside" the traditional role-system. Examples are those representatives of science who mediate between universities and foundations, various types of public relations representatives, labor mediators, whether government employed, hired by labor and management, or—as in some cases—clergy-men and hence "outside" the system, and a variety of others.

This is by no means to deny that individuals who are spatially remote from one another may be involved in an institutional complex which does definitely require subscription to the same value-system. An example is participation in the political system. This system can tolerate a large number of apathetic individuals, but not a large number of individuals who believe that installation of a candidate in office is to be accomplished by storming the White House. Another example which potentially involves large numbers of

people, though it may actually involve fairly small numbers at any given time, is that of universalistic values* in the treatment of strangers.

In our society physical and social mobility are exceedingly important. Furthermore, individuals are continually interacting with others who are anonymous prior to or even during and after a specific contact. Consequently the sharing of universalistic manners and morals as values governing conduct toward strangers is of great significance. If people could not travel or engage in commercial and other transactions with strangers, without some confidence that they would be accorded (roughly speaking) the same treatment as that which prevails among acquaintances, and not subjected to force or fraud, the structure of the society would be seriously impaired. It would be possible to indicate other respects in which very large numbers of people must share the same set of values if the system is to remain integrated.

There is no wish to deny the existence of serious problems of malintegration, nor to deny the importance of research in these areas. It is a fact that within a complex society there are numbers of people who are apathetic toward the crucial values of the total system or sub-system in which they participate. There are others who, individually or collectively, manifest a hostility toward these value-systems and an orientation to other systems: individuals termed criminal, deviant, subversive, fanatic, and the like. Nor is there any desire to limit the analysis of value-problems to mere description, without regard for the problems of the inculcation of values, of the conditions which tend to perpetuate or to alter value-systems, or for problems of strain. But these questions cannot be taken up here.

As a matter of fact it is usually more interesting and often more profitable analytically to focus on role-strains, value-strains, and the like.⁷ They are easier to locate and

easier to describe than are the problems of integration, shared values, and the like. Our terminology and our thinking provide sharper tools in these areas. These facts limit the dramatic quality of the illustrations provided here, and the degree to which systematization is possible. Nevertheless, the approach outlined does provide some tools for the analysis of interesting problems in contemporary societies. It is a sociological approach to the problem of "cultural pluralism" or "cultural unity in diversity"—as it has sometimes been phrased—which is a feature not merely of a society with varied ethnic composition, but of any complex society.

It might be asked whether a simple analysis of roles and role-prescriptions might not have sufficed for our purposes, eliminating any reference to value-systems. A narrow adherence to this procedure would not be sufficient. Not only do the roles in a subsystem of a society complement each other at a behavioral level, but in addition the individuals in such role-systems are oriented not only to the role-definitions of other members, but to the general set of prescriptions that define the total role-system. In the absence of these general prescriptions, the behavior of the individual would not be meaningful, either to himself or to other members of the system or to the analyst. The near-exceptions to this are found in the case of individuals who claim that they "are doing their job without asking any questions"—but even here, the concept of a job itself has complex value-elements. Furthermore, the concrete prescriptions of behavior for individual roles and for role-systems are themselves justified in terms of more general value-statements, some of which have transcendental or ultimate value-referents. While it is true that when one studies a religion or any system of ultimate values, it is the consequences of the system of ideas and values for social action which is important for social analysis, nevertheless the task of outlining the values themselves, whether at a relatively concrete

* Cf. Talcott Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory*, Glencoe, Illinois, 1949, *passim*, for discussion of "universalism" and "particularism."

⁷ Cf., for example, Samuel A. Stouffer, "An

Analysis of Conflicting Social Norms," *American Sociological Review*, 14 (Dec., 1949), 707-717.

level or in terms of a few general abstract principles, is always a necessary part of the analysis. Both because any given role-prescription is meaningful only in terms of the role-system of which it is a part, and because the values governing a role-system ultimately involve important transcendental referents, simple role-analysis will not yield completely adequate results in most cases.

Finally, then, we see that in addition to the common value-elements of the total social system, there can be a considerable diversification of value-systems in parts of that total system, and that such diversification can occur without malintegration as an inevitable result. Sub-systems are themselves internally integrated by adherence to shared bodies of values which differ from system to system. These sub-systems may be integrated with one another by sharing certain values relative to the kinds of joint action in which they are engaged. The sharing of such values in action which integrates these parts of the total society sets limits on the kinds of value-systems possible in each part. Furthermore, every individual participates in several role-systems. Though the value-systems of each role-system may not at all be identical, there are problems of compatibility which similarly set limits on the range of possible diversification. The existence of "middle-men" as articulations between two role-systems permits an increasing degree of diversification of the values of the two role-systems. The more extended the links, the greater the degree to which the value-systems may vary. "Mediators" as interpreters and peace-makers reduce the possibility of serious tensions arising from value-heterogeneity. Nevertheless, the existence of actual or potential situations which involve large numbers of people in the same situation of action—though by no means always in face-to-face relationships (we have used the cases of voting and of "anonymous" contacts)—does necessitate the sharing of a common value-system for large numbers of people. But none of these considerations permits us to dispense with the concept of a shared system of values for the total society. This is essential both in setting limits upon the types of value-systems that

can exist in the sub-systems, and in establishing the nature of the articulations between the sub-systems. In an African kingdom, a feudal system, or a caste system, the ultimate value-system of the total society will be different, and so will the nature of the integration of the sub-systems.

The fact that malintegrations of value-systems, that role-conflicts and the like are empirically to be observed must also be noted. We are thus faced with the possibility of investigating a large number of cases with respect to types of integration which involve the sharing of total value-systems, types which involve the sharing of only a few values, with diversification of sub-systems, and those which involve malintegration and strain.

The analysis of value-systems alone, whether value-systems of total societies or of sub-systems, is insufficient for social analysis. Value-considerations must be related to roles, role-systems, and role-behavior, and to individual values and deviant motivations. They must be related to the analysis of the amount of latitude for apathy, expediency, and conflict which can exist with a tolerable degree of integration. Furthermore, we have here omitted a variety of exceedingly pertinent questions which must be asked in any adequately described empirical situation: the "cruciality" of the values, roles, etc., under consideration vis-à-vis the total society or sub-system under consideration; the extensive or limited character of the value-prescriptions—that is, they may bind a man to a set of obligations regarding "the whole duty of man" or they may bind a man to a set of obligations regarding a small sector of his total existence; the degree to which lip-service vs. "internalization" of values exists; the relative weight of two value-commitments when there is conflict, with the possibility that one commitment may be greatly attenuated. Lastly, it may be crucial for the system, the sub-system or the articulation of two sub-systems, that certain values be held by individuals or groups in particular positions—rather than that they be held by a certain number of persons. Problems of power and influence enter here. All these questions are

of the utmost significance but would require great scope and empirical material for development.

By no means asserting that a complex society has no common values, and in fact insisting that a core of common values is an integrational principle of any viable social system, this approach asks for further analysis of the value-systems or sub-systems of the society, in close connection with the recognition that these sub-systems themselves must be integrated with one another, and that every individual participates in a number of sub-systems. It asks for the functional analy-

sis of these various interactional situations to see *what* values must be shared in each situation, and how this impinges on the value-systems shared in other situations. Rather than assuming that heterogeneity inevitably results in malintegration, or attempting to reduce heterogeneity to exiguous common values, it looks toward a more precise formulation of role-systems and their component value-elements, and their integration with one another through certain common value-elements from one system to the next, as essential for the continued functioning of the society.

THE NEIGHBORHOOD, URBAN ECOLOGY, AND CITY PLANNERS*

RICHARD DEWEY
University of Illinois

THE MODERN period of city planning, which dates roughly from the World's Fair of 1893, has been dominated from its inception by architects, landscape architects, and engineers. Their domination has spread from the private consulting firms to the established planning commissions and departments on federal, state, and local levels. For years the problems faced and dealt with in the planning field were problems with which these specialists were equipped to deal, and the buildings, fountains, civic centers, lagoons, monuments, and even the highways were treated in isolation from the thinking and research of the social scientists. The latter were pursuing the problems of urbanism in their own way, and for the most part with neither knowledge or concern of the efforts of those technicians in the drivers' seats of the planning firms, commissions, or departments. What has resulted from this nearly complete divorce of actual city planning on the one hand from the studies of the city by sociologists and other social scientists on the other hand is clearly visible. Any sociologist, social-psychologist, economist, or political

scientist who takes the time to examine the master plans which line library shelves, and the current versions which will find their way to those shelves, is soon convinced of the inadequacy of these plans from the social science viewpoint. However, the divorce has not only accrued to the disadvantage of the planner, but has lulled the urban sociologist, among other social scientists, into an uncritical complacency. Inasmuch as he has not been called upon to test his observations, nor to measure the adequacy of his concepts in the day-by-day application of the planners who are shaping the growth and changes of urban communities, his concern with historical developments and with the grosser outlines of theory has apparently met the needs of those enrolling in his courses. Few if any of the students taking courses in urban sociology are called upon to apply their newly gained information in actual attempts to understand or control urban behavior.

However, there is increasing evidence that this situation is changing, and that the long-term estrangement of social scientist and city planner is coming to a close. Upon the initiative of the engineers, landscape architects, and architects who do the actual planning, research positions calling for training in the

* Paper read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society held in New York, December 28-30, 1949.

social sciences have become integral parts of planning staff organizations of most large cities.¹ The felt need for information and viewpoints which are not provided in the training of engineer or architect has been expressed formally by the American Institute of Planners in a report by their committee on "The Content of Professional Curricula in Planning," a committee made up of "firing line" planners, and not of academicians.² That report stresses the need for knowledge of economics, sociology, and political science equally as much as it does the need for technical knowledge of materials and/or for skill in design.

It is the purpose of this paper to urge the urban sociologist to overcome certain of the shortcomings which are the result of the separation of his efforts from those of the city planners. As a means to that end, two of the several weak spots of the urban sociologists are briefly discussed. In both instances the errors are of omission rather than of commission; the one concerning ecological theory directly, the second only indirectly.

The first instance concerns the sociologists' treatment of those urban areas denoted by the ecological terms "transition" or "conversion" zone. Whatever may have been written and said by the critics of the concentric circle analysis of city patterns and growth (which was initiated by Park and developed by Burgess), and we all know that the criticism has been considerable, none has denied that the terms "transition zone" or "conversion zone" denote valid structure and processes which are associated with rapidly growing American cities.³ These areas of mixed

¹ It is true that there are instances where social scientists have sought entrance to planning activities and have been denied, but this is not the rule.

² "Content of Professional Curricula in Planning," *Journal of American Institute of Planners*, XIV (Winter, 1948), 4-19.

³ Cf. R. E. Park & E. W. Burgess, *The City*, Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1925; Maurice R. Davie, "The Pattern of Urban Growth," in *Studies in the Science of Society*, ed. by G. P. Murdock, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937, pp. 133-161; Walter Firey, *Land Use in Central Boston*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947; Homer Hoyt, *The Structure and Growth of Resi-*

land uses immediately adjacent to central and auxiliary business and industrial districts characterize all such urban areas. Nor would planners deny, once they discover what is meant by the "transition zone," that herein lies a major problem area, if not the problem, of today's metropolis. Yet the plans for the problem's solution as recommended by the planners usually entail either some form of super-highway which would permit the employees of the central business district to ignore the problems of slum, blight, and confused land use by speeding past them en route to job or suburban residence, or else the construction of low-cost subsidized housing on high-cost land. These plans evidence a basic lack of understanding of the nature of the so-called "transition" zone, and this is one point at which the social scientists, urban sociologist and land economist particularly, have failed in their obligation to the planners. One looks in vain through current literature for an adequate discussion of the nature of this area. Even the continued use of the terms "transition" and "conversion" zones evidence the out-dated nature of the ecological concepts. These dynamic concepts of urban patterns and growth were derived from observation of rapidly growing cities, and are no longer applicable to central cities which are growing very slowly or not at all. The less flattering term of "stagnation" zone better describes the actual present-day scene. The problem of slum and blight in the past was frequently one of a moving target: the ecological processes of invasion and succession kept the situation fluid, creating problems of mixed land use on the periphery of the transition zone where business and industry pressed into residential areas, but solving problems on the inner side of the zone where the transition or conversion from residential to non-residential use had become complete. That period of rapid growth of the city is gone, in all probability permanently,

dential Neighborhoods in American Cities, Washington, D.C. Federal Housing Administration, 1939; James A. Quinn, "The Development of Human Ecology in Sociology," in Barnes, Becker, and Becker, *Contemporary Sociological Theory*, New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1940.

and the planner will find the concepts of invasion and succession of waning importance. As Stuart Queen has said, the problems now facing the planner of cities lie primarily in those areas where the conversion process stopped short of completion. Because these ecological processes are slowing down, even stopping or reverting in certain instances, the slum of today will not be the business district of tomorrow, nor can the planner meet his obligation through zoning regulations and control of expanding growth. The problem has become one of urban *re*-development, not one of controlled growth. The addition of this information, supplemented by that provided by needed research in the area, would not be difficult from the point of view of the sociologist or economist, yet would add greatly to the planner's ability to cope with his problems. Failure to provide the planner with such basic information accounts in no small part, it would seem, for the apparent willingness of many planners to accept as inevitable the present ecological patterns of large urban communities. The social scientist has some obligation to point out to the planners that the land use pattern of the erstwhile transition zone is the heritage of miscalculations of speculators as to the rate of future urban growth, the extreme overcrowding of low income residents as a *temporary expedient* in the speculation process, and of unfortunate tax policies which encouraged deterioration of the area. This much can be done immediately, despite the tremendous need for research as to the best use to be made of the extensive slum and blighted areas.

The second point selected to illustrate the costs of estrangement of planner and sociologist concerns the "neighborhood-unit" principle. This principle was given its clearest formulation and greatest impetus by the late Clarence Perry in connection with his work for the New York regional plan. The neighborhood-unit, as defined by Perry, is a residential area which

. . . should provide housing for that population for which one elementary school is ordinarily required, its actual area depending upon its population density . . . should be bounded on all sides by arterial streets, sufficiently wide

to facilitate its bypassing, instead of penetration, by through traffic . . . [should include] a system of small parks and recreational spaces. . . . Sites for the school and other institutions having service spheres coinciding with the limits of the unit should be suitably grouped about a central point. . . . One or more shopping districts . . . should be laid out in the circumference of the unit . . . [and] the unit should be provided with a special street system . . . being designed to facilitate circulation within the unit and to discourage its use by through traffic.⁴

Until very recently this principle rode unchallenged at the vanguard of planning concepts, sharing the spotlight with the over-emphasized express or limited-access highways. Although the remarks which follow are directed primarily toward the small group of extremists among planners who have exceeded Perry himself in their enthusiasm for the plan (Perry readily admitted that the principle was applicable only to certain parts of the city, being limited by both physical and social factors, see *ibid.*, pp. 52, 61) Mr. Perry did leave room for the inference that the principle still embodied for him much of the small village flavor. Witness his statement that

Thus the square itself will be invested with a meaning, a symbolism, more significant than the mere sum of its parts. It will be a visible sign of unity. . . . The square itself will be an appropriate location for a flagpole, a memorial monument, a bandstand, or an ornamental fountain. *In the common life of the neighborhood* it will function as the place of local celebrations. Here, on Independence Day, the Flag will be raised, the Declaration of Independence will be recited, and the citizenry urged to patriotic deeds by eloquent orators.⁵

It is to this aspect of Perry's writings, but more particularly to his less critical followers, that we now turn attention. Reginald Isaacs, planning director of Michael Reese Hospital in Chicago, caused no small amount of consternation among planners with his recent analytical attack upon the neighborhood-unit principle as a guide for urban planning. His main points of criticism, that the very social and physical nature of the

⁴ *Housing for the Machine Age*, p. 51.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 65. Italics not in the original.

metropolitan regions makes the creation of the small-town type of neighborhood an improbability, and that where the development of such neighborhoods has been attempted, the efforts were often motivated by the desire to segregate socio-economic groups, are not without verifying data.⁶

Isaacs makes a good, some persons think an over-emphatic, case against certain aspects of the principle, but perhaps his most telling attack was against the misuse of it. In response to the criticism, Frederick Adams, head of the department of regional and city planning at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, accused the sociologist of having presented a principle to the planners, and then criticising them for accepting it as valid. Professor Adams credits us with activity which is not ours, because the sociologists have been most conspicuous by their absence in both the development of the principle and in the ensuing controversy. In James Dahir's recent comprehensive annotated bibliography, containing well over 100 titles dealing directly and indirectly with the neighborhood-unit principle, only six titles are the works of sociologists.⁷ Surely it is within the province of sociology that the neighborhood

⁶ "Are Urban Neighborhoods Possible?" *Journal of Housing*, July, 1948, pp. 177-180; "The 'Neighborhood Unit' Is An Instrument for Segregation," *Loc. Cit.*, August, 1948, pp. 215-219. The essence of these arguments also published in "The Neighborhood Theory," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, XIV (Spring, 1948), 15-23. See also Max S. Wherly's answer to Isaacs' position, "Comment on the Neighborhood Theory," *loc. cit.*, XIV (Fall, 1948), 32-34.

⁷ *The Neighborhood Unit Plan—Its Spread and Acceptance*, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1947; Cf. "The Neighborhood Concept in Theory and Application," in *Land Economics*, XXV, Feb., 1949 (Supplement: "Symposium on Frontiers of Housing Research") articles by Svend Riemer, Reginald Isaacs, Robert B. Mitchell, and Gerald Breese; Judith Tannebaum, "The Neighborhood—A Psycho-Sociological Analysis," *Land Economics*, November, 1948; Walter Gropius, "Organic Neighborhood Planning," *Housing and Town and Country Planning*, United Nations Bulletin, 2, April, 1949, pp. 2-8; *Planning the Neighborhood*, American Public Health Association, published by Public Administration Service, Chicago; Catherine Bauer, "Good Neighborhoods," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, November, 1945.

concept falls, yet the treatment of it there has left much to be desired. Nor can we plead that the lack of research justifies our neglect, because there is much that we can contribute even today. It can be pointed out that much of the difficulty associated with the attempt to use the concept in planning lies in the planner's interpretation of it as a unitary concept, whereas it is a dual concept as they employ it.⁸ It embodies a service area concept designed to reduce the need for undue expenditure of time and energy, and for this part of the principle there are research findings which will permit the planners to proceed with the assurance that their reports will result in satisfaction for the residents of the service area.⁹

The other embodiment of the neighborhood principle is a nostalgia for the rural way of life with its closely compacted primary groups. The misconceptions of many planners as to the nature of the neighborhood as a primary group will thwart any real success

⁸ One sociologist has broken the concept down into even more parts, viz., the primary neighborhood, the concentric service neighborhood, the relational personal neighborhood, the areal neighborhood, and the residential area. Frank L. Sweetser, Jr., *Neighborhood Acquaintance and Association—a study of personal neighborhoods*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1941, p. 91. Professor Sweetser's study concerns itself with the "relational personal neighborhood," which he describes as being "socially definite, although it is areally indeterminate."

⁹ *Better Housing for the Family*, published by the Woman's Club of New York City, 1948; Theodore Caplow, "Home Ownership and Location Preferences in a Minneapolis Sample," *American Sociological Review*, 13 (December, 1948); *Present Housing of Former Project Tenants*, New York City Housing Authority, May, 1943; *Survey of Tenant Opinion in Charter Oak Terrace*, Hartford Housing Authority, 1942; *Urban Planning and Public Opinion*, Bureau of Urban Research, Princeton, N.J., September, 1942; *Why do Tenants Move?*, Citizens Housing Council of New York, 1940; *The Milwaukee Survey*, Urban Redevelopment Study, Chicago, 1949; Richard Dewey, "Peripheral Expansion in Milwaukee County," *American Journal of Sociology*, LIV (September, 1948). Further evidence of the practicality of the service area aspect of Perry's principle is found in the many residential areas already built which embody service units in keeping with the original principles. The best illustrations are Greenbelt, Greenhills, and Greendale.

of shaping social relationships by means of physical design. Among the questions to be raised by the sociologist for the benefit of the planner are the following.

The first question relates to the nature of the rural setting in which the neighborhood seemed to function best. Might it not be the homogeneity of income classes, nationality, racial, and religious composition that made random neighboring possible? Have the planners taken into account the marked heterogeneity of the city and considered the probability of the attempts to recreate rural patterns of social relationships in an urban setting floundering upon the stark realism of habitual prejudices? Can the sociologist disagree with Isaacs' assertion that application of the neighborhood principle will either result in segregation on a scale hitherto unknown or will fail completely? He makes his point well when he asks how the neighborhood unit principle can be applied to a population which is approximately equally divided between parochial and public school attendants. What sociologist would claim that sheer juxtaposition of peoples with irreconcilable convictions is sufficient for the resolution of these differences?

A second query we might raise is whether or not the rural community with its prototype of the neighborhood was ever the social paradise it is often assumed to have been. Isn't it more than likely that the advocates of the neighborhood principle look upon the small town social patterns from the vantage point of the leader or outstanding citizen of the community? This fact is illustrated by Oliver Goldsmith in his famous *Deserted Village*, a source often quoted in support of the small town ideal. One seldom remembered paragraph reveals that Goldsmith's principal concern with the passing of "Sweet Auburn, Fairest Village of the Plain" is his frustration at not being able to return to his former haunts and to show his worldly wisdom before the local yokels who never left the village.¹⁰ Had he written as much and as well

¹⁰ "In all my wand'ring round this world of care,
In all my griefs—and God has given my share—
I still had hopes my latest hours to crown,

about the reasons why he left the village in the first place, we might have a more balanced picture of "Sweet Auburn." Might it size the simple truth that whereas high social visibility plus high status adds up to a genuinely satisfactory way of life, high visibility added to mediocre or low social status results in a social situation that falls far short of satisfaction.

A third point requiring emphasis concerns the nature of the small town's primary groups. It is often overlooked that there are two types of primary groups operating in the rural setting. In the first group membership is voluntary and is made up of friends and associates of one's own choosing. The second group is made up of those whose attention is unsolicited and often unwelcome, but the small town resident cannot escape membership in this primary group. The former type of primary group is essential to man's welfare regardless of his residence, but the latter type is neither essential nor desirable, and is frequently the reason for persons migrating from rural areas. The sociologist and social psychologist can aid planners by pointing out that a large primary group is *not* essential to the development of an adequate personality. However, this misconception is integral to the thinking of those who would plan our cities in terms of neighborhoods. As one English writer has said, "Many worthy people do not want formal social organizations. They are happy among their family and their friends." He adds that ". . . when exiles think of their home town they are as likely to recall the pub, the snack bar or Sunday evenings in the park as they are to think of the church, the school or the community centre."¹¹

Amidst these humble bowers to lay me down;
To husband out life's taper at the close,
And keep the flame from wasting by repose.
I still had hopes, for pride attends us still,
Around my fire an evening group to draw,
And tell of all I felt and all I saw;
And, as a hare, whom hounds and horns
pursue,

Pants to the place from whence at first she
flew,
I still had hopes, my long vexations passed,
Here to return—and die at home at last."

¹¹ "Can Communities Be Planned," *Planning*, (London), Vol. XV, No. 296, March 28, 1949.

A fourth point is found in the fact that the ideal type neighborhood was congruent with the economic community wherein the populace spent all of their time. This fact, plus the slower modes of transportation and communication, enforced the close-knit community neighborhood. The resulting social pattern was born of necessity, not desire. Does not the fact that the breadwinner, and often other members of the urban family, must go outside of the proposed neighborhood for work, school, and special services destroy one of the prerequisites for the creation and maintenance of urban neighborhoods? The primary group activities, such as bowling teams and bridge groups, which are centered around place of work rather than residence, reduce the necessity of neighboring in the rural sense. It certainly is true that the planners who are ". . . trying to revive community life based upon place are moving against the tide of people's wishes. With modern communication there is no need for people to focus their interests on a particular locality."¹² In fact, it may be inviting a form of parochialism to do so. Svend Riener cautions us that "cultural stagnation may well be expected where the individual is challenged to escape from participation in city-wide and nation-wide problems into the parochial haven of neighborhood affairs."¹³

Further evidence of the improbability of any successful re-creation of the rural neighborhood in metropolitan communities is found in the attempts to do this by copying certain activities which were carried on in the rural setting. In certain housing projects in large cities attempts have been made to foster handicrafts in the neighborhood centers, thinking thereby to re-capture the neighborhood pattern of social activity. Actually, the result is an intensification of the division and specialization of labor which characterizes urbanism generally.¹⁴ Even though such activities as quilting, weaving, and hooking rugs are engaged in, they are

the activities of the specialist, whereas in the original rural setting every one in the community engaged in them. This affords one more example of the essential difference between the rural community of yesterday and the urban one of today.

In closing these remarks about the nature of the neighborhood-unit principle, it may be desirable again to make explicit the point that the target of such remarks is the extremist who has gone even farther than Clarence Perry ever did in espousing attempts to re-create the rural neighborhood within the metropolitan community. Such planners constitute a minority, albeit a vociferous one, among planners generally. Nor is this action on their part mystifying when one knows of the ugly, haphazard, and costly physical structure of modern metropolitan centers and of the genuine loneliness that characterizes much of the urban social life. The criticisms given here are more of the misapplication of the principle rather than of the principle as Perry outlined it in his *Housing for the Machine Age*. If the principle proves to be of prime importance in making our cities more livable, if it be the means of bringing more democratic control to the city as Cooley warned must be done, it will not be because of the uncritical application of it by ardent advocates, but because of its cautious application in accord with the best available knowledge of man's behavior in an urban environment.

Although it is probably true that urbanism is as neglected by adequate research as any other field of sociology, the sociologist and other social scientists can do much to bring greater realism into the present and future efforts of those whose responsibility it is to plan and redevelop our urban centers. But in order that this contribution may be made, the social scientists must learn what the planners are doing and what concepts are shaping their efforts. The plea made by this paper is that the social scientist in general, and the urban sociologist in particular, make certain amendments and additions before the planners come to us and find us wanting.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Loc. Cit.*, p. 71.

¹⁴ This point was suggested by Prof. J. E. Hulett, Jr., University of Illinois.

FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF SEX ROLES*

MIRRA KOMAROVSKY

Barnard College, Columbia University

THE CONCEPT of social roles with special reference to sex and age roles has been the subject of increasing sociological interest. But the problem of sex roles in various segments of our society requires further systematic empirical study. This paper attempts to outline what is believed to constitute a fruitful theoretical orientation for such research and to illustrate the application of this theoretical approach in a pilot study, involving twenty intensive case histories of middle class urban married women, in the summer of 1949. The study was focused on the "problem" aspects of sex roles, and while the discussion will be thus delimited, the theoretical approach it advocates appears equally applicable to other aspects of this general subject.

That there exists a great deal of strain in women's roles among the urban middle classes is generally recognized but the description and analysis of this phenomenon remain to be developed. The mere diversity of roles that women must play at different ages or in different relations need not in itself create a problem. Many societies show such diversity without causing either social conflict or personal disorganization. Indeed in any society, age, sex, class, occupation, race, and ethnic background involve the individual in a variety of socially sanctioned patterns of interaction *vis-à-vis* different categories of persons. Why, then, to put the question most generally, do sex roles today present such an arena of social and mental conflict?

Probably the most influential and systematically developed answer to this question today is the one found in psychiatric literature. This answer centers upon two

explanatory models. The orthodox analysts say with Freud: "Anatomy is her fate." They see women's problem in terms of the psychological dynamics arising out of some biologically determined sexual characteristic, i.e., penis envy or masochism. The individual life history is then taken as determining whether the development of this characteristic will follow normal or neurotic patterns. The other explanatory model takes more account of cultural factors. But, again, the root of the problem is seen in the clash between the biologically determined feminine impulses, on the one hand, and the social roles, on the other, which today, it is alleged, are peculiarly at variance with the biologically set needs of the feminine psyche.

In contrast to the psychiatric, the theoretical approach of this paper is sociological. It seeks to interpret social and mental conflict and the institutional malfunctioning which constitute the social problem in question, in terms of interrelation of elements within and between relevant social and cultural systems. It accepts the general premise that our culture is full of contradictions and inconsistencies with regard to women's roles, that new social goals have emerged without the parallel development of social machinery for their attainment, that norms persist which are no longer functionally appropriate to the social situations to which they apply, that the same social situations are subject to the jurisdiction of conflicting social codes, that behavior patterns useful at some stage become dysfunctional at another, and so on.

If orientation towards social patterns distinguishes our approach from the psychiatric, other features set it apart from some of the anthropological and other sociological approaches. It attempts more deliberately and systematically to place sex roles in their structural contexts. It is only when sex roles are seen in their manifold relations to kinship, occupational, educational and other social systems to which they are relevant, that

* Paper read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society held in New York, December 28-30, 1949. The author wishes to acknowledge her gratitude to Professor Robert K. Merton for his valuable help in the preparation of this paper.

we can attain three scientific objectives: (1) the functional significance of sex roles becomes apparent, (2) cultural contradictions can be located, (3) possibilities for change can be assessed. Furthermore, though to an extent shared by others, it is the central concern of this orientation to explore the *unintended consequences* of relevant social and cultural systems, not only for personality but for other systems; or, to use the terminology suggested by Merton, to explore the latent functions and dysfunctions of one system for another.¹

The orientation towards social patterns does not preclude the consideration of psychological factors: personality types as determinants of acceptance or rejection of given social roles, tensions in personality produced by diverse roles, techniques of maintaining an unconventional role, and so on. Indeed, it may be suggested that the consideration of these psychological factors can be all the more incisive and precise when they are set in the framework of social patterns.

So described, the approach will be readily identifiable as the "functional analysis" in sociology but a few further observations are in order. Because this research is oriented towards "social problems," it centers upon precisely those phenomena which have hitherto been on the periphery of functional analysis: phenomena of maladaptation, of strain, of dysfunction. Furthermore, sex roles are in such flux today that research must also deal with phenomena of change and readjustment, so intimately related to social and psychological strains. A static approach which did not address itself to problems of social dynamics would be patently inadequate for the task in hand.

Functional analysis has sometimes been criticized on the score of method; more specifically, because of its failure to subject its theoretical formulations to empirical tests. If the criticism is deserved, it does not appear to arise from its intrinsic features. In the forthcoming application of the approach, general formulations were redefined into

propositions which were actually or potentially testable by empirical techniques.

AN APPLICATION OF FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS

It is well known that the family of procreation occupies a dominant position in our kinship system. This is evidenced in a large variety of ways. Typically, the family of procreation is residentially segregated from the family of orientation of either spouse which, of course, is not the case in the joint or stem family systems. The ties to ancestors which obtain in a clan society and the ties to siblings maintained in the consanguine family type are much weaker in our society. Furthermore, all social norms, from those expressed in the legal code to those expressed in the "advice to the lovelorn" column, reiterate the theme that the primary loyalty is to one's spouse and children as against parents or siblings. The legal expression of this theme is found in our inheritance and support laws. If a man dies intestate it is generally true that his wife and children get *all* of his property. It is only in the absence of direct descendants that parents or collateral relatives share the inheritance with his widow. While statutes are fairly common requiring a son to contribute to the support of an indigent parent, his responsibility is more limited than it is toward his wife and children. These laws are deeply rooted in the mores. As an example, undergraduates have been observed by the writer to be shocked to learn that these cultural norms are far from being universal and that among the Arapaho, to take one instance, a dead man's brother has superior claim to his property even if the widow and his children are left destitute.²

In fact, the priority of the marriage relationship over the parental family in our culture has in recent years found expression even in certain intellectual fields of inquiry. As the result of the diffusion of the psychiatric point of view, close ties to a parent are under suspicion as the "silver cord" and, conversely, the emancipation from the family of orientation is viewed as the touchstone

¹ Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Chapter 1.

² M. Nimkoff, *Marriage and the Family*, p. 36.

of emotional maturity. These presuppositions often find their most explicit and unquestioned expression in textbooks. Thus, for example, a popular textbook on marriage states: "If there is a bona-fide in-law problem the young couple need first of all to be certain of their perspective. The success of their marriage should be put above everything else, even above attachment to parents. Husband and wife must come first. Otherwise the individual exhibits immaturity."³ Another textbook affirms: "Close attachments to members of the family, whether parents or siblings, accentuate the normal difficulties involved in achieving the response role expected in marriage."⁴ Again, ". . . there is a call for a new attitude, a subordinating of and to some extent an aloofness from the home of one's childhood."⁵ "Do not live with or in the neighborhood of your relatives and in-laws, and do not allow them to live with you."⁶

Some recent researches such as Morgan's⁷ and Dinkel's⁸ again testify to the extent to which the dominance of the family of procreation is rooted in our mores. Though these mores show some ethnic, religious and other variations,⁹ all available evidence

³ M. A. Bowman, *Marriage for Moderns*, p. 328.

⁴ H. Becker and R. Hill, *Marriage and the Family*, p. 349.

⁵ E. R. Groves, *Marriage*, 1933, p. 274.

⁶ H. Hart, *Personality and the Family*, p. 199. "Psychological" statements of this sort are frequently found in family textbooks. Authors often discharge their obligations to the concept of cultural relativity by an introductory chapter on "Other Family Patterns" and a general statement that the rest of the book deals with our own family system. This general disclaimer of universality does not prevent students from accepting the generalizations cited throughout the text as universal and it certainly does not help them to see sociopsychological processes in relation to the larger social structure in which they occur.

⁷ C. M. Morgan, "The Attitudes and Adjustments of Recipients of Old Age Assistance in Upstate and Metropolitan New York," *Archives of Psychology*, 214, Columbia University.

⁸ R. M. Dinkel, "Attitudes of Children Toward Supporting Aged Parents," *American Sociological Review*, 9 (August, 1944), 370-379.

⁹ Dinkel's study, for example, reveals that Catholics adhered most strongly to the belief that children should support parents even at the cost of psycho-

points to the primacy of the family of procreation as the dominant American cultural pattern.

But although this pattern of the primacy of the family of procreation *vis-à-vis* the family of orientation has been abundantly recognized, it has not been systematically related to the wide range of its functional and dysfunctional consequences. From within this range we may mark out the problem of sociopsychological continuities and discontinuities in the kinship structure. More particularly, we wish to consider to what extent the training in the parental family makes for subsequent adjustment to the well-nigh exclusive loyalty to spouse and children. We are raising two specific problems. Which particular elements of role training in the parental family can be discerned to have by-products which affect later adjustment of the members in their own families of procreation? Which of the two sexes is enabled to make the shift from the parental family to marriage with the minimum of psychological hazards?

DIFFERENTIAL TRAINING OF THE SEXES IN THE PARENTAL FAMILY

Illuminating material bearing upon differential training of boys and girls in the parental family was collected by the writer in the form of 73 biographical documents prepared by women undergraduates. The documents reveal that despite increasing similarity in the upbringing of the sexes among middle-class families, some sex differences relevant to our problem still persist. The girls who had brothers testified that in various ways the parents *tended to speed up, most often unwittingly, but also deliberately, the emancipation of the boy from the family, while they retarded it in the case of his sister*.

Judging from these documents, there are three different mechanisms through which this is achieved. Interesting as these are in themselves, our main problem is to consider presently their further consequences for the operation of the kinship system. Among

logical hazards to family life. The Jews had an average score between that of Catholics and Protestants.

these mechanisms is, first of all, the pattern of providing sons with *earlier and more frequent opportunities for independent action*. The boys are freer to play away from home grounds, to return later, and to pick their own activities, movies and books. They are ordinarily allowed the first independent steps earlier than their sisters, such as the first walk to school without an adult, the first unaccompanied movie or baseball game, and later in life, the train trip or the job away from home.

A student writes:

It was thought to be a part of my brother's education to be sent away to school. I was expected to go to a local college so that I could live at home. When my brother got his first job he got a room so that he would not have to commute too far. My sister, at 22, turned down several offers of jobs at a high salary and took a much less desirable one only because she could live at home. She continues to be as much under parental control as she was when in college. Frankly, if anything should happen to my parents, I would be at a complete loss while I know that my brothers could carry on alone very well.¹⁰

The second mechanism through which the emancipation of sons is speeded up involves a *higher degree of privacy in personal affairs* allowed the boys. One girl writes:

My mother is very hurt if I don't let her read

¹⁰ The relative extent to which sons and daughters are sent to an out-of-town college as against one in the home town is not known, but an indirect indication that the girls may be somewhat more frequently kept near the home is to be found in a soon-to-be-published study, conducted by the Columbia University Bureau of Applied Social Research, *The United States College Graduate*, by Patricia Salter West, based on a cross-section of all living American college graduates. The study revealed that a somewhat higher percentage of women than men attended colleges in the same state in which the graduates spent "most of (their) pre-college years."

Proportion of Respondents whose Colleges were in the Same State in which Graduates Spent "Most of Pre-College Years"

	Men	Women
College in Same State	65%	71%
College in Different State	35%	29%
Total	(4540)	(3231)

the letters I receive. After a telephone call she expects me to tell her who called and what was said. My brother could say "a friend" and she would not feel insulted.

And again:

My brother is 15, 3 years younger than I am. When he goes out after supper mother calls out: "Where are you going, Jimmy?" "Oh, out." Could I get away with this? Not on your life. I would have to tell in detail where to, with whom, and if I am half an hour late mother sits on the edge of the living-room sofa watching the door.

States another student:

I have a brother of 23, and a sister of 22, and a younger brother who is 16. My sister and I had a much more sheltered life than my brothers. My brothers come and go as they please. Even my younger brother feels that his current girl friend is his personal affair. No one knows who she is. But the family wants voluminous files on every boy my sister and I want to date. It is not easy for us to get the complete genealogy of a boy we want to go out with.

Thirdly, the *daughters of the family are held to a more exacting code of filial and kinship obligations*. When the grandmother needs somebody to do an errand for her, or Aunt Jane who doesn't hear well needs help, the girl is more likely to be called upon. The pressure to attend and observe birthdays, anniversaries, and other family festivals is apparently greater upon her than upon the boy.

These patterns of differential training of the sexes in the parental family are generally recognized to be functionally oriented to their respective adult roles. The role of the provider, on the one hand, and of the home-maker on the other, call for different attitudes and skills. Competitiveness, independence, dominance, aggressiveness, are all traits felt to be needed by the future head of the family. Although the girl can train for her adult role and rehearse it within the home, the boy prepares for *his* outside the home, by taking a "paper route" or a summer job away from home. Again, the greater sheltering of the girl may be functionally appropriate in the light of greater risks incurred

by her in the case of sexual behavior and also in marriage since, for the woman, marriage is not only a choice of a mate but also of a station in life.

The parents at times explicitly recognize this functional character of their training. One girl, for example, reports that both her parents were more indulgent to her. With a little pleading she could usually get what she wanted. Her brother, on the other hand, was expected to earn money for his little luxuries because "boys need that kind of training." In a couple of cases the girls testified that their brothers were expected to work their way through college, while the girls were supported. A student writes:

My brother is two years younger than I am. When we started going to school my father would always say as he saw us off in the morning, "Now, Buddy, you are the man and you must take good care of your sister." It amused me because it was I who always had to take care of him.

Another student recollects that when her brother refused to help her with her "math" on the ground that no one was allowed to help *him*, her mother replied: "Well, she is a girl, and it isn't as important for her to know 'math' and to learn how to get along without help."

More often, however, the proximate ground for enforcing the proper roles is expressed in terms of what constitutes manly or unmanly behavior or just "the right thing to do." The degree to which the recognition of functional implications is explicit is in itself an important problem bearing upon social change.

But if the differential upbringing of the sexes thus constitutes a preparation for their adult roles, it also has unintended consequences. This role training or, more specifically, the greater sheltering of the girl, has, as unintended by-products, further consequences for kinship roles which are not perceived. And it is to this that we now address ourselves. We are now prepared to advance a hypothesis that the greater sheltering of the girl has what Merton terms a "latent dysfunction" for the woman and for marriage in general. More specifically, we suggest that the major unintended conse-

quence of this greater sheltering of the girl is to create in her such ties to the family of orientation that she is handicapped in making the psycho-social shift to the family of procreation which our culture demands. Our problem is not merely to demonstrate the fact of discontinuities in role training so perceptively discerned in other spheres by Benedict and others. These discontinuities must be related to their structural contexts. We shall show how tendencies created within one social structure react back upon the operation of another structure within the same kinship system without the intention or, indeed, the awareness of the participants.

The hypothesis just set forth requires us to examine the actual mechanisms through which these postulated consequences follow. Essentially it is assumed that to the extent that the woman remains more "infantile," less able to make her own decisions, more dependent upon one or both parents for initiating or channeling behavior and attitudes, more closely attached to them so as to find it difficult to part from them or to face their disapproval in case of any conflict between her family and spouse, or shows any other indices of lack of emotional emancipation—to that extent she may find it more difficult than the man to conform to the cultural norm of primary loyalty to the family she establishes later, the family of procreation. It is possible, of course, that the only effect of the greater sheltering is to create in women a generalized dependency which will then be transferred to the husband and which will enable her all the more readily to accept the role of wife in a family which still has many patriarchal features. In contrast to this, we shall explore the hypothesis that this dependency is specific; it is a dependency upon and attachment to the family of orientation.

For the purposes of testing, this hypothesis may be restated in two steps: first, the alleged greater attachment of the girl to her family of orientation and, second, the resulting difficulties for marriage.

Turning to family studies in the search for data bearing crucially upon this hypothesis, we find the data to be scanty indeed. The comparative absence of materials sug-

gests that the hypothesis requiring this material was not at hand. With regard to the first step, the greater attachment to and dependence of the woman upon her family of orientation, the evidence, though scanty, is consistent and confirming.

SEX DIFFERENCES IN ATTACHMENT TO AND
DEPENDENCE UPON THE FAMILY
OF ORIENTATION

In a recent study, Winch¹¹ discovers a contrast between the sexes with respect to attachment and submissiveness to parents. Among the 435 college males included in the study, age correlated negatively with love for both parents and submissiveness to them, whereas among the 502 college women neither of these correlations is significant. The author puts forth and is inclined to support the hypothesis that, at least while in college, women do not become emancipated from their families to the same degree or in the same manner as men do.

Another set of data, as yet unpublished, from the same study, of 936 college men and women also tends to support our hypothesis.¹² It suggests that the college women are somewhat more attached to parents, less likely to make decisions contrary to the wishes of the parents, more frequently experience homesickness than is the case with the male undergraduates. No sex differences were found in feelings that parents have attempted to dominate their lives.¹³

¹¹ R. F. Winch, "Courtship in College Women," *American Journal of Sociology*, Nov. 1949.

¹² The writer wishes to express her indebtedness to Dr. Robert F. Winch for making these tables available.

¹³ Amount of Attachment between you and your Father.

	Male (436)	Female (501)
Extremely close	15%	22%

Amount of Attachment between you and your Mother.

Extremely close	24%	36%
-----------------	-----	-----

To what extent have the principal decisions in your life been in accordance with the wishes of your Father?

Very much	22%	31%
-----------	-----	-----

To what extent have the principal decisions in

Another confirming datum concerning undergraduates is found in a study of some 1500 students at the University of Minnesota.¹⁴ The author observes: "In two widely separated surveys of the total group, the frequency and type of family problems were found to be related to several other descriptive factors: girls, for example, had family problems more often than boys, especially such problems as 'difficulty in achieving independence.'"

The relative attachment to parents on the part of older men and women is revealed by Burgess and Cottrell.¹⁵ The authors studied a sample of 526 couples, the majority of whom had been married from two to four years. Two tables record the extent of attachment to parents derived from the statements made by the respondents themselves. Four degrees of attachment were distinguished: little or none, moderate, a good deal, and very close. The tables show that a slightly greater proportion of wives than of husbands characterized their own attachment to parents as "very close." The difference is greater in attitudes towards the father than towards the mother (to whom both sexes were, incidentally, more attached).

your life been in accordance with the wishes of your Mother?

Very much	21%	34%
-----------	-----	-----

Do you ever feel "homesick" for your father?

Very often or frequently	14%	24%
-----------------------------	-----	-----

Do you ever feel "homesick" for your mother?

Very often or frequently	19%	32%
-----------------------------	-----	-----

To what extent do you feel that your father has tried to dominate your life?

Very much or considerably	7%	7%
------------------------------	----	----

To what extent do you feel that your mother has tried to dominate your life?

Very much or considerably	13%	15%
------------------------------	-----	-----

¹⁴ Cornelia D. Williams: "College Student's Family Problems," *Journal of Home Economics*, March 1950, p. 180.

¹⁵ Burgess and Cottrell, *Predicting Success and Failure in Marriage*.

	Husbands (526 cases)	Wives (526 cases)
Attachment to Father		
Very close	21%	30%
Attachment to Mother		
Very close ¹⁶	35%	42%

Terman's findings are on the whole similar. The figures are as follows:¹⁷

	Husbands (734 cases)	Wives (721 cases)
Attachment to Father		
Greatest	16.7%	20.1%
Attachment to Mother		
Greatest	28.9%	35.1%

To sum up, when asked to characterize their own attachment to parents, somewhat more women than men give the response, "Very close." The size of the difference is small but the pattern is consistent. The sex difference is greater with regard to the father.

These studies were cited because they are almost the only ones available. It should be noted that they all depend upon the direct testimony of respondents. Except when the verbally expressed attitude is precisely what is wanted, all such studies raise the question of the relation of the verbal index to the phenomenon it allegedly represents. Failures of memory, of honesty, of self-knowledge often stand between the verbal index and the phenomenon studied. The next datum bearing upon our hypothesis has the advantage of having been derived from the study of behavior rather than from verbal attitudes alone though it would have been given added meaning had it also included the latter.

The Women's Bureau (Bulletin No. 138) made a study of two communities widely different in employment offered to women: City of Cleveland and the State of Utah. The report concludes:

In families with unmarried sons and daughters, daughters supply more of the family supporting income than sons supply, though earning less than their brothers earn (p. 13). In Cleveland twice the proportion of boys as of girls contributed nothing to the family support. With working sons and daughters under 21 years,

about a third of the girls compared with a fourth of the boys turn over *all* their earnings to their families.

It would be important to determine whether such a pattern of greater contribution of single daughters to family support is generally true. For if it is, it would have bearing upon a more general problem. It would represent a standardized pattern of behavior which is not directly called for by social norms, but is a by-product of social roles. In other words, it would mean that differential training of boys and girls in anticipation of adult sex roles has had, as an unintended by-product, a closer identification of the girl with her family and her greater responsibility for family support. Tracing this by-product brings out anew how interrelations of institutional patterns operate to produce other ramified patterns which are below the threshold of recognition.

So much for the first step of our hypothesis: the lesser emancipation of the daughter in the middle class kinship structure from the family of orientation. In so far as it is valid, we may expect that the transition from the role of the daughter to that of the spouse will be more difficult for her than for the son. She might find it more difficult, as was suggested earlier, to face parental disapproval in case of conflict between parents and spouse and, in general, to sever ties to her parents and to attain the degree of maturity demanded of a wife in our culture.

WOMAN'S LESSER EMANCIPATION FROM HER FAMILY OF ORIENTATION AS A FACTOR IN MARITAL DISCORD

That marriage difficulties arise as a result of the attachment of the wife to her family was amply illustrated in the pilot study conducted by the writer. In some cases the problem took the form of a mental conflict over the claims of parents and husband. For example, one woman said:

When I was single, I always helped my family. Now I have just heard that my father isn't well and should have a week's vacation. If only I had some money of my own I wouldn't hesitate a minute to send him a check. As it is, even if my husband would agree to give me the

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 377, Table 58; and p. 379, Table 60.

¹⁷ L. M. Terman, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness*, p. 213.

money, have I the right to ask him to deny himself the new radio for the sake of my family?

In other cases, the relation of the wife to her family caused marital conflict. The overt conflicts were sometimes about the excessive (in the husband's view) concern of the wife over her younger siblings. One husband accused his wife of neglecting their children in her preoccupation with the problems of her adolescent brother and sister whom, he maintained, she "babied too much." She telephoned them daily, waiting, however, for the husband to leave for work because the telephone conversations irritated him. The relation of the wife to her mother was the focal point of marriage conflict in still other cases. The husband objected to the frequent visits of the wife to her mother, the mother-in-law's excessive help with the housework ("You are shirking your duties as a wife"), the wife's dependence upon her mother for opinions, the mother-in-law's interference, and so on.

If our hypothesis is valid, we should find that such in-law problems in marriage more frequently involve the wife's parents than the husband's parents.

Given this theoretical expectation we examined the body of relevant opinion and data contained in some twenty texts and other books on the family. Of those examined, the bulk were written by sociologists, a few by psychiatrists and psychologists. As far as the sociologists were concerned, the field is virtually barren of data bearing crucially upon our hypothesis. The reason is simple—the problem was never posed. Several writers suggested that the mother-in-law constitutes a greater hazard to marriage than the father-in-law but they do not raise the question of the side from which the in-law problem is more likely to arise.

This gap reveals vividly the decisive role of theory in empirical studies. Evidently the sociologists were concerned with the explicit and acknowledged cultural norms which assert the structural symmetry of our bilateral family with identical relations to both families of orientation on the part of the spouses. Deviations from the norm of symmetry, then, tend to be interpreted in terms of individual

pathologies. It was the failure to perceive that deviations from the norm of symmetry may themselves be induced by other workings of the kinship structure and not merely by individual abnormality that resulted in the observed gap.¹⁸ Indeed, the illustrations used in books were inadvertently misleading. While the text implied a symmetrical relation to the two sets of in-laws as the norm, the illustrations of deviance cited more frequently a "mother's boy." Illustrations frequently come from clinical sources which are selective. Furthermore, in-law trouble which is due to the husband's dependence upon his parents, although rarer, may be more acute and, therefore, more obvious.¹⁹

The psychiatrists, represented by Hamilton²⁰ and Dreikurs,²¹ have passing references to the problem which are contrary to our hypothesis, but with no supporting data. Dreikurs asserts that the husband's family is more disturbing in marriage. Hamilton considers that the male "mother love victim" is the greater threat to marriage because "fathers seldom get a chance to absorb their daughters' emotions so much that they never love any other man."

It may be suggested that whatever the merits of the case, a certain theoretical bias has predisposed the psychoanalyst to this position. The psychoanalysts have been absorbed in the childhood drama of emotional development. The Oedipus complex has been more prominent in the orthodox theory than the Electra complex. In speculating about the in-law problem, the fixation of the son upon the mother would naturally loom important. The writers have not explored the possibility that the cultural definitions of sex roles may have differential consequences for the adjustment at issue.

An indirect but confirming bit of evidence comes from Burgess and Cottrell.²² The authors cite a result for which they offer no explanation. They find that "closeness of

¹⁸ See in this connection, R. K. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie" in *Social Theory and Social Structure*.

¹⁹ See below.

²⁰ G. Hamilton, *A Research in Marriage*.

²¹ R. Dreikurs, *The Challenge of Marriage*.

²² *Op. cit.*

attachment . . . in the association of parents and son show a consistent though small positive relation to marital adjustment." No such consistent pattern appears in the association between parents and daughter, although "no" attachment to the father and "little" or "no" attachment to the mother appear to work against a high marital adjustment score. In terms of our hypothesis, it is possible that *more* women than men who checked "a good deal of attachment" represented cases of "over-attachment" with its inimical influence upon marriage happiness.

Terman studied the same relationship. He cites²³ the mean happiness scores of husbands and wives according to the degree of parent-child attachment and also correlations of happiness scores with parent-child attachment. In contrast to Burgess and Cottrell he finds a positive correlation between attachment and happiness for *both* men and women. He does not state in the text what appears in the figures, however, that the correlation is lower for women.²⁴ Again it is possible that the favorable features in good relations with parents are counterbalanced in the case of women by the too close a tie which is sometimes hidden in the response "very close attachment."

If future research is to bear crucially upon the hypothesis that the "overattachment" of the wife to her family of orientation creates marriage conflict as evidenced by "in-law" trouble, it must be so designed as to disentangle various contradictory tendencies. It is possible, for example, that such marriage conflict is much more frequent among women whereas among men, though rarer, it may be experienced more acutely. Excessive ties to parents would be even more dysfunctional for the male role of the family head than for the housewife. Our culture is less permissive towards unusually close son-parent ties. Consequently, the "silver cord" may be more socially visible and better reported even if (and because?) it is a rare occurrence as compared with the daughter-mother ties.

²³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 214-5.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Tables 50 and 52.

Another refinement suggests itself. The role of in-laws as sources of tension may vary with the stages of the family cycle. We have hitherto stressed the attitudes of the spouses towards their parents as the source of in-law trouble. But the parents contribute their share. And here it is possible that during engagement and perhaps even in the first year of marriage it is the husband's family which creates more trouble for the young couple. As a rule, the girl's family may be more favorably disposed to marriage because a reasonably early marriage is more advantageous to the woman. Furthermore, the very attachment of the girl to her family means, as the folklore has it, that "when your son marries, you lose a son, when your daughter marries, you gain one," or, "your son is your son till he takes him a wife, your daughter is your daughter all her life." Again, the greater control exercised over the choice of mates by the girl's family may mean that the prospective son-in-law is more acceptable than the prospective daughter-in-law because he reflects the family's choice.²⁵ But whereas in the engagement period the husband's family may figure more prominently in in-law conflicts, it is assumed, in the light of this paper, that as the marriage continues, the basic dependence of the woman upon her family tends to make her parents the principal actors in the in-law drama.

It is hoped that future research may recognize the problem and test further the hypotheses here set forth.

²⁵ An interesting confirmation of these a priori considerations comes from the forthcoming volume on Engagement and Marriage by E. W. Burgess and P. Wallin, cited through the courtesy of Professor Wallin. Two hundred and thirty-six engaged couples were asked to check topics the discussion of which provokes "reticence, tension or emotion" in themselves. Among the listed topics were "your family" and "your fiance(e)'s family." The men's families as "sore spots" of the engagement were checked by the women more frequently than the women's families, 20.4% of women listing his and only 11.5% their own. As for men, they were about equally troubled by their own families (12%) as by their prospective in-laws (8.4%). The authors conclude: "Apparently, women feel they are—or perhaps they actually are—subject to more criticism from the men's families than is the case with the men in relation to the women's families."

A
ency
for
twen
years
marri
num
and
spou
of va
for
spou
H
selec
of
Furt
with
reach
sons
age a
at v
which
Some
one
anoth
group
No
inde
that

*
can
ember
'S
report
are t
part
The
(Sept
Ruby
Marri
XLIV
Kolle
Marri
Males
view

AGE AS A FACTOR IN MARRIAGE*

PAUL C. GLICK AND EMANUEL LANDAU
Bureau of the Census

AGE is one of several important factors that tend to limit the choice of a marriage partner. There is a general tendency in American society for men to marry for the first time when they are in their twenties and for them to marry a wife a few years younger than they are. Age at first marriage varies over a relatively limited number of years for most men and women, and the difference between the ages of most spouses likewise is subject to a small range of variation. There is the additional tendency for the difference between the ages of the spouses to be greater if either or both are marrying for the second or subsequent time.

However important age may be in marital selection, other factors, such as propinquity of residence,¹ quite often outweigh it. Furthermore, age at marriage is associated with the age at which physical maturity is reached, the age at which marriageable persons of the two sexes are concentrated, the age at which education is completed, the age at which self-support begins, the age at which children can be borne, and the like. Some, if not all, of these items vary from one racial, religious, or economic group to another and among persons within any one group.

Nor is age at marriage a tendency that is independent of the times. There is evidence that the median age at marriage has declined

since 1890. On the basis of census data on marital status and age, the estimated median age at first marriage for men who had ever been married at the time of the 1890 census was 26.1 years; it dropped to 24.3 years for 1940, and to 22.7 years for 1949. For women, the corresponding figures were 22.0 years for 1890, 21.6 years for 1940, and 20.3 years for 1949.² Furthermore, age at marriage differs from prosperity to depression³ and from peacetime to wartime. Marriages may be

¹ The 1940 figure for females is based on census returns on age at marriage. It is quoted here because it has been used in several other publications and because it differs so slightly from the 1940 figure (21.5 years) based on the same method used in calculating the other estimated medians cited here. Estimated median ages at first marriage for persons enumerated in each census from 1890 to 1940 and the methods by which the medians were obtained were published by the Bureau of the Census in *Population—Special Reports*, Series P-45, No. 27, "Age At First Marriage." The figures for 1949 are based on statistics published in the Census Bureau's *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 26, "Marital Status and Household Characteristics," and supplemental data for men in the armed forces. See also the article by Paul C. Glick, "The Family Cycle," *American Sociological Review*, 12 (April 1947), 164-174. Nation-wide data on age at marriage are not available from statistics based on marriage records. Statistics for 23 states on age at marriage were published in the Census Bureau's *Vital Statistics—Special Reports*, 17: 85-108, "Marriage Statistics—Resident Brides and Grooms by Age: Collection Area, United States, 1940," March 1943 (out of print). Marriage statistics are now collected by the National Office of Vital Statistics. Figures for selected states on age at marriages during recent years will soon be published by that agency. See Samuel C. Newman, "The Development and Status of Vital Statistics on Marriage and Divorce," *American Sociological Review*, 15 (June 1950), 426-429.

² Evidence of such variation in age at marriage and especially of a decline in the difference between the ages of spouses at marriage during the depression of the 1930's is presented by Walter C. McKain, Jr., in an unpublished thesis, "Assortative Mating in Prosperity and Depression, with Special Reference to Ages, Residences, and Occupations of the Contracting Parties." See also Walter C. McKain, Jr., and C. Arnold Anderson, "Assortative Mating in Prosperity and Depression," *Sociology*

* Paper read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society held in New York, December 28-30, 1949.

¹ Several studies bearing on this factor have been reported in the sociological literature. Among them are the following: James H. S. Bossard, "Residential Propinquity As A Factor in Mate Selection," *The American Journal of Sociology*, XXXVIII (September 1932), 219-224; Maurice R. Davie and Ruby Jo Reeves, "Propinquity of Residence before Marriage," *The American Journal of Sociology*, XLIV (January 1939), 510-517; and Marvin R. Koller, "Residential Propinquity of White Males at Marriage in Relation to Age and Occupation of Males, Columbus, Ohio," *American Sociology Review*, 13 (October 1948), 613-616.

postponed or set forward, depending on the level of economic activity and psychological factors that prevail. Furthermore, practices with regard to age at marriage are commonly known to differ widely from country to country. Child marriages in India and late marriages in Ireland are cases in point.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to treat all of the ramifications of the subject that have been introduced. The paper is essentially an analysis of national data collected at one point in time. The value of the results would have been improved if more of the factors mentioned above could have been taken into account.

In April 1948, the Bureau of the Census included several supplemental questions on the schedule used in its monthly sample survey of a cross-section of about 25,000 scientifically selected households in 68 counties or groups of counties throughout the nation. In addition to questions asked each month on age, sex, employment status, occupation, and industry, the schedule included questions, as in April 1947 and earlier surveys, on income and marital status; and, for the only time during the 1940's, the sample survey included questions on number of times married and duration of present marital status. From the last three items, age at present marriage, widowhood, or divorce was also derived. The present paper deals primarily with some of the results obtained from this survey. Since the figures are based on a sample, they are subject to sampling variability. Therefore, the smaller figures, as well as small differences between figures should be interpreted with particular care. Nevertheless, the relationships revealed by the data should be useful for analytical purposes.

The first topic discussed is age of men and of women at marriage and remarriage. This is followed by a consideration of the differ-

ences between the ages of husbands and their wives. Finally, each of these subjects is treated in relation to selected socio-economic characteristics.


Age at marriage and remarriage. The period when half of the men have entered their first marriage is between the ages of about 22 and 28 years, according to the results of the 1948 survey. One-half of the men who were still married to their first wife had married sometime during the six-year span. (This span is described statistically as the difference between the first and third quartiles of the distribution of ages at first marriage.) Furthermore, as many had married before they had reached their 22nd birthday as had married after they had passed their 28th birthday. (See Figure 1.)

The average (median) age at first marriage for the men who were still married to their first wife at the time of the 1948 survey was 24.2 years.⁴ It does not follow, however, that 24 was the modal age at marriage, that is, that more of the men married when they were 24 years old than at any other age. As a matter of fact, only 9 per cent of the men married for the first time when they were 24. There were about as many men reported as having married at age 21, 22, or 23 as at age 24. Only 9 per cent were first

⁴ This figure constitutes a revision of the corresponding figure, 24.7 years, published in Table 11 of the Census Bureau's *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 23, "Marital Status, Number of Times Married, and Duration of Present Marital Status: April, 1948." All of the medians presented in that table should be reduced by one-half year, because the medians were derived as if age at entry into present marital status had been obtained by a direct question in the survey, instead of being obtained indirectly in response to a question on duration of present marital status. The uncorrected figures were cited on page 728 of the article by Paul C. Glick, "First Marriages and Remarriages," *American Sociological Review*, 14 (December, 1949), 726-734. Earlier in this paper figures on the estimated median age at first marriage for 1949 based on the marital status and age distribution of the population were cited. Since the methods used in obtaining the 1948 and 1949 figures are not the same, the reader should not interpret the apparently marked difference between the figures given for these two years as indicating the amount of change during the intervening period in age at first marriage.

and *Social Research*, 21 (May 1937), 411 ff.; Otis D. Duncan, "The Factor of Age in Marriage," *The American Journal of Sociology*, XXXIX (January 1934), 469 ff.; and James H. S. Bossard, "Age Factor in Marriage: A Philadelphia Study, 1931," *The American Journal of Sociology*, XXXVIII (January 1933), 536 ff.

FIGURE I.— HUSBANDS AND WIVES BY AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE AND REMARRIAGE: U.S. 1948



BUREAU OF THE CENSUS

married before they were 20 and 7 per cent after 35. At each year of age after 24, the number marrying for the first time tapered off, gradually at first and then relatively more sharply.

Age at first marriage for women is lower,

of course, and even more narrowly restricted in range than that of men. One-half of the women surveyed in 1948 who were still in their first marriage had entered matrimony between the ages of about 19 and 24—a span of 5 years. The median age of women at

first marriage was 20.9 years. The peak years at which women entered their first marriage were from 18 to 21, inclusive; about 10 or 11 per cent of the women were reported as having married at each of these four ages. At the extremes, only 15 per cent of the women were first married before they were 18 years old and 7 per cent after they were 30.

This background serves as a basis for certain observations and conclusions. First, there is a relatively narrow age period during which the majority of men and women enter their initial marriage.

Second, although the range of age at first marriage is rather narrow, there is enough variation to warrant giving more attention to the dispersion, and less to the central tendency, with regard to age at first marriage, than has been given in some earlier treatments of the subject.

Third, changes in the average age at which education is completed have not affected the average age at marriage very seriously. In spite of the great increase in the proportion of persons who complete high school or who attend college, there has been no apparent repercussion on the average age at marriage. A counteracting factor that may have operated to encourage earlier marriage, on the other hand, is the wider dissemination of knowledge and practice with respect to family limitation.

Fourth, the period when men first marry may be compared with the corresponding period when men enter the labor force. A study made by the Bureau of Labor Statistics showed that half of the men enumerated in the 1940 census started their participation in the labor force between the ages of 15.3 and 18.1 years, with as many starting before age 15 as after age 18. Since so many reservations must be recognized because of differences in the base dates and other problems of comparability, however, further study is needed before a definitive statement can be made as to what proportion of the husbands precede their entrance into marriage with a given number of years of labor force participation.

Color differences and urban-rural differ-

ences in age at first marriage are not available from the 1948 sample survey, but they were obtained in the tabulations of the 1940 census data on the fertility of women. The 1940 tabulations on age at first marriage were based on a sample of about $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of all women in the United States.^{4a}

Nonwhite women who had ever been married were about two years younger, on the average, than the corresponding group of white women at the time of first marriage. The median age at first marriage for nonwhite women was 19.3 years and that for white women, 21.1 years. These figures undoubtedly reflect well-known differences in the average income and occupational level of the two color groups. (See section below on classifications by socio-economic characteristics.)

Urban women were about 1 year older, on the average, than rural women at the time of first marriage, according to the 1940 figures.⁵ Age at entry into first marriage was about the same, on the average, for rural-nonfarm and rural-farm women. The somewhat older age of urban women at first marriage is very likely associated with the fact that women in cities are more likely to work for wages or salaries outside the home before marriage than women in rural areas.

Let us turn now to an analysis of age at remarriage. Of the 35 million married men in 1948, about $4\frac{1}{2}$ million, or 13 per cent, had been married more than once. Their median age at remarriage was 36.5 years. A comparison of this figure with that for the median age at first marriage, 24.2 years, shows a substantial difference, namely 12 years. A comparison of the distribution of age at remarriage with that of age at first

^{4a} The statistics on age at first marriage by color and residence presented here are from the Census Bureau's *Population—Special Reports*, Series P-45, No. 7, *op. cit.*

⁵ Data for 1910 show a similar urban-rural differential in age at first marriage. See Frank W. Notestein, "Differential Age at Marriage According to Social Class." *The American Journal of Sociology*, XXXVII (July 1931), 22-48. In his study, the universe was limited to women who had been married five to nine years and who were under forty years of age at first marriage.

marriage is likewise very striking. The central one-half of the ages at remarriage for men cover the 17-year span from about 29 to 46 years of age. The corresponding span for age at first marriage was only 6 years.^{5a} (See Figure 1.)

About as many women as men in 1948 were remarried, but the women remarried at a considerably earlier age. The median age at remarriage for the 4½ million women who were still married at the survey date was 30.8 years. Once again the dispersion of ages at remarriage is very large. The central one-half of the ages at remarriage cover the 14-year span from about 25 to 39 years.

One of the gaps in our knowledge is the contribution of previously divorced persons, as compared with previously widowed persons, to the numbers of remarriages at different age levels. We have an indication, however, that about three-fifths of those who were remarried in 1940 had been previously divorced.^{5b} With the increase in the number of divorces between 1940 and 1948, it is likely that the ratio of previously divorced persons to previously widowed persons has risen at all ages of remarriage. Certainly most of those remarrying at the earlier ages are persons whose first marriage was broken by divorce and most of those remarrying at the later ages are persons whose previous marriage was broken by death of the spouse. These facts would lead one to expect that the distribution of ages at remarriage was bimodal.

As pointed out above, women ~~women~~ remarry do so at a much younger age, on the average, than men do. This tendency suggests that the period between the dissolution of marriage and remarriage is briefer for women

than it is for men. Statistics are not available on a national scale, however, to demonstrate this point. If it is true, a plausible explanation would probably include reference to the greater dependence of women or someone else for financial support.

Another hypothesis, on which there is some evidence from independent studies based on selected samples, is that women who marry at an extremely young age are more likely than those who marry at a more mature age to have their marriages dissolved by divorce;⁶ such women would be expected to remarry subsequently at a relatively young age.

Again, women whose marriages are broken when they are past middle age, usually by widowhood, apparently have poorer remarriage prospects than men whose marriages are broken when they are past middle age. One reason for this is the fact that many widows would lose their pension rights or their inheritances if they remarried. This reason may be less important a factor, however, than other factors in accounting for the ratio of three widows for every widower in the United States. These other factors include the younger age of women at first marriage, with the consequence that women usually outlive their husbands; and also the more favorable survival rates of women at all ages. Because widows so greatly outnumber widowers and thus so often hold the life's earnings of the family, a large part of the wealth of the country is in the hands of widows.

The balance of this section consists of a

^{5a} See Census Bureau's *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 23, *op. cit.* See comment on revised medians in footnote 4.

^{5b} See Census Bureau's *Vital Statistics—Special Reports*, 17: 128-129, "Marriage Statistics—Resident Brides and Grooms by Previous Marital Status: Collection Area, United States, 1940," March 1943; also see the discussion of available figures on previous marital status presented in *The American Family*, a report of the Inter-Agency Committee for the National Conference on Family Life, May 1948, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949, p. 21.

* See Howard Becker and Reuben Hill (ed.), *Marriage and the Family*, Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1942, pp. 462-463; Meyer F. Nimkoff, *Marriage and the Family*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947, pp. 546-547; Andrew G. Truxal and Francis E. Merrill, *The Family in American Culture*, New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1947, pp. 701-703; Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, "The Chances of Marriage and of Remarriage," *Statistical Bulletin*, January 1944. Statistics on divorce rates and marital death rates are presented in an article by Paul H. Jacobson, "Total Marital Dissolutions in the United States: Relative Importance of Mortality and Divorce," in *Studies in Population*, Princeton University Press, 1949, pp. 3-16.

methodological note. Statistics on age at first marriage as well as those on age at remarriage vary somewhat according to the universe on which the study is based. If a person is dealing with figures for all persons still married to their first spouse, he may expect the values to differ somewhat from those he would obtain from statistics based on husbands and wives both of whom have been married only once and who are still living together. Furthermore, statistics on age at marriage based on a method which involves the use of the total male or female population classified by marital status and age may be expected to differ from those based on marriage records. On the other hand, the ranges of the data, and even the averages, are often not very far apart for several of these universes and sources because of the heavy overlap among the universes and other reasons.⁷

Although the 1948 study of age at marriage was based on results obtained indirectly from answers to a question on duration of marriage in combination with age at the survey date, it is probable that statistics on average age at marriage thus derived, if properly interpreted, do not differ significantly from averages that might have been obtained from answers to a direct question on age at marriage.

The median ages at marriage based on the 1948 data are for married persons of all ages at the survey date, rather than for only those who were old enough to have experienced the full span of marriageable ages. Research workers have sometimes used data

⁷ For example, statistics on median age at first marriage for men differ as follows: 24.2 based on all married men in 1948 still married to their first wife; 24.1 based on married couples in 1948 with both the husband and his wife married once and the husband employed (for the same universe classified by duration of marriage, the median age at marriage was: 24.2 for those married less than 5 years and 24.1 for those married 5 years or more); 24.3 based on the total male population in 1940 classified by age and marital status (see Census Bureau's *Current Population Reports*, Series P-45, No. 7, *op. cit.*); and 25.3 based on marriage records for 23 states in 1940 (see Census Bureau's *Vital Statistics—Special Reports*, 17: 85-108, *op. cit.*).

for persons in a single age group, for example, 45 to 54 or 45 to 64, as representing a preferable base for such statistics. The present study was not restricted to such an age group, partly because of limitations of the sample. The median age at first marriage of an actual cohort as it travels through life would be slightly older than that recorded for all persons married at the survey (or census) date.⁸

Figures on age at marriage based on census returns are the only ones available for showing certain types of cross-classifications with socio-economic factors. Furthermore, they permit the analysis of a cross-section of the population as of one point in time. But they are likely to differ from figures based on marriage records to the extent that there are changing or differential rates of marriage, divorce, death, and remarriage—and there have undoubtedly been marked changes in these rates during the lifetime of the adult population. Also both census data and marriage records are subject to biases due to errors of response, to nonresponse, and to sampling variation or limited coverage. Nonetheless, the inferences that may be drawn from one source or calculated by one method regarding changes over time or differentials among socio-economic groups usually—but not always—tend to be about the same as those drawn from another source or calculated by another method.

Differences between ages of husbands and wives. In our society there is a well-established pattern of differences between the ages of spouses, namely, the husband is generally a few years older than his wife. This is not a rigid pattern, inasmuch as there is variation from couple to couple and also inasmuch as the pattern is not the same in remarriage as it is in first marriage. We shall return to some reflections on the possible reasons for the pattern, or patterns, after we have set forth some of the facts.

This part of the 1948 study is necessarily

⁸ See Wilson H. Grabill, "Attrition Life Tables for the Single Population," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 40 (September 1945), 364-375.

limited to married couples still living together at the survey date. Some of the findings are limited to persons 18 to 74 years of age (thereby omitting 3 per cent of the couples) and others are limited to couples

TABLE I. NUMBER OF YEARS WIFE WAS YOUNGER OR OLDER THAN HER HUSBAND, FOR MARRIED COUPLES, 18 TO 74 YEARS OLD, BY NUMBER OF TIMES MARRIED, FOR THE UNITED STATES: CIVILIAN POPULATION, APRIL 1948

(A minus sign for a quartile indicates that the quartile fell among wives who were younger than their husbands)

Years wife was younger or older than her husband	Husband and wife married once	Husband and/or wife married more than once
Number ¹	27,164,000	6,110,000
Per cent.....	100.0	100.0
Wife younger than husband		
10 years or more younger.....	77.8	74.9
6 to 9 years younger.....	7.9	27.6
5 years younger.....	16.7	18.0
4 years younger.....	7.7	5.5
3 years younger.....	9.4	5.9
2 years younger.....	11.2	5.7
1 year younger.....	12.5	6.3
Wife same age as husband.....	10.2	6.5
Wife older than husband.....		
1 year older.....	12.0	18.6
2 years older.....	5.4	4.6
3 or 4 years older.....	2.7	3.0
5 years or more older.....	2.4	4.3
Quartile ²		
First (years).....	-5.4	-10.2
Second (median years).....	-2.8	-4.7
Third (years).....	-0.7	-0.5

¹ Married couples with both spouses living together. Excludes 1,015,000 married couples with one or both spouses under 18 years old; both 75 or over; or one between 18 and 74 and the other under 18 or over 74.

Source: Bureau of the Census.

with both spouses married only once (thereby omitting 19 per cent).⁹

⁹ For 1948 statistics on age of husband by age of wife not shown in the present paper, see the Census Bureau's *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 26, *op. cit.*

The findings in Table I indicate that the average wife was 2.8 years younger than her husband,¹⁰ where both the husband and his wife were married only once and where the median was used as the measure of the average.


However, the average wife, strictly speaking, was one of a small minority; only 11 per cent of all wives were just 3 years younger than their husbands. Half of the wives' ages fell below those of their husbands by about 1 to 5 years. In fact, 78 per cent of all wives were younger than their husbands and only 12 per cent were older; the remaining 10 per cent were the same age as their husbands. (See Figure 2.)

The figures just cited pertain to married couples living together in their first marriage. Quite a different picture is portrayed for couples with one or both spouses married more than once. Here the average wife was 4.7 years younger than her husband. In other words, marital unions involving at least one partner with a previously broken marriage tended to comprise husbands and wives whose ages were 2 years farther apart than those involving no partner with a previously broken marriage. Moreover, couples involving remarriages had a far wider scatter of the differences between the ages of the spouses, as indicated by the fact that the central one-half of the age differences included wives about 1 to 10 years younger than their husbands. The corresponding range for first marriages was 1 to 5 years younger.

Now let us consider some implications of the differences between the ages of spouses that we have set forth. Some of the factors in marital selection, such as propinquity and relative ages of men and women at physical maturation, were mentioned at the outset of

¹⁰ This figure is one-half year less than the difference between the median age of men at first marriage and the median age of women at first marriage for all married persons married only once (24.2 years minus 20.9 years). There is no mathematical requirement that the figures should be approximately equal, but familiarity with the subject matter would have led one to expect them to be nearly alike.

FIGURE 2.—YEARS WIFE WAS YOUNGER OR OLDER THAN HER HUSBAND:
UNITED STATES 1948



the paper. In addition, the fact that three-fourths of the husbands are older than their wives seems to reflect the fundamental tendency for the husband to be the sole, or at least primary, provider of economic support

of the family. In order for him to prepare for his role as provider, he usually spends several years of apprenticeship at his job or profession. Again, a young woman may be expected to prefer as a marital partner a

man who is somewhat older than she is and therefore likely to furnish a better livelihood than one who is her own age or younger.

The underlying factors, whatever they may be, that influence men to select wives a few years their juniors and that influence women to select husbands a few years their seniors may also operate in drawing together persons with extreme differences in age, as does happen in a minority of the cases. To illustrate, the young woman who places more than the usual amount of emphasis on material comforts or social status may be more readily attracted by the man who chooses to postpone marriage for a longer period of time than usual in order to be able to acquire more wealth, earning capacity, and social status before marriage than one who does not choose to do so.

Social pressures no doubt serve to restrain couples with large gaps in age from marrying.¹¹ In the case of first marriages, these pressures are augmented by the relative abundance of young adult single persons of nearly the same age. Moreover, persons marrying for the first time tend to select as a partner one who is also marrying for the first time; whereas those who remarry tend to select a partner who has been previously married.¹² In so doing, the person who is approaching first marriage tends to choose a mate more nearly his or her own age than the person does who is approaching remarriage. The difference between these two patterns seems to be the result of the interaction of the factors of selection and availability.

Another approach to the analysis of differences between the ages of spouses is found in the figures presented in Table 2. This table shows the median difference between the ages of husbands and their wives according to how old the husband (or wife) was at the

survey date. The figures show that for successively older husbands, the median difference in age increased. The increase was much less pronounced for first marriages than for remarriages. Thus, among first marriages, the wife was only about 1 year younger, on the average, where the husband

TABLE 2. MEDIAN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AGE OF HUSBAND AND AGE OF WIFE, BY AGE AT SURVEY DATE, FOR MARRIED COUPLES, 18 TO 74 YEARS OLD, BY NUMBER OF TIMES MARRIED, FOR THE UNITED STATES: CIVILIAN POPULATION, APRIL 1948

Subject	Husband and wife married once	Husband and/or wife married more than once
Median Years Wife was Younger Than Her Husband		
Total.....	2.8	4.7
Husband 18 to 24 years old.....	1.0	0.1
Husband 25 to 34 years old.....	2.3	2.1
Husband 35 to 44 years old.....	2.9	4.3
Husband 45 to 54 years old.....	3.4	6.1
Husband 55 to 64 years old.....	3.8	7.3
Husband 65 to 74 years old.....	4.3	9.7
Median Years Husband was Older Than His Wife		
Total.....	2.8	4.7
Wife 18 to 24 years old.....	2.9	6.4
Wife 25 to 34 years old.....	2.7	5.4
Wife 35 to 44 years old.....	2.8	5.6
Wife 45 to 54 years old.....	3.1	4.4
Wife 55 to 64 years old.....	2.6	2.3
Wife 65 to 74 years old.....	1.3	0.3

¹ See footnote 1 in Table 1.

Source: Bureau of the Census.

was between 18 and 24 years old, but the wife was 4 years younger, on the average, where the husband was 65 to 74 years of age. By contrast, among remarriages, the difference in age of the spouses was negligible where the husband was 18 to 24 years old but the wife was about 10 years younger, on the average, where the husband was 65 to 74.

¹¹ For a study of the tendency for husbands and wives to have similar characteristics, see Ernest W. Burgess and Paul Wallin, "Homogamy in Social Characteristics," *The American Journal of Sociology*, XLIX (September 1943), 109-124.

¹² See Table 7 in the Census Bureau's *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 21, "Characteristics of Households, Families, and Individuals: April, 1948."

Before proceeding to comment on these figures let us note how unlike the figures just cited are the corresponding figures by age of wife. Among first marriages, the median differences in age vary around 3 years for women in age groups up to 45 to 54 years, then they diminish. Among remarriages, the median differences diminish more or less steadily as the age of the wife increases.

The kind of figures shown in Table 2 illustrate a weakness of census-type data in the study of age at marriage. The data for the youngest age groups at the survey date reflect relatively current marriage experience but not lifetime experience. By comparison, those for the older groups, most of whose marriages took place several years ago, reflect almost the entire lifetime marriage experience but not very much current experience. The very oldest groups are also affected by selective factors in survival. Joint survival of both spouses is more likely if their ages are not far apart.

If there had been no marked fluctuations in marriage and remarriage rates such as we have experienced during the last two decades, this point would carry less force. Even so, with a growing population and a consequently changing age structure, and with selective mortality favoring the joint survival of marriage partners whose ages are not very far apart, it must be acknowledged that census data are not as well suited as data based on marriage records for answering certain questions with a high degree of accuracy. Short of marriage-record data, what is needed is a detailed study of age at marriage of husband by age at marriage of wife, by duration of marriage (or age at survey date), by socio-economic characteristics. Such a tabulation would tax the limits of census returns for the country as a whole even if they were on a 3 per cent or 5 per cent basis with several million persons in the sample, let alone a sample of 90,000 persons, as in the present study!

Before turning to our next section, let us mention one of the more practical applications that may be made of the findings on

differences between the ages of spouses. This use is in the study of retirement systems, pensions, and endowments and other insurance systems, where large financial outlays are involved. The age at retirement of the husband is closely connected with the age at which both the husband and his wife are entitled to social security benefits. Furthermore, the age to which joint survival of marriage partners extends determines the time at which insurance and assistance payments begin, and the period of joint survival is in large part a function of differences between the ages of the spouses. For this particular type of application, data from census returns are most useful supplements to those from marriage records, because of the fact that they give a cross-section of the situation as of one point in time and reflect, therefore, the end results of the many factors associated with joint survival.

Classifications by socio-economic characteristics. This brings us to the concluding section, in which we shall report briefly on some findings from the 1948 survey on age at marriage in relation to income and occupation of the husband and on differences between the ages of spouses in relation to occupation of the husband.¹³ The universe covered was all married couples with the husbands married once. Occupation detail was obtained only for the couples with the husband employed.

The information on age at marriage was tabulated by broad groupings according to duration of marriage. The results for married couples that had been married fewer than 5 years are regarded as more appropriate for the present study than those for couples married for a longer time. Concentrating the attention on these men with fairly recent mar-

¹³ The findings from the 1948 census study generally confirm on a national scale the findings of other studies for smaller areas. See Frank W. Notestein, *op. cit.*; Walter C. McKain, Jr., *op. cit.*; Meyer F. Nimkoff, "Occupational Factors and Marriage," *The American Journal of Sociology*, XLIX (November 1943), 248-254; and Richard Centers, "Marital Selection and Occupational Strata," *The American Journal of Sociology*, LIV (May 1949), 530-535.

riages as of the time of the survey reduces the effects on the results of improvement in earning capacity and of occupational mobility after marriage.

TABLE 3. MEDIAN AGE OF HUSBANDS AT FIRST MARRIAGE, BY TOTAL MONEY INCOME OF HUSBAND IN 1947, MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP OF HUSBAND, AND DURATION OF MARRIAGE, FOR THE UNITED STATES: CIVILIAN POPULATION, APRIL 1948

Major occupation group of husband and total money income in 1947	Median age at first marriage (years)	
	Married less than 5 years	Married 5 years or more
Total Money Income in 1947		
All incomes.....	23.9	24.2
\$6,000 and over.....	31.5	25.5
\$5,000-\$5,999.....	29.5	24.3
\$4,000-\$4,999.....	25.7	24.5
\$3,000-\$3,999.....	25.8	23.8
\$2,000-\$2,999.....	23.8	23.9
\$1,000-\$1,999.....	22.7	24.0
Under \$1,000 ¹	22.7	24.5
Employed Husbands		
Total employed husbands ²	24.2	24.1
Farmers.....	25.6	23.8
Proprietors.....	25.4	24.4
Professional workers.....	25.2	25.5
Service workers.....	24.8	24.7
Clerical workers.....	24.6	24.7
Craftsmen.....	24.0	23.6
Operatives.....	23.4	23.3
Laborers, except farm.....	22.9	24.0
Farm laborers.....	22.8	23.0

¹ Including loss and no money income in 1947.

² Includes employed husbands married once and living with their wives.

Source: Bureau of the Census.

The median age of husbands at first marriage was, in general, progressively higher among husbands with progressively higher incomes; this generalization applies to husbands married less than 5 years. Those with less than \$2,000 income were about 23 years old at first marriage, whereas those with \$2,000 to \$2,999 were about 24, those with \$3,000 to \$4,999 were about 26, and

those with \$5,000 or more were about 30 years old at first marriage. (See Table 3 and Figure 3.)


These figures show clearly that the earning power of a man during the first few years of marriage is much greater for those who postpone their marriage longer than the average. The greater earning capacity may be explained in part as a result of a longer period of training or more experience in the labor force before marriage, or both. In addition, the same sociological factors that prompt some men to postpone marriage until they have exceeded the average earning capacity of men at marriage no doubt continue to operate after marriage to their financial advantage.

The figures on occupation of husband reveal tendencies that are consistent with those on income. The survey provided enough cases to establish two classes of occupation groups with relatively higher and lower median ages at marriage. Tests of statistical significance show, however, that some of the medians in one class were not clearly different from some in the other class.

In the former group (those with higher ages at marriage) were the white-collar workers—proprietors, professional workers, and clerical workers—and also farmers and service workers. The median age at first marriage for men in these occupation groups was about 25 to 26 years. The remaining occupation groups were manual workers—craftsmen, operatives, and laborers. The median age at first marriage for men in these groups was about 23 to 24 years.

These results show that in general the men in occupations requiring the acquisition of more financial resources or the pursuit of more specialized training tend to delay their first marriage for approximately 1 to 3 years past the age at which men in most of the other occupations first marry. In certain occupation groups, such as farmers, service workers, and laborers, successive generations often follow the same type of work. It is possible that attitudes toward age at marriage may vary from one occupation group to

FIGURE 3.— MEDIAN AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE FOR HUSBANDS MARRIED LESS THAN 5 YEARS, BY INCOME IN 1947 AND OCCUPATION IN 1948: U.S.



BUREAU OF THE CENSUS

another and may be passed on from one generation to another.

The analysis of differences between the ages of spouses by occupation of the husband was restricted to couples with both spouses

married once. Unfortunately, in this part of the study, duration of marriage was not controlled. This fact may have obscured the relationships rather seriously. The figures in Table 4 show, however, that one of the oc-

cu
fir
am
en
the
the
ma
co

T
Hu

Cle
Pro
Cra
Ope
Prop
Ser
Lab
Farm
Farm

1
wive
S

TH

T
crim
Myr
to be
insist
pract

¹ C
York

cupation groups with relatively high ages at first marriage—professional workers—was among the groups with the smallest differences between the ages of husbands and their wives, about $2\frac{1}{2}$ years. It appears, therefore, that professional men tended to marry relatively late and to marry wives comparatively near their own ages. At the

other extreme, it was found that laborers were among the youngest at marriage and among those with the largest differences between the ages of the spouses. Standardizing the figures by age of the wife did not change the conclusions drawn from the unstandardized results presented in the table.

In this paper, several types of census material have been drawn upon in order to throw light on various aspects of the problem of age as a factor in marriage. As a result of the exploration involved in the preparation of the basic materials, it should be possible to plan a more unified and meaningful study the next time one is undertaken. For instance, it has become apparent that the analysis of socio-economic differentials in age at marriage and in the gap between the ages of spouses can probably be made much sharper by studying data for persons quite recently married and by controlling the results more closely on age. If such an analysis is made from census-type data, a much larger sample than that canvassed in the 1948 study is required in order to provide statistically reliable results. In another year or two it will be possible to provide the basis for such a study when the later phases of the processing of the 1950 census returns have been reached.

TABLE 4. MEDIAN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AGE OF HUSBAND AND AGE OF WIFE, BY MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP OF HUSBAND, FOR THE UNITED STATES: CIVILIAN POPULATION, APRIL 1948

Major occupation group of husband	Median years wife was younger than her husband
Total employed husbands ¹	2.7
Clerical workers.....	2.4
Professional workers.....	2.5
Craftsmen.....	2.5
Operatives.....	2.7
Proprietors.....	2.7
Service workers.....	3.0
Laborers, except farm.....	3.1
Farmers.....	3.2
Farm laborers.....	3.4

¹ Includes employed husbands living with their wives, where both spouses were married once.

Source: Bureau of the Census.

THE RANK ORDER OF SENSITIVITY TO DISCRIMINATIONS OF NEGROES IN COLUMBUS, OHIO

W. S. M. BANKS, II
Fort Valley State College

THE PROBLEM

THIS study is an attempt to test an hypothesis which Gunnar Myrdal termed "the Negro rank order of discriminations."¹ In his epochal volume Myrdal stated that his observations led him to believe that whites in the United States insisted on the retention of discriminatory practices against Negroes in a specific order

according to the type of discrimination. He asserted that they insisted most on retaining the barriers against Negro men having access to white women for sexual intercourse or marriage. Next in the order is their insistence on discriminations as far as courtesies and respect are concerned. Then follows their insistence on the retention of discriminations in the accessibility of public services, funds, and facilities. Below these in rank are the insistences on the retention of political, legal, and economic discriminations in that order.

¹ Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, New York; Harper & Bros., 1944.

This is what he called the "white man's rank order of discriminations."

Myrdal further hypothesized that the Negro's rank order of discriminations is parallel but inverse to the white man's rank. The Negro, according to Myrdal, resents and resists economic discriminations most and discriminations in sex relations and intermarriage least.

It was explicitly pointed out by Myrdal that these were "impressionistic judgments" and he suggested that experiments be conducted to validate (or invalidate) the hypotheses. The present study is a partial attempt to do this.

WORKING HYPOTHESES

In testing the hypothesis of the Negro rank order of discriminations a number of related hypotheses were involved. These grew out of the suggestions made by Myrdal in "Footnotes," p. 1187 of *An American Dilemma*. The related hypotheses used are as follows:

The ranking of the six general types of discrimination by individuals will vary with the (a) age, (b) sex, (c) occupation, (d) education, and (e) place of birth or conditioning so far as Negro-white relations are concerned.

METHODOLOGY

The locus of the study was Columbus, Ohio. It is generally agreed that Ohio is more or less representative of the midwest and in many respects the whole country. Further, Columbus is generally representative of the state of Ohio so far as race relations are concerned. There are reasons to believe that the attitudes and practices prevalent in Columbus will extend along a continuum which would include all patterns found elsewhere in the state. Concurrence on these observations was secured from several reputable scholars.

In order to develop an instrument for the purpose of collecting relevant data, 120 instances of discrimination against Negroes were listed. There were at least 15 instances of each of the six general types of discrimination. Each of these 120 instances was typed

on a separate card. Then a group of "experts" were asked to sort these cards into seven stacks. Six stacks constituted the six general types of discrimination suggested by Myrdal. The seventh stack was labeled "ambiguous or doubtful, overlapping, neither of the six types."

The "instances" of discrimination were drawn from (a) the recorded observations of Negroes interviewed in Columbus, (b) those suggested by scholars in the area of race relations, and (c) those drawn from the literature relative to Negro-white relations. Each card was assigned a code number indicating which of the six general types of discrimination it was intended to represent. If a card was placed in any other category than the one it was intended to represent this card was regarded as being misplaced. Any card misplaced by three or more of the judges was thrown out. A total of 24 items or instances of discrimination against Negroes were thus eliminated, leaving 96 items for the scale to be constructed.

In arranging the items on the resulting scale no consistent pattern was used throughout. That is to say, there was no consistent pattern in terms of types of discrimination.

The respondents were instructed to indicate how serious a case of discrimination each item represented. There were four possible responses: "very serious," "moderately serious," "not serious," and "not a case of discrimination." Arbitrary weights of 3, 2, 1, and 0 were assigned to each of the four responses in that order. By so doing it was possible not only to get a ranking of the six general types of discrimination by Negroes but also some idea as to the distance between each of the six types in this ranking.

At the end of each scale provisions were made for the recording of personal data which relate to the hypotheses involved in the study.

Validity. It is claimed that the scale used in this study measured the degree of seriousness with which Negroes in Columbus, Ohio view (a) a number of instances of six types of discrimination and (b) consequently the six types of discrimination. Logically, if

Negroes should indicate that the instances of one type of discrimination were more serious than instances of another type it would be reasonable to assume that resentment of and resistance to the former would be greater. To put it in terms of this study it would mean that the intensity of the resentment of the former was greater than that of the latter, thus giving a rank order for the two types of discrimination.

The generalized statements of persons interviewed during the preliminary phases of this research tended to suggest a rank order of discrimination which is quite similar to the one suggested by the hypothesis being tested. Further substantiation of the observation was made by listening to "barber shop oratory" with a wide variety of "philosophers" participating. More than half a dozen shops in different sections of the city were visited. The points of view advanced were quite similar to those suggested by persons who were formally interviewed and those implied in the rank order hypothesis.

Finally, credence may be given the scale by the fact that recognized Negro leaders tend to suggest the same rank order or one quite similar. This is reflected by actual statements or by the policies and actions of these leaders and, where applicable, the organizations in which they function. In any event maximum concern about economic and legal discriminations and minimum concern about discriminations in the general etiquette and sex relations is evinced. The findings yielded by the use of our scale reflect a similar attitudinal pattern relative to the six general types of discrimination. In the absence of any more objective criteria the scale used is obliged to stand on its own merits until further use and testings have increased its validity.

Reliability. The scale used was subjected to two major tests of reliability. First, a version of the split-half test was made. The scores of the two sexes were computed separately and a rank order ascertained. The rank orders of the two sexes were the same and yielded a rank order correlation coefficient of +.77 when compared to the rank

order suggested in the hypothesis being tested.

Secondly, a group of 50 Negro college students were asked to rate the items on the scale. Their ranking correlated very highly with those of a numerically comparable group of adult Negroes living in Columbus.

The Sample. It was assumed initially that in terms of the suggested variables, the universe was highly heterogeneous so far as attitudes towards discriminations are concerned. This assumption is based on the belief that within the total universe there are clusters of attitudinal patterns. These clusters are based on age, sex, occupation, years of schooling and place of birth. It is highly probable that other clusters exist, but for purposes of this study only those noted will be considered.

The sample was based on findings relative to the characteristics of the Negro population of Columbus as reported in the Sixteenth Census of the United States. Some consideration was given to current estimates of changes in the Negro population. In general, however, the proportions included in the sample correspond with those prevailing in 1940. In brief, the sample used in this study, a total of 200, was randomly selected from the total universe—the 40,000 Negroes in Columbus, Ohio. A cross-section of the whole Negro population was interviewed, with special efforts being made to insure representativeness so far as spatial, age, sex, occupational, and educational distributions were concerned.

FINDINGS

It was found that generally Negroes in Columbus, Ohio resent all discriminations moderately or very much. A second general finding is that the sensitivity of Negroes to discrimination can be quantified.

Specific findings relative to the major hypothesis and the sub-hypotheses are as follows:

1. *Gunnar Myrdal's Negro rank order of discriminations hypothesis is by and large an accurate portrayal of the sensitivity of Negroes in Columbus, Ohio to discrimina-*

tion. The obtained rank order differs from the Myrdal rank order but it correlates highly with it (+.77). The major difference in ranking was that of economic discrimination as may be seen from an examination of Table 1. Columbus Negroes ranked it third rather than first as suggested in the hypothesis. Even so the score differences were very

TABLE 1. A COMPARISON OF MYRDAL'S NEGRO RANK ORDER OF DISCRIMINATIONS AND THE RANK ORDER OF A SAMPLE OF COLUMBUS NEGROES

Types of Discrimination	Myrdal's Rank	Rank Order of Sample
Economic	1	3
Legal	2	1
Political	3	2
Public Services & Facilities	4	4
Courtesies and Respect	5	6
Sex Relations	6	5

small as may be seen in Table 2. This variation from the Myrdal rank order may be due partly to the prevailing economic prosperity and the influence of Negro leaders, improvement organizations, and the press. In the absence of any severe economic pressures

TABLE 2. MEAN SCORES BY TYPES OF DISCRIMINATION AND RANK ORDER OF MEANS OF 200 NEGROES IN COLUMBUS, OHIO

Types of Discrimination	Mean Scores	Rank
Economic	2.74	3
Legal	2.82	1
Political	2.78	2
Public Services & Facilities	2.72	4
Courtesies & Respect	2.35	6
Sex Relations	2.38	5

which would stimulate concern about the matter of getting a living, there would not likely be any serious concern about economic opportunities. At the same time local and national Negro leaders and pressure groups tended to emphasize the "need" or "want" for opportunities to share equally in the funds and resources made available for education, to participate equally in political ac-

tivities, and to be treated equally by law agencies and personnel.

2. *On a basis of the findings of this study there are no significant differences between the sensitivity of male and female Negroes to discrimination.* That is to say, sex is not a significant correlate of sensitivity to discrimination (see Table 3). However, it is probable that by using a more refined scale some significant differences may be found, particularly with reference to certain types of discrimination.

3. *Age per se is not a significant correlate of sensitivity to discrimination.* The Pearsonian zero order correlation coefficient was +.10. Table 4 indicates that younger Northern Negroes are apparently less sensitive to discrimination than is generally believed.² This is due primarily to the type of experiences which these people have or have not

TABLE 3. MEAN SCORES OF THE SAMPLE BY TYPES OF DISCRIMINATION AND SEX

Types of Discrimination	Male (101)	Female (99)
Economic	2.72	2.76
Legal	2.80	2.84
Political	2.74	2.91
Public Services & Facilities	2.70	2.74
Courtesies & Respect	2.34	2.37
Sex Relations	2.38	2.39

had so far as race relations are concerned. In spite of the fact that the "35-44" age category evinced the highest sensitivity to discrimination the writer is of the opinion that this was more a reflection of past contacts with the more flagrant instances of discrimination than a reflection of age differences. Approximately 57 per cent of this category were Southern born and had had their first introduction to Negro-white relations in a Southern setting. Thirty per cent of the remaining ones had spent one or more years in the South.

4. *On the surface, occupation seems to be*

² The overwhelming majority of the persons interviewed who were between the ages of 18 and 24 were Northern born.

a significant correlate of sensitivity to discrimination. Table 5 indicates that the higher the occupational level the lower the sensitivity to discrimination. Here again, however, other factors are of equal if not more importance. It may well be that those persons in the professions enjoy a relatively high degree of economic security and therefore can circumvent or avoid those situations which involve flagrant discrimination. It has been suggested also that upper class Negroes attempt to dissociate themselves from the general Negro community.³ There is an attempt on their part to identify themselves with the middle or upper class whites. If

TABLE 4. MEAN SCORES BY AGE AND TYPE OF DISCRIMINATION

Types of Discrimination	Age			
	18-24	25-34	35-44	45 & over
	N = 35	N = 78	N = 47	N = 40
Economic	2.70	2.74	2.82	2.77
Legal	2.86	2.77	2.90	2.84
Political	2.75	2.75	2.87	2.74
Public Services & Facilities	2.72	2.65	2.82	2.76
Courtesies & Respect	2.28	2.25	2.50	2.47
Sex Relations	2.26	2.26	2.50	2.42
Combined Means	2.63	2.55	2.74	2.67

these observations are accurate, it would follow that the scores as recorded reflected a class bias rather than an occupational bias as such. Of course there is the counter argument that the two are closely related and cannot be considered separately. This point we refuse to belabor in order to avoid becoming engrossed in the difficulties associated with the definition of social classes in the United States.

One other observation tends to substantiate the belief that the observed differences are not merely functions of occupation. Over

two-thirds of the professionals were Northern born and reared. This seems to be the significant factor accounting for the differences.

5. Generally, the greater the number of years of schooling completed the less the sensitivity to discrimination. The score vari-

TABLE 5. MEAN SCORES BY OCCUPATION AND TYPES OF DISCRIMINATION

Types of Discrimination	Occupation		
	Professional N = 25	White Collar N = 42	Domestic- Laborer N = 133
Economic	2.72	2.74	2.74
Legal	2.88	2.80	2.82
Political	2.83	2.82	2.75
Public Services & Facilities	2.73	2.73	2.72
Courtesies & Respect	2.23	2.31	2.39
Sex Relations	2.01	2.31	2.47
Combined Means	2.56	2.62	2.65

ations of the different categories were not statistically significant as determined by the critical ratio but a pattern was reflected which seems to justify the above conclusion (see Table 6). It may well be that as one

TABLE 6. MEAN SCORES OF THE SAMPLE BY YEARS OF SCHOOLING

Years Schooling	N	Mean Scores
8 or less	34	2.73
9-10	23	2.64
11-12	69	2.66
13-14	22	2.58
15 and over	52	2.57
	200	2.64

gets more and more schooling he tends to find rationalizations for such treatment which was previously "unbearable." On the other hand it may be that the more educated Negroes are more able to discriminate between the degrees of their sensitivity to discrimination than the less educated ones.

6. The one variable which seems to be

³ Among the studies which indicate this is the American Council on Education series summarized by R. L. Sutherland in the volume *Color, Class and Personality*.

TABLE 7. PEARSONIAN CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN THE SIX TYPES OF DISCRIMINATION
N = 200

	Economic	Legal	Political	Public Services and Facilities	Courtesies and Respect
Legal	+.78				
Political	+.82	+.89			
Public Services and Facilities	+.55	+.83	+.96		
Courtesies and Respect	+.63	+.39	+.50	+.61	
Sex Relations	+.39	+.48	+.35	+.56	+.82

most directly correlated with sensitivity to discrimination is the place of one's initial exposure to Negro-white relations. *Persons whose basic conditioning was acquired in the South or who have spent several years in the South tend to be more sensitive to discrimination than those whose conditioning was acquired in the North.* This is due partly to the fact that the construct "discrimination" has a different meaning for Southern Negroes than it does for Northern Negroes. When the former think and talk of discrimination their orientation is the background of personal experiences in which they had been "victims" of discriminatory practices. The antagonisms fostered by these experiences are reflected in their verbalization of their resentment of discrimination. It may well be that verbalizations or recordings of their attitudes constitute an outlet for frustrations occasioned by these experiences.

On the other hand, the Northern Negro tends to react to "discrimination" somewhat abstractly. For the most part his experiences have been devoid of the more flagrant types

of discrimination. Consequently his sensitivity will reflect an intellectually oriented reaction to a phenomenon. Under such conditions it is not likely that a high degree of sensitivity will be evinced.

Finally, a pattern of relationships between sensitivity to different types of discrimination was obtained by correlating the scores of each type with those of the other five types. Table 7 presents the findings of these operations. It is apparent by observation that six of the fifteen pairs are closely related. These are legal-economic, +.78; legal-public services and facilities, +.83; legal-political, +.89; political-economic, +.82; political-public services and facilities, +.96; and, sex-courtesies and respect, +.82. These coefficients of correlation suggest that these pairs are interrelated, that a knowledge of a person's sensitivity to one of the types in a pair is an indication of his approximate sensitivity to the other type. It also appears that five other pairs are relatively closely related. These had coefficients of correlation of +.63, +.61, +.56, +.55 and +.50.

WARTIME MANPOWER CONTROLS IN JAPAN

EDGAR C. McVOY

U. S. Department of the Army, Tokyo, Japan

THIS article is a sequel to one by the author "Wartime Controls in a Democratic Society," which appeared in the *American Sociological Review* in February, 1946.

Japan is the nation to which the term

"totalitarian" is applied, although this appellation probably could be accurately applied to Japan only during the later years of its expansion in Asia and the war with the Allied Powers, from 1937 (date of the China Incident) to 1945.

It
Japan
com-
partia-
wart-
econ-
with
peak,
per
United
nese
from
impor-
had
either
power
pan's
compl-
obliga-
emper-
of each
birth,
in sub-
to acc-
family
(2) Ja-
man w-
thought
to such
clique,
bol to o-
Then
hard to
efficien-
Japan
same 1
Europe
Japan's
a progr-

¹ U. S. port (Pan-
Printing
² J. F.
York: Fa-
III and I-
num and
Co., 1946.
³ Wilf-
City, New
Chap. IV

It must be admitted at the outset that Japan is not a very satisfactory nation for comparison with the United States on totalitarianism versus democracy with respect to wartime mobilization. In the first place, her economic resources are meager as compared with those of the United States. Even at its peak, Japan's economy had only about 10 per cent of the potential of that of the United States.¹ In the second place, Japanese totalitarianism was of a different nature from Western totalitarianism in at least two important respects: (1) the Japanese never had the Western concept of individualism, either in theory or practice, which was a powerful force in some of the Western nations which later became dictatorships. Japan's social controls were always based on a complex of class and group relationships and obligations, which, under Meiji and later emperors, culminated in the supreme duty of each individual to the emperor.² From birth, a Japanese is molded, for the most part in subtle ways, to a respect for his elders and to accept without question his status in the family, community and national hierarchy. (2) Japan did not have the type of strong man which headed up European dictatorship, though Tojo was the nearest approximation to such a person. There was always a ruling clique, which used the emperor as their symbol to obtain popular support and obedience.³

There is another respect in which it is hard to compare such things as morale and efficiency of war mobilization as between Japan and the United States, although the same limitation would apply to parts of Europe. That is, the war was fought on Japan's own territory, and the nation felt a progressively tighter pressure on its re-

sources. Finally, the strategic bombing on the home islands had a devastating effect on the productivity and morale of the population which was totally independent of the social control system.⁴ Granting all these limitations, an attempt will be made to discover parallels and contrasts in the manpower phase of war mobilization as between the United States and Japan.

MANPOWER CONTROLS BEFORE 1937

Even before the "totalitarian" period, Japanese Government and industry had effective controls over the allocation of manpower and the conditions of labor in industrial employment. In 1930, total non-agricultural employment was about 15,000,000.⁵ Three groups important to national economic policy were in manufacturing, mining and construction, which included about 6,000,000 workers. With regard to the type of controls, we must distinguish within these industries two types of workers, regular and casual.

(1) The regular workers comprised from 75% to 90% in manufacturing and mining, and about 10% to 20% in construction.⁶ Casual workers accounted for the rest. One of the most important industries, which had been greatly expanded in the decade of the 1920's, was textiles, employing in 1930 some 1,700,000 workers.⁷ Silk reeling and cotton spinning were the basic industries in the textile group. Cotton spinning was characteristically done in large factories with modern machinery under highly organized conditions. With the exception of technicians and supervisors, most of the workers in textiles were young girls recruited from rural areas and residing in company dormitories. The methods of recruitment through contracts with parents and the controls exercised over

¹ U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *Summary Report (Pacific War)*, Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1946, p. 14.

² J. F. Embree, "The Japanese Nation," New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1945, especially Chaps. III and IV. Also, Ruth Benedict, "The Chrysanthemum and the Sword," Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1946.

³ Wilfred Fleisher, *Our Enemy Japan*, Garden City, New York; Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1942, Chap. IV.

⁴ U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-22.

⁵ "The Japanese Wartime Standard of Living and Utilization of Manpower," U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, 1947.

⁶ Estimate from Employment Security Bureau, Labor Ministry, Japanese Government.

⁷ Figures from Research and Statistics Division, Economic and Scientific Section, GHQ, SCAP, Tokyo.

both work conditions and off-duty conduct amounted to an indenture system of labor.⁸

Other important industries were coal mining, machinery, shipbuilding, iron and steel, chemicals, lumber and its products, and later, aircraft and munitions. Workers in these industries were both male and female and were recruited both from rural and urban areas. Method of control was similar in some instances to that in textiles.

(2) Casual labor under bosses consisted of between two and three million workers in construction, maintenance, transportation and service trades who were attached to *oyabun* or bosses, and performed their work through contract between the boss and the party who wanted the work done.

These jobs consisted of not only standard construction operations, but maintenance, cleanup, and seasonal work in factories and other establishments. It is estimated that up to 25% of the workers in factories, mines and railroads were under this contract system. One of the reasons for employers' use of such workers was to avoid responsibility for compliance with labor laws and obligation for retirement allowances of workers. The workers were attached to the boss by an oath of loyalty. They ordinarily stayed with the same boss for a lifetime and might be subject to threats of violence if they tried to leave. They were expected to do the bidding of the boss without question. The boss exacted some 30% of their wages, and in turn, he was expected to provide a modicum of protection to the worker in time of sickness, unemployment and old age.⁹

The remainder of the non-agricultural labor force consisted of workers in commerce, transportation, communications, government service, miscellaneous industries, professions and domestic service.

One group that should be mentioned, cut-

⁸ Alice W. Shurcliff, "Occupation Ends Peonage in Japanese Textile Mills," *Labor Information Bulletin*, U. S. Dept. of Labor November, 1948, pp. 10, 11.

⁹ C. W. Hepler, "The Labor Boss System in Japan," *Monthly Labor Review*, January, 1949, pp. 47-49.

ting across the classifications given above, is skilled tradesmen and their apprentices. The system was a carry-over from feudal days. Boys were apprenticed at a very early age and were bound to the master as a chattel. The apprentice lived with the master's household and was usually a servant when not pursuing his trade. He worked for meager wages and would sometimes remain an apprentice for as much as ten years in a trade requiring two or three years to master.¹⁰

Controls over workers such as those described above were, for the most part, either condoned or aided by the government. Although labor standards were set up under the Factory Act of 1911, they were very low at best, and were not rigorously enforced. Penalties for violation included moderate fines, but not imprisonment.¹¹

Labor unions were prevented from seriously challenging employer dominance through repressive laws and police action. The Public Peace Police Law, passed in 1900 and amended at various later dates, was used repeatedly to break up trade union meetings. "The government and the employers have leaned heavily on repressive laws and the use of police power as a device to obstruct the free development of trade unions. Deriving their powers from a series of sweeping laws, ordinances and regulations, between 1920 and 1938, the Japanese police arrested more than 60,000 persons suspected of 'radical' activities or thoughts, dissolved numerous trade unions and broke up hundreds of trade union meetings."¹²

In this 'pre-war' period there were few

¹⁰ "Report on Business Investments and Fair Trade Practices Submitted by American Chamber of Commerce," memorandum from Chief, Labor Division to Chief, Economic and Scientific Section, GHQ, SCAP, June, 1949. See also N. S. Smith, "Material on Japanese Social and Economic History," *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, Second Series, Vol. XIV, June 1937, pp. 163-173.

¹¹ Text of and notes concerning the Factory Act in files of Labor Division, Economic and Scientific Section, GHQ, SCAP, Tokyo.

¹² "Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining in Japan," Civil Affairs Guide, War Department Pamphlet No. 31-68, July, 1945.

direct legal controls over movements of workers, shifting of jobs, and choice of jobs. In 1921, because of unemployment which arose at the end of World War I, the national Diet passed the Employment Exchange Law, which was the first national regulation of recruitment and employment of workers. This law provided for subsidies to local authorities to operate public employment exchanges, and for licensing of private employment exchanges.

WARTIME MANPOWER MOBILIZATION

Following the China Incident in 1937, Japan began its all-out mobilization for war, although some provisions of the laws passed at that time were not actually enforced until after Pearl Harbor.¹³ The authorities realized that they would need a more thorough control over national resources, including manpower. The labor force was still largely engaged in normal peacetime pursuits, the bulk of them in agriculture. It was therefore necessary to set up national sanctions which would serve to channel labor into important war industries and to mobilize portions of the labor force not fully utilized, such as females; also to try to get more effort and more efficiency out of the existing workers in essential industries. The measures adopted constituted a progressive series designed to "scrape the barrel" nearer and nearer to the bottom.

The Employment Exchange Law of 1921 was amended in 1938 with a view to tightening government control over recruitment and placement of labor.¹⁴ No new private em-

ployment agencies were to be authorized and those then in existence would be strictly regulated by the government. Also, under the revised law, the public employment exchanges were brought, to a large extent, under national regulation, although technically they were still locally administered. The revisions in the Employment Exchange Law also provided a control over recruitment of labor by private individuals and over the supply of labor by labor bosses.

In 1938 the Diet passed the National Mobilization Law which concerned all aspects of the nation's activities but had specific articles applying to employment and labor. These articles had the following provisions, with the date of implementation given:

1. *Authority for the government to draft labor for industrial service*, implemented by an Imperial Ordinance in 1939.
2. *Mobilization of special groups for national labor service*. These groups included students, women's groups and patriotic organizations. Ostensibly, they volunteered to do war service for the nation but actually there were compulsory controls over their activities, especially in the later war years. In addition to students, there were two patriotic labor associations: one composed of regular workers and the other composed of casual workers under labor bosses. Both groups were used by the government during the war as a means of mobilizing labor. This regulation was enforced in December, 1941.
3. *Control over placement, discharge and quitting by workers*, enforced in January, 1942. The effect of this regulation was to freeze labor in essential jobs and to control the hiring of new workers in the interests of war production. A related provision, which was enforced in 1938, concerned the control and use of school graduates and technicians.
4. *National Job Qualification Report*. By Imperial Ordinance of January, 1939, all skilled workers were required to file with the government, a statement of education and experience to show types of work for which they were suited. This was used as a means of directing labor into necessary jobs.

In addition to the provisions of the National Mobilization Law, there were other

¹³ For a full description of war mobilization measures See T. A. Bisson, *Japan's War Economy*, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945. Also, *Civil Affairs Handbook, Japan*, Sec. 8: Industry, Army Service Forces Manual, U. S. Govt. Print. Office, 1944. Also, manpower mobilization measures are given a detailed treatment in U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, "The Japanese Wartime Survey of Standard of Living and Utilization of Manpower," *op. cit.*

¹⁴ Information concerning labor mobilization was obtained primarily from files and officials of the Employment Security Bureau, Labor Ministry, Japanese Government.

laws passed during the war which had direct effect in controlling labor. Among these were the National Labor Notebook Law which required every skilled or semi-skilled worker to carry a notebook showing the record of his employment. This was passed in March, 1941. There was also the Industrial Mobilization Law of 1943 which provided for government control over business firms, including their hiring and use of labor, and the Factory and Workshop Ordinance of 1944, which set up military ranks in munitions factories and accompanying military discipline, including saluting. The method of enforcing the controls over workers provided for in these laws is described in the following paragraphs.

The major agency for enforcement (other than the omnipresent police) was the euphemistically-named Welfare Ministry, which was created in 1938. One of its major functions was labor control, although it dealt also with sanitation, health, social insurance and other matters. Locally, this Ministry operated through prefectural governors and through them to the public employment exchanges, for control of placement of workers. A history of the name applied to these exchanges during the war is indicative of their function. The traditional name of the public employment exchange is *Shokugyo Shokai Sho* or Employment Introduction Place. In 1941 the name was changed to *Kokumin Shokugyo Shido Sho* or National Employment Guidance Place. In 1944 the name was changed to *Kokumin Kinro Doin Sho* or National Diligent Labor Mobilization Place.

METHODS OF IMPLEMENTING MOBILIZATION MEASURES

The methods of mobilizing labor were different for four major groups of the labor force, as described below:

1. *Skilled labor and technicians.* The manager of a munitions plant would send to the Munitions, War or Navy Ministry a request for a certain number of skilled workers of given types. This request would be considered by a committee representing several ministries, although the most influential were

the Munitions, Navy, War and Welfare Ministries. The committee would decide whether the request could be filled in view of the national manpower situation. Having been approved by the committee, the request was turned over to the Welfare Ministry, which consulted its records on skilled labor registration to determine what prefectures had the required labor available. Welfare Ministry then would send a quota to several prefectures for filling this requirement. The next step was for the Prefectural Employment Exchange Unit of the Education Section (after November, 1942, under the Police Section) acting for the Prefectural Governor, to select names of workers from their prefectural roster. The list of names would then be sent to local Employment Exchanges for enforcement. The local office would deliver a "white card" to the worker and instruct him to appear at the office on a certain day. When he arrived he would be told what job he would be sent to. This was likely to be in a different prefecture or a distant location. Ordinarily, the worker accepted his assignment without protest; this was partly because of a powerful barrage of propaganda which had been streaming from Tokyo for years, concerning the duty of each Japanese to the emperor. However, in case the patriotic appeal was not enough, the man could be fined up to one thousand yen or imprisoned for a year for violation of these regulations. Actually, there were few cases of non-compliance and almost no instances of prosecution over this provision.

This does not mean that workers gladly accepted conscription. It only means that there was, other than a few cases where political influence was used to avoid conscription, no practical alternative to compliance, because of local pressures to conform and close police surveillance of individual conduct. There are some cases reported of "white card" labor draftees being sent to factories away from home, and, upon being granted leave to return home for a short time, refusing to return to the factory. There is at least one report, unverified by the author, of a "white card suicide" on the

part of a whole family whose breadwinner had been selected for labor service.

Moreover, the small number of prosecutions for violation of labor controls does not mean an absence of police action or arrests. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure in effect at that time, and under an Administrative Enforcement Law, both of which were executed loosely by police, it was possible to hold a person arrested without indictment for a considerable length of time; and even after indictment, a preliminary investigation by a judge might take a year or more before the prisoner would be brought to trial.¹⁵

The basic method of control, not only for manpower regulations, but for all purposes by the government, was through propaganda and through the military and civil police, who were instructed to watch for disaffection of any type. Any dissenters with the national policy were dealt with severely. Such dissension might concern any policies for mobilization or conduct of the war, as well as willingness to enter into national industrial service.¹⁶

2. *Casual labor.* In this case the manager of the munitions plant would send his request directly to the local employment office. If this office could fill the request locally that was the end of the matter. (Incidentally, local recruitment was done through labor bosses.) If there was not enough labor available locally, they would send a request to another area, and with the cooperation of the casual laborers' patriotic organization, would obtain the labor from another area. If they still could not get enough labor, the government would ask the other labor patriotic groups, who would then organize a group of students or other special workers to handle the job.

3. *Special groups.* This was composed primarily of students and women. From the school records appropriate workers were selected for various purposes, either for com-

mon labor in industry or for harvest work in agriculture. A great deal of patriotic drum beating was done, and it was tacitly understood that no one would refuse to serve, although ostensibly everything was on a voluntary basis.

Mobilization of students was started in 1939 as vacation work on farms, but was extended in 1941 to work on farms even during the school term, and in 1943 to work in factories. By 1944, many factories had become dependent on students for a substantial portion of their labor force, and education was considered as of minor importance. At its peak, student employment reached about 3,000,000.¹⁷

There were also progressive drives to increase the number of women in employment, both in agriculture and industry. From 1930 to 1940, the major trend was an increase of females in agriculture to offset the movement of males to industry and the armed forces. From 1940 to 1944, the proportion of females increased not only in agriculture, but in fishing, mining, commerce, transportation, government, and all categories except manufacturing and construction.¹⁸

4. *Korean and foreign labor.* Koreans were considered as Japanese nationals subject to the same laws. However, for the most part they were mobilized on "voluntary contract" basis. A Japanese company, usually a mining company, would be authorized to recruit labor from Korea. The company representative would go to Korea and would engage workers who were sent to Japan and organized into gangs. During the war, in any of the industries considered essential, such as coal and metal mining, workers were not permitted to leave their employment during the term of their contract. Most of the enforcement was done by company guards with the sanction of the police. The net result was a condition of virtual slave labor. Chinese

¹⁵ Information obtained from Legal Section, GHQ, SCAP, Tokyo.

¹⁶ "Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining in Japan," *op. cit.*

¹⁷ Interrogation No. 14, Headquarters, U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific) Tokyo, 8 October, 1945.

¹⁸ U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, "Japanese Wartime Standard of Living and Utilization of Manpower," *op. cit.* Appendix Tables TT and FFF.

coolies were recruited and employed on the same basis as Koreans, with the exception of prisoners of war, who were forced to work under guard. From 1939 to 1945, 166,000 Korean contract workers were brought to Japan.

Penalty for leaving employment to which a person had been assigned in the national interest was the same as for refusing to accept the assignment in the first place; that is, a maximum of one thousand yen or one year's imprisonment. Again there were few cases that came to a point of prosecution because of the other sanctions applied.

STAGES OF PLANNING UTILIZATION OF MANPOWER

The Japanese Government went through progressive stages of stringency of manpower mobilization. These stages are documented by records of the Cabinet Planning Board from 1939 to 1944.¹⁹ The records indicate that full mobilization was not accomplished quickly or easily, and that many factors, including morale of workers, were considered. They also indicate that demands for workers had to be scaled down drastically because of limited supply. For example, in 1944, various Ministries submitted requirements for 7,500,000 workers, but it was necessary to pare the number down to 4,500,000.

Plans for 1939 were labeled "Measures for 1939 Mobilization Plan in Preparation for a Long War," and the purpose was given as "to locate all sources of labor and to establish efficient labor controls." Sources of labor were school graduates, non-essential industries, unemployed, agricultural workers, married women and Koreans. These workers were to be allocated to munitions, exports, transportation, and even civilian goods industries. If all other measures failed, workers were to be "commandeered." Emphasis was placed on efficient use of present labor force

¹⁹ Translation in files of Labor Division, Economic and Scientific Section, GHQ, SCAP, Tokyo. Also see U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, "The Japanese Wartime Standard of Living and Utilization of Manpower," *op. cit.*

and exchange of technicians between industries. Training was to be given for certain categories of skilled workers. Perhaps the most interesting aspects from the standpoint of this paper were the programs "to establish health and sanitation standards," "efficient hours and safety measures," "to protect women in industry," "to increase efficiency by the stimulation of morale awards," "secure living standards, etc.," and "to rebuild and transfer factories to overcome transportation and housing problems."

By 1941, certain new measures were added. School terms were "streamlined" in order to get the graduate sooner for industry. Building construction was cut to a minimum, and laborers were divided into "regular" and "temporary" in order to facilitate movement. The temporary workers were recruited largely from student groups. Incidentally, it was in this year that the Factory Act was suspended, and the drastic Peace Preservation Law was passed. This law provided heavy penalties, including death, for persons forming organizations against the "national policy," showing disrespect for the Imperial Household, or opposing the private property system. The law was used primarily against labor leaders and "radicals."²⁰

The 1942 plan was labeled "Total National Mobilization and Victory." It was noted that sources for labor were drying up. Measures were to be an increase in efficiency of 20%, establishment of priorities by factories rather than industries, strict enforcement of labor control laws, and greater resort to conscription of labor. In 1943, orders were given to suspend certain enterprises, to use prisoners of war, domestic prison labor and larger numbers of Koreans and Chinese. Priority industries were munitions, iron, coal, airplanes, and metals. Two-shift systems were inaugurated. However, welfare measures for workers were re-emphasized.

The 1944 plan mentioned the "war crisis," noted that agriculture could contribute no more workers and would need special con-

²⁰ "Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining in Japan," *op. cit.*

sideration in the form of student labor, and called for more importation of Koreans and Chinese. Methods adopted to maintain production were to (1) limit turnover of manpower, (2) permit local conscription of labor, (3) conscript women, (4) put women on night shifts, (5) mobilize students for year-round labor, and (6) form day laborers into mobile groups for rapid shifting where needed.

LABOR PATRIOTIC ASSOCIATIONS

Use of the labor patriotic associations deserves special treatment in a description of mobilization efforts. First, there was the *Sangyo Hokoku-Kai*, known as *Sampo*, or Patriotic Industrial Association.²¹ This association was formed by private groups in 1938, but was given government sanction in 1939 and was made an integral part of the government mobilization program in 1942. It was sponsored by the Welfare Ministry, and the majority of its funds were appropriated by the government. Membership reached a peak of 5,500,000. Its purpose is described as follows: "The strength of *Sampo* rested in the combined purpose of management, government and the police to regiment labor. Management personnel were invariably selected as presidents of local units; police controlled all associations within their district, and the prefectural governor actively participated in encouraging membership and establishing local policy. The purposes of local associations were to educate and elevate workers, to mobilize labor for war production, to provide amusement for members, to stimulate war bond sales, to encourage savings, to distribute scarce commodities—at less than market prices, to promote industrial efficiency, and to prepare for air raid evacuation."²² Incidentally, its growth coincided with the complete dissolution of labor

unions. At all times, the Welfare Ministry and the employment exchanges worked hand-in-glove with *Sampo*.

The other organization was the *Romu Hokoku-Kai*, or Association for Service to the State through Labor, known as *Roho*. This was established as a national association with government sponsorship in 1943, and its major purpose was the control of casual labor. In 1945, it contained some 2,100,000 members. "The principal activities of the organization were to allocate day laborers, to promote labor efficiency, to recruit personnel for the loading and unloading of vessels, to encourage savings and war bond sales, to distribute daily necessities, and to spur the war effort."²³ This association also was under the Welfare Ministry, and was used extensively by the employment exchanges for recruitment purposes. *Roho* actually was of more direct use in mobilization of labor than *Sampo*, since it constituted a corps of mobile workers under full control of bosses. The bosses were given a role almost of government officials and were able to provide this labor on short notice where needed.

POST-WAR CHANGES IN MANPOWER POLICY

It should be mentioned parenthetically that there has been a drastic change in the manpower controls in Japan since the end of the war. All of the measures under the wartime mobilization laws were abrogated as one of the initial acts of the occupation forces. The Employment Exchange Law was replaced in 1947 with the Employment Security Law which provides for a new system of public employment exchanges giving a free and voluntary placement service. The only restrictions which are contained in this law are intended to outlaw former undesirable recruiting and labor supply activities and to control private employment exchange projects. Since these post-war developments are outside the scope of this article, no details of this period will be included.

²¹ For a full description of this organization, see memorandum in files of Labor Division, GHQ, SCAP of 15 October, 1945, "Preliminary Report on Current Labor Situation." The association is also described in Japan Year Book, 1944-45.

²² "Preliminary Report on Current Labor Situation," *op. cit.*

²³ "Preliminary Report on Current Labor Situation," *op. cit.*

COMPARISON WITH MANPOWER CONTROLS
IN U. S.

The final portion of the article will provide an analysis of the Japanese controls during wartime as compared with those described by the author in the article, "Wartime Controls in a Democratic Society," cited above. Each of the conclusions stated in the previous article will be examined and compared with the Japanese experience.

1. "In a democratic society of the type we have in the United States, controls during wartime, as well as in peace, depend for their success on the backing of public opinion and upon voluntary compliance of the majority of the citizenry."

On the surface at least, this proposition would apply almost equally well to the manpower controls maintained by Japan during the war. As indicated above, there were not many cases of prosecution of violators of the manpower controls. The Japanese government found it necessary to carry on extensive propaganda measures in order to provide the backing of the populace, and many of the actions to mobilize manpower were at least ostensibly voluntary. The contrast must be made in the whole structure of the two societies in which these so-called voluntary controls operated. In Japan, controls over the media of public opinion were so thoroughly maintained by the central government that to a large extent public opinion could be manufactured for whatever purposes the government wished to use it.²⁴ In addition to the difference in the nature of public opinion, it must be remembered that the risk of defying authority or even expressing opinions contrary to the official government policies were immeasurably greater in Japan than in the United States. Dissenters were liquidated at the level of "dangerous thoughts," so that there were few violators of specific mobilization measures.

The conclusion is that although the laws and regulations were couched in euphemistic

terms and that the official government position was that it had 100% backing of public opinion, there was actually much more compulsion on the part of the Japanese to get compliance with mobilization measures than there was in the United States.

2. "A democracy is capable of a moderate degree of mobilization of its human and material resources in an emergency, but cannot attain anything approaching absolute mobilization."

The antithesis of this statement is that a totalitarian government is capable of a high degree of mobilization in times of an emergency and, in fact, is able to approach absolute mobilization. The evidence is contradictory on this point. If we consider the relative resources of Japan and the United States, it is true that Japan had a higher proportion of its available resources mobilized for war. It is estimated that Japan was able to utilize about 45 per cent of its economy for direct war purposes at peak, while the United States attained about 50%.²⁵ However, if we consider that Japan was always near a subsistence economy, and had to retain a large element of labor and resources merely for basic necessities, the Japanese percentage is impressive. The U. S. living standard, for the average family, actually increased during the early war years and remained at about the same level through the war, while it was reduced almost to a starvation level in Japan. During the later years, needs of the civilian economy were almost completely ignored in government programs.

There is the further element that the effects of strategic bombing, in 1944 and 1945, disrupted production and reduced morale to a high degree. The following paragraph from the report of the Strategic Bombing Survey indicates the effects:

The Japanese labor force had declined in efficiency due to malnutrition and fatigue, the destruction of much of the urban housing and the difficulties of local transportation. Production hours lost through all causes including absenteeism, sickness, air-raid alerts and enforced

²⁴ For pre-war situation in control of press, see H. E. Wildes, *Social Currents in Japan*, University of Chicago Press, 1927. For a description of later controls, see J. F. Embree, *op. cit.*, Chap. VI.

²⁵ U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *Summary Report (Pacific War)*.

idleness rose from 20 per cent in 1944 to over 40 per cent in July 1945. The size of the labor force employed did not materially decline and the productive hours actually worked remained sufficiently high to indicate that such influence as manpower deficiencies may have had on the over-all level of production in July 1945, was largely ascribable to the continued drafting of highly skilled workers into the armed forces services and to the inefficient administration of manpower in meeting the rapidly shifting requirements resulting from bombing, rather than to over-all lack of labor.²⁶

In spite of these conditions, the Japanese continued production and there was still little disaffection from the war effort right up to the end.

With respect to efficiency in mobilization, it is well to note that military officials, in the early war years, deplored the lack of speed in mobilization, and various political considerations hampered national unity in directing the economy. The necessity of protecting cartels and private property interests was one of the major blocks to full mobilization.²⁷ In addition, there was a limit beyond which authorities could not coerce individuals and control their lives, and it was necessary to provide incentives to workers, and to beat the patriotic drum loud and long to keep the citizenry putting out maximum effort. For example, when workmen were channeled into certain industries and forced to work long hours and when the conditions of livelihood became stringent, very few people chose to defy the regulations and quit their jobs, but the amount of absenteeism increased to the point of diminishing returns. The absenteeism was due largely to shortage of food, illness, fatigue, and labor "black marketing." After bombings became extensive, absenteeism increased even more sharply.²⁸ In many industrial plants surveyed recently, rates of absenteeism were lower after the war, without labor controls, than

they were during the war, even in the years before the disruptive effect of bombing.²⁹ Officials in charge of mobilization measures have reported that there were cases during the war of deliberate absenteeism, sometimes by the worker exposing himself to illness in order to obtain a few days' rest.³⁰

For the reasons given above, it is difficult to make an unequivocal statement that Japan's mobilization was "rapid" and "absolute" by comparison with that of the United States. In fact, if you consider that Japan was preparing for war many years before Pearl Harbor, whereas the United States began its really serious mobilization after Pearl Harbor, the relative effort of the United States appears rather effective.

3. "Controls based on public approval and voluntary cooperation are not fully effective, but require much less effort on the part of authorities for enforcement than totalitarian controls and are more stable."

The validity of this proposition is borne out by the Japanese experience, but it seems to be a lesson that the Japanese learned, to a degree, as well as Americans. Within the framework of their social structure and traditions, Japanese officials made full use of the techniques of "public approval and voluntary cooperation." The evidence is that the great majority of the people "voluntarily" assisted in the war effort. Even a portion of the labor union leaders agreed to join forces with the *Sampo*.³¹ A minority of workers were actually conscripted. In 1943, peak year of conscription, there were 700,000 new workers drafted. From 1939 to 1945, 1,600,000 were drafted.³² On the other side, we must remember that the threat of coer-

²⁶ "Report of Investigation of Actual Status of Labor in 30 Machine and Tool Mfg. Factories," Labor Bureau, Economic Stabilization Board, Japanese Government, Tokyo, 1948.

²⁷ Based on interviews by the author with former officials of the Welfare Ministry, Japanese Government. Notes on file in Labor Division, GHQ, SCAP.

²⁸ "Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining in Japan," *op. cit.*

²⁹ U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, "The Japanese Wartime Standard of Living and Utilization of Manpower," *op. cit.* pp. 88-96.

³⁰ U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, *Summary Report (Pacific War)*.

³¹ See T. A. Bissell, *op. cit.* pp. 3-11.

³² U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, "The Japanese Wartime Standard of Living and Utilization of Manpower," *op. cit.* Appendix Table BBB.

ction or prosecution was always at hand for any of these "voluntary" workers, and that the heavy hand of the police had systematically liquidated any dissension from national policy.

As to the comparative "effort on the part of the authorities for enforcement," as between Japan and the United States, it is very difficult to assess. In the United States, there is about one police officer to every 500 urban residents and one to 1000 in rural areas. In Japan during the war, regular police amounted to about 75,000, or a little less than one per 1000.³³ But if we add several categories of special police and military police who had control over civilian populations, the average might be about the same as in the United States per unit of population. This comparison is likely to be misleading, because on the one hand, Japanese police had broader functions than U. S. police, and on the other hand, U. S. police were much better equipped and more mobile. In addition to police, we must consider government officials, as well as private groups cooperating with the government, concerned with mobilization of manpower. An attempt to compare all these groups numerically would not be too fruitful, again because of their different roles. Without a much more exhaustive and fundamental comparison than is possible in connection with the present paper, statement made in the earlier article remains unverified by Japanese experience.

4. "Wartime controls along with public opinion follow a cyclical pattern." While the evidence is not too clear on this point, the same proposition seems to apply to Japan, to a limited extent. For one thing, channels of public information were so much under control that most of the Japanese public never knew the real course of the war. The evidence shows that for manpower controls, the initial impetus came in 1939, with a leveling off until 1942, at which time there was a tightening of control; again, much

more stringent controls were initiated in 1944.

5. "In application of wartime controls there is considerable confusion over the amount of centralization of authority to be applied." This proposition applies to Japan also in a limited respect. Since there was already a high degree of centralization of control at the beginning of the war, there was little room for increase in such centralization and little inclination on the part of the national authorities to decentralize control.

There was a change in method of administration of the national policies. At first it was done through direction of prefectural governors by the various national ministries. While the prefectural governors were appointed by national authority, they were still subject to local pressures. Furthermore, there was a good deal of confusion arising from the fact that they received orders from several different ministries. Sometimes the orders were in conflict. Therefore, towards the end of the war an office of regional administration was set up under the Home Ministry. This was an effort to develop a single line of command and to increase the control by the national government over local administration. A further method of centralization was to put many aspects of domestic control under the police in 1942, including labor controls. The general trend in Japan could be described as one of increasing centralization of authority and effort to close the gap between national direction and local compliance.

6. "Where a portion of the human and material resources is placed under military control, but a large portion is not, friction between military and civilian blocks is inevitable, with each attempting to increase its sphere of control."

In Japan during the war the dominant groups were the military and the cartels, who for the most part cooperated in war control measures. There was conflict between the cartel leaders and the military extremists over the issue of government management of industry, but the extremists lost out early in the period of mobilization. As the war de-

³³ Information from Public Safety Division, G-2, GHQ, FEC, Tokyo.

veloped, War, Navy and Munitions Ministries managed to get the lion's share of resources, including manpower, for industries supplying them directly.³⁴

The general conclusion stated at the close of the previous article was as follows:

A society in which social controls are based primarily on voluntary group action and indirect sanctions is relatively slow to mobilize in time of crisis, but through the long pull has more strength and stability than one in which controls are totalitarian in the sense of being imposed from above.

The validity of this general conclusion is not clearly supported by the experience of Japan in mobilization for war, at least in a short-run view. Evidence is that Japan was not remarkably quick to mobilize, nor did mobilization approach the absolute. This situation could be explained by pointing out that Japan was not a perfect totalitarian state, though its controls were certainly imposed from above to a much greater extent than in the United States. Conflicts among dominant groups and inability to force individuals beyond a certain point, as well as administrative inefficiency, led to imperfect mobilization.

The other factor which runs counter to the generalization is that Japan did, in fact, have a remarkable degree of tenacity and stability, even in the face of devastating bombing.

Considering Japan as a contrast to the United States, the difference in social control during wartime between "democratic" and

"totalitarian" nations is not as sharp as appears on a superficial examination. On the one hand, pressures of war cause the "democratic" nation to adopt certain totalitarian measures, and on the other hand, the "totalitarian" nation is unable to achieve perfect mobilization because of the necessity of compromise among powerful pressure groups and the inability to force people beyond a certain point of diminishing returns. One could almost generalize that there is a basic quality of human nature which abhors too high a degree of regimentation for sustained periods.

As to long-run stability one might speculate that if the Japanese had had a truly representative government with a relatively free play of an informed public opinion during the period from 1920 to the present, its leaders would never have been able to carry on an all-out aggressive war and to provoke the United States by the attack on Pearl Harbor. This is not to say that Japan's ultimate goals would have been greatly altered by the difference in the type of government and public opinion. Japan probably still would have tried to achieve dominance of Asia, but would have been content to do it through a slower process of economic and ideological penetration, along with more limited military operations. Such a process probably would have stopped short of an all-out war against such a formidable combination of enemies.

This type of speculation cannot be labored too much but serves to illustrate that the Japanese society might have had a greater stability and strength with a more democratic form of government and control.

³⁴ T. A. Bisson, *op. cit.*

NOTES ON RESEARCH AND TEACHING



SOME METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL WORK RESEARCH

ERNEST GREENWOOD

Research Department,

Welfare Council of Metropolitan Los Angeles

FRED MASSARIK

*Institute of Industrial Relations,
University of California, Los Angeles*

The purpose of this article is to explore some of the methodological problems that emerge when social research is injected into the applied setting of a social agency.

Relatively little attention has been given to an analysis of the functions of the social scientist working with policy-forming bodies. In this vein a recent memorandum by Robert K. Merton on applied social research¹ highlighted the absence of any systematic review and appraisal of the characteristics and problems unique to policy-oriented research. He pointed to the ever increasing use of social scientists by commercial, governmental and welfare agencies and to the failure by these same scientists to take proper inventory of the potentialities and problems inherent in their researches.

The systematization urged by Merton would have a number of practical values, two of which are readily apparent to the writers. (1) It would help to clarify the reciprocal roles of the researcher and the policy-maker who employs him. This could result in a more efficient working relationship between the two, a relationship which is now often disturbed by semantic, occupational and value differences. (2) Then, too, such a systematic body of experience might find valuable pedagogical uses in the proper training of the coming generation of social scientists many of whom will eventually end up in applied social research should the present trend persist.

It would seem that any such systematization must draw its data from the day-to-day experiences of social researchers working in vari-

ous applied settings. It is of considerable importance, therefore, that applied social scientists, irrespective of their work settings, record those of their experiences which have theoretical implications.

Persons trained in social research are increasingly being called upon by social workers to gather accurate data which will assist the latter in the solution of their professional problems. This trend indicates a growing recognition by social work practitioners that the social research formerly confined to the universities has important practical applications. This recognition is a relatively belated arrival on the social work scene, although it had taken a firm foothold in fields such as marketing, radio and advertising some time ago.

The scientific approach and technical skills which the social researcher brings to a social work problem are essentially the same as those he employs when he works upon a problem laden solely with theoretical implications.² In both instances, the objects of study are human collectivities, their behavior and its results. Hence, the research experiences of social scientists acquired in the university setting can be applied fruitfully to problems peculiar to social work. At the same time, the social researcher operating in the social work setting must be prepared to engage in a number of adaptations. University professors who went to Washington during the last war to do research in the various wartime federal agencies were likewise made aware of this last fact.³

In transferring research methodology from

¹ Robert K. Merton, "The Role of Applied Social Science in the Formation of Policy: A Research Memorandum," *Philosophy of Science*, XVI (July, 1949), 161-181.

² In this connection, see Julian L. Woodward's article, "Making Government Opinion Research Bear Upon Operations," *American Sociological Review*, IX (December, 1944), 670-677.

the academic to the applied setting, the social researcher is frequently beset by conditions which compel him to make two types of adjustments: (1) in relation to the persons with whom he works, and (2) in relation to the problem which he is to "solve." The latter has strictly methodological implications; the former has interpersonal ramifications.⁴ Although the two are intertwined and affect each other, they are sufficiently distinct to warrant dichotomization.⁵

We shall not be concerned here with the interpersonal problems that accompany the invasion of social researchers into the precincts of social work. Rather we will deal with the difficulties which accompany the researcher's attempts to set up an appropriate study design for handling the questions posed to him by the social work practitioner.

A crucial initial step in applied research occurs in the formulation of the hypothesis for investigation. This step is fraught with methodological difficulties because the practitioner's phrasing of his problem is often not at all the real problem warranting investigation, or, if and when it is the real problem, his formulation is rarely suitable for research. Merton summarizes this:

Experience suggests that the policy-maker seldom formulates his practical problem in terms sufficiently precise to permit the researcher to design an appropriate investigation. Characteristically, the problem is so stated as to result in the possibility of the researcher being seriously misled as to the "basic" aspects of the problem which gives rise to a contemplated research. This initial clarification [by the researcher] of the *practical* problem, therefore, is the first crucial step in applied social science.⁶

⁴ The social researcher who is employed by the social work practitioner plays the role of a technical expert. Some of the implications of this role have been explored by Florian Znaniecki in his *The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge* (Columbia University Press, 1940). However, Znaniecki's treatment sheds no light on the problems which concern the authors. The same might be said of the approach conventionally exemplified by writers in the "sociology of knowledge," although the problems dealt with in this article might well belong under this heading.

⁵ Merton sees this clearly and hence correctly distinguishes between the "interpersonal and organizational problems" and the "scientific problems" attendant upon policy-oriented research. Merton, *op. cit.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

An illustration may help to clarify the above points.⁷

The Jewish Centers Association of Los Angeles approached the authors with the following problem concerning one of its units, Menorah Center. Adjacent to Menorah Center is City Terrace, a newly developing neighborhood which has recently experienced a great increase in Jewish population. Menorah Center requested a grant of funds to permit the establishment of an extension program in City Terrace. Supporting the request was the contention that there were many potential center members among the Jewish residents of City Terrace who were deterred from taking part in Menorah Center activities by distance, but who would attend an extension program located in their midst. Setting up such a program would have involved hiring additional personnel and acquiring quarters and facilities. Therefore, the authors were instructed to secure such data as would have enabled the administrators to decide whether the situation warranted the expenditure required.⁸

The research design finally decided upon involved the study of two samples to determine what significant differences, if any, existed between them with respect to a series of factors having relevance to the solution of the problem. One sample consisted of Menorah Center members residing in City Terrace, while the second sample consisted of City Terrace Jewish residents who were not members of Menorah Center. Both sets of persons were interviewed in their homes. A schedule was constructed to yield answers to such items as personal characteristics of the respondent, his residential distance from Menorah Center, his recreational pattern, his reaction to the program at Menorah Center, his program preferences, et cetera.

Before analyzing the procedure further, we may note that two types of errors involved in problem formulations by policy-makers have been identified.⁹ One is the over-specification while the other is the over-generalization of the problem. In the former the policy-maker comes

⁷ The conceptual contents of this article were drawn from experiences acquired by the authors from a series of investigations, of which the study herein described is one. The City Terrace study has been selected for illustrative purposes.

⁸ The authors wish to express their appreciation to the Jewish Centers Association of Los Angeles for permission to use sections of the City Terrace Study in the present article.

⁹ Merton, *op. cit.*

with what amounts to an already specified hypothesis which, upon examination, is found to miss the central pragmatic problem. In the latter he comes with a vaguely stated objective, thinking that he has thereby identified the central problem. In either case the researcher must recast the policy-maker's formulation into an hypothesis whose verification will yield the facts which have the promise of solving the central problem.

The illustration under discussion may be classified as an example of over-specification. The policy-makers in this instance suspected that their problem was one primarily of distances. That is, it was felt that Menorah Center was denied the membership of many Jewish residents of City Terrace because it was located too far from them; hence the need for an extension program in City Terrace itself. Preliminary examination of the problem revealed that the distance factor was not the only or even the most important factor around which to fashion a fruitful hypothesis. What about the existing program of Menorah Center? Was it attractive enough to draw City Terrace residents? If something were wrong with the program itself, its mere transplantation into City Terrace would fall far short of a solution of the policy-maker's problem. The final formulation of the hypothesis was therefore aimed to shed light upon factors other than and in addition to that of distance which might operate to keep Jewish City Terrace residents away from Menorah Center. Hence the researcher's formulation was, in this instance, wider than the policy-maker's.

The hypothesis which was finally subjected to verification was as follows: *That a series of home interviews with samples of (1) Menorah Center members residing in City Terrace and (2) City Terrace Jewish residents who are not members of Menorah Center would NOT reveal statistically significant differences in their replies on a series of relevant items, such as personal characteristics, residential distance from Menorah, recreational pattern, reaction to the Menorah program, program preferences, et cetera.* This formulation is, of course, a far cry from the one with which the authors were initially confronted.

In starting from the problem formulation offered to him by the policy-maker, what logical path must the researcher traverse to reach that final hypothesis around which the research design is to be constructed? Are the intervening logical links quite similar in most applied re-

search situations? If such similarity does exist, it should be extracted and the steps should be systematized. In describing his research experiences in Washington during the last war, Woodward implies having employed what is tantamount to the Socratic Method to reach the terminal hypothesis.¹⁰ For example, the policy-maker states that he needs certain information. The researcher asks why he needs it and how is he going to use it once he gets it. In the light of the answers the researcher suggests that perhaps he needs something else. The researcher keeps "badgering" the client with questions compelling the latter to define and redefine his own problem. From this interaction emerges the final hypothesis.¹¹ Another consequence flowing from this dialectic process is that the questions begin to segregate themselves into two classes, those for which the prospective study promises answers and those which require approaches beyond the scope of the proposed study. In this fashion the client is led to appreciate the researcher's insistence for delimiting the problem statement.¹²

There are occasions, however, when the researcher finds himself in the position where he cannot even ask intelligent questions; that is, when logic alone, without substantive knowledge, does not suffice him. This is often the situation when the researcher enjoys only meager acquaintance with the configuration constituting the setting of the practitioner's problem. If and when this occurs, some preliminary orientation period is essential. This was the case in the instance under discussion. In the attempt to evolve "hooks" with which to grapple with the practitioner's problem, the authors spot-mapped the addresses of the members of Menorah Center. Their geographic distribution revealed that one-fourth of them resided in City Terrace. This finding generated for the authors a number of questions: Why were some City Terrace Jewish residents willing to participate in Menorah Center activities despite the distance? In what way were City Terrace Menorah members different

¹⁰ Woodward, *op. cit.*

¹¹ *Ibid.* Other social researchers have had similar experiences in having to assist the practitioner in reformulating his problem. In this connection see Isidor Chein's "Some Aspects of Research Methodology," *The Jewish Social Service Quarterly*, XXV (June, 1949), 452-457.

¹² Genevieve W. Carter, "Research In Study Process"; paper presented at the National Conference of Social Work, 1948 (unpublished).

exist, it
be sys-
expen-
war,
that is
ach the
policy-
ation.
and how
in the
s that
archer
tions
ne his
es the
owing
tions
lasses,
omises
es be-
in this
re-
prob-
re he
at is,
ledge,
uation
r ac-
tuting
f and
ation
ne in-
olve
prac-
d the
enter.
one-
This
er of
ewish
Cen-
way
erent
similar
er in
see
hod-
XXV
study
fer-

from City Terrace Jewish residents who were not members? Did distance or some factor related to the program and/or facilities of the Center deter the latter from joining? Assuming distance to be the primary deterrent, was the number of City Terrace Jewish residents not now Menorah members sufficiently large to warrant the establishment of an extension program? If an extension were set up, would the latter enroll in it? The authors were able to raise these questions with their client and from the resultant interplay of questions and answers the terminal hypothesis emerged.¹³

Occasionally the practitioner sees his central pragmatic problem clearly and the formulation which he poses to the researcher is basically correct. And still, the researcher must invariably recast the practitioner's formulation into operational terms to render the problem empirically manageable. That is, he must anchor the problem to a number of objective, empirically ascertainable referents so that he might deal effectively with it. In his preliminary exploration of the problem the researcher consciously searches for these referents.

A detailed and an adequately constructed operational formulation will convey specifically *what* the investigation seeks to determine and *how* it is to be determined. The specific enumeration of the facts to be ascertained and of the methods to be employed permits the designing of a study plan, the costs and reliability limits of which can be reasonably estimated. In a practical setting where time and money considerations are vital and where the client wishes to know in advance what he is purchasing, this last desideratum is of prime importance.

In this connection, another element peculiar to social research merits brief mention, viz., the frequent inability to engage in a frontal attack, through the use of a projected experimental design, upon the problem and hence the need to resort to an oblique approach with a consequent reliance upon inferential conclusions. The specimens of social work research previously offered in illustration demonstrates the point.

¹³ The test of the study hypothesis ultimately led to the conclusion that what really determines membership in a community center is a see-saw between its attraction power, in the form of its program and facilities on the one hand, and on the other hand the distance or effort involved in getting there. Increase the former and you can afford to increase the latter; increase the latter and you must increase the former.

The Jewish Centers Association desired to know whether the setting up of a Menorah Center extension program in City Terrace would activate the Jewish residents not already Menorah members. Now, the ideal test to that question would be to appropriate the money for personnel and facilities, set up the program, run it for a reasonable length of time and, *ceteris paribus*, watch the results. But, because this type of experiment might show negative results, it is precisely this expensive alternative which the client wishes to avoid.¹⁴ Our colleagues in the bio-physical sciences can create at considerably less expense a laboratory set-up which is a model of the real-life situation. This the social scientist cannot always do.¹⁵ The final hypothesis agreed upon for the City Terrace study is an example of the "oblique approach" to which the social scientist must often resort.

When the hypothesis, including the approach it represents, is an indirect attack upon the central pragmatic problem, then the conclusion yielded by the test of that hypothesis is not the immediate answer to the policy-maker's problem. An extra intervening step is introduced. The conclusion for which the policy-maker is waiting must then be inferred by the researcher from the facts unearthed by the investigation.¹⁶ Thus, the results of the City Terrace interviews revealed that one of the distinguishing differences between Menorah Center members and non-members is that the former are sufficiently attracted to the program of Menorah Center to be willing to cope with the distance factor, whereas to the non-members that same program holds little attraction. These facts led the authors to raise the question with their clients as to whether they might not do better to examine the existing program of Menorah Center

¹⁴ In the particular illustration detailed above, the Jewish Centers Association might have expended a small amount of funds and set up a limited extension program in City Terrace and watched the effects. But, if the results had been negative, they might have been attributable precisely to the very limited nature of the attempt, thereby leaving the central problem still unanswered.

¹⁵ The manifold obstacles to social experiments have been elaborately treated by one of the authors in his *Experimental Sociology: A Study In Method* (King's Crown Press, 1945).

¹⁶ The type of inference referred to above is a logical one and is to be distinguished from a statistical inference wherein a conclusion is drawn about a population of events from observations of a sample.

before expending the sums required for an extension program in City Terrace. Perhaps proper changes in that program might prove in the long run equally or even more effective and certainly less expensive.¹⁷

The propositions offered by the writers as final conclusions to the client upon which the latter was to base policy were really inferences from the data unearthed by the test of the research hypothesis. This fact can occasion some misunderstanding between researcher and practitioner during the investigation. The practitioner has his eyes on the terminal conclusion and assumes that it either exists or does not exist. The researcher has his eyes on the findings from which the terminal conclusions will ultimately be inferred, knowing that not the latter but only the former exist objectively.

Before concluding this discussion on the formulation of hypotheses, another related point merits brief mention, viz., the emergence of additional hypotheses subsidiary to that which prompts the investigation. In the course of any properly executed piece of research the researcher encounters certain obstacles which impede the investigation and which must be overcome if the latter is to proceed to its successful conclusion. The attempts to solve these obstacles become points of departure for new research. In this fashion, the test of the primary hypothesis, which formed the content of the initial piece of research, generates secondary hypotheses necessitating testing. The research project herein described illustrates this.

The interview schedule employed in the City Terrace study contained a question regarding the number of times weekly and monthly that interviewees, who were Menorah Center members, frequented that center, the purpose being to gauge the degree of their participation in center activities. It was the intent of the authors to determine whether the degree of participation of Menorah Center members residing in City Terrace was (1) less than was normally expected and (2) if so, whether this could be attributed to the factor of distance. In thinking through the study design, the authors were faced with the question: What frequency of attendance by members is considered customary and "normal"

¹⁷ Several steps in that direction had been taken by the study itself which had obtained valuable information on the program preferences of City Terrace Jewish residents not now Menorah Center members and their reactions to the Menorah program.

in the Jewish center field? When the practitioners were asked the same question, they ventured various guesses, but could offer no empirically determined norms. At two other points in the study the design could have been improved if statistical norms, drawn from experience either locally or elsewhere, had been readily available.¹⁸

The point being emphasized in this section is raised à propos of a question which Merton himself poses in his memorandum. He asks: Who originally sees the research problem, the practitioner or the researcher?¹⁹ The City Terrace study illustrates that it all depends on what is the problem and at what juncture it emerges as a problem. The practitioner recognizes those problems which immediately and directly impede the exercise of his skills. As the researcher tries to unravel the practitioner's primary problem, subsidiary problems emerge. The subsidiary problems become starting points for new research, provided the researcher can convince the policy-maker that the results of such research will ultimately prove beneficial. As a rule, the practitioner is sensitive to problems that pinch the hardest and whose solution promises immediate relief. The researcher, on the other hand, is sensitive to problems whose solution assists in rounding out one's understanding of a field and yields results of ultimate applicability.

PREDICTING OUTCOME OF ADULT PROBATIONERS IN WISCONSIN

J. L. GILLIN
University of Wisconsin

Adult probation in Wisconsin was established by statute in 1901. In her adult probation law Wisconsin departed from the procedure which had grown up in the East, where adult probation originated. There the supervision of probationers was exercised through officers appointed by the courts, but with oversight of this work of the courts by a State body. Here outside of Milwaukee county, which had its own adult probation system, the legislature provided for direct handling of the probationer by the State

¹⁸ The norms alluded to above are indispensable to a field of practice and essential to its program research and planning. Programs must be geared to existing norms in that they must be responsive to statistically predominant needs and demands. Where a field of practice is well developed, sooner or later such norms are established.

¹⁹ Merton, *op. cit.*

authority which had charge of the penal and correctional institutions for adult criminals. This body was entirely separate from the courts. This procedure was natural in Wisconsin since she had centralized the control of her state penal and charitable institutions.

During the second and third decades of the present century there was a great deal of criticism of parole and probation in Wisconsin by the newspapers and by certain private associations. The parole officers while under the authority of the State Board usually were assigned to definite institutions. The probation officers likewise were under the Board, but had no connection with the parole officers.¹ The number of officers was so limited and the qualifications so meager that judges were complaining and were refusing in many cases to place men on probation because they saw such inadequate supervision given their probationers. Pre-probation investigations were impossible, since there were only two probation officers for the whole state. There was danger that the Legislature would repeal the laws relating to probation and parole.

Courts were placing their probationers under local volunteer probation officers rather than under the State Board. In 1924 a study showed that in 56 counties studied, 76 per cent of the probationers were placed under local volunteer supervision rather than under the Board as required by law. Moreover, only 5 per cent of the cases eligible for probation in the 56 counties were placed on probation, whereas in Milwaukee County, which had an adequate staff, 22.3 per cent of the adult convictions were given probation.²

Attempts to predict outcome on parole antedated similar efforts for probation. The first reports on outcome of adult offenders on probation were limited to studying the proportion of successful probationers in a given unit of government or by a type of crime for which convicted, apparently with the purpose of justifying probation to the legislators. It was characterized by the use of simple percentages and averages without any refined statistical techniques applied to the association of failure or success with

conditions in the background of the probationers. Even the Wickersham *Report on Penal Institutions, Probation and Parole* in 1931 cited no pieces of careful research on probation. The only careful piece of research on this subject available when the study of probation in Wisconsin was undertaken was that by Elio D. Monachesi on probation cases in Ramsay County, Minnesota, entitled *Prediction Factors in Probation*, The Sociological Press, Hanover, New Hampshire, 1932.

Our first studies in Wisconsin were on probation, as criticism centered on that first. After my return from leave of absence for work with the Red Cross in 1922 I began to direct studies of the probation system in Wisconsin. Five studies by graduate students under my direction and one by the National Probation Association assisted by graduate students selected by me were made about the same time.³

These were preliminary studies experimental in nature made without funds from the University and intended to provide us with an overall view of the situation in the State.

After the University made available research funds, it was possible to select and subsidize graduate students as research assistants and attack the problems of probation.

In 1935 we undertook a more careful statistical study of 2,819 cases closed by the Bureau of the Board of Control from January 1, 1933 to December 31, 1935. In this study we applied the methods found necessary in our studies in parole. This study was made under my supervision by Reuben L. Hill, then my graduate assistant. The sources of the data were, like those for the

¹ Recently those two sets of officers have been combined under a Bureau of Probation and Parole.

² Francis H. Hiller, *Probation in Wisconsin: Report of a Survey by the National Probation Association, Assisted by the American Social Hygiene Association, the University of Wisconsin and the State Board of Control*, New York, 1925, pp. 14-36.

³ These were: A. Moeck, *A Statistical Study of Adult Probation Work of Milwaukee County*, Ph.M. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1925; Elsie S. Jenison, *A Study of Probation Supervision in the State of Wisconsin*, A Seminar Paper, 1925; A. Glen Barry, *Some Financial Aspects of Probation*, A Term Paper, 1925; A. D. Vitesk and W. A. Geske, *A Study of Court Costs and Restitution in a Survey of 537 Probation Cases, 1922 to June, 1925*, A Seminar Paper, 1925; Freda Wineman, *The Juvenile Court and Probation*, 1925; Gustave H. Amerler, *The Role of the Probation Officer in the Success or Failure of Adult Probationers in Wisconsin*, M.A. Thesis, 1938; Francis H. Hiller, *Probation in Wisconsin*, Report of a Survey by the National Probation Association assisted by the American Social Hygiene Association, the State Board of Control, and the University of Wisconsin, New York, 1926; H. H. Turney-High, *Adult Probation in Wisconsin*, Ph.D. Thesis, 1928.

parolees, the records of the Bureau of Parole and Probation of the Board of Control. A unique feature of this study was a more intensive study of 56 pairs of probationers who did not differ in the factors found significantly different between successes and failures, but one of each pair was a success and the other a failure. For these a further search of the data was made to ascertain whether other factors could be found which explained their divergence in conduct while on probation. Of the 14 additional items studied in connection with these cases 5 certainly and possibly 3 more proved to be significantly different in these 56 pairs. The five were overt disharmony in the home, degree of participation in local organization, stability of employment, length of time detained in jail and whether the crime was planned or unplanned. The three additional ones which are not indubitably significant in these pairs were sex conflict and marital maladjustments, leisure time activities, and proportion of time unemployed.

For the whole sample tests were made as to the stability of the possible factors studied in the first two years compared with 1935. In this study in addition to that test for stability one was made between the entire sample stratified into rural-farm, rural-non-farm, and urban, and another between those probationers sentenced to the Reformatory and Wood's parolees from the Reformatory. One further innovation was introduced into this study. An attempt was made to ascertain whether there was intercorrelation between the factors taken into consideration.⁴

What were the results of these tests of the stability of the factors studied? By comparing the violation rates of the probationers whose cases were closed in 1933 and 1934 with those closed in 1935, Dr. Hill found that 7 of the 9 factors he had found significantly associated with success or failure on probation carried over into 1935. They were marital status, property possessed by the probationer, previous criminal record, crime for which convicted, size and type of community in which convicted, length of maximum sentence, and employment vs. unemployment at termination of probation. Age at conviction, which was rejected, was stable

between the two periods except for age-groups 25-29, and 45-49. For the whole table the probability was five per cent or less that the variations were due to chance. In the interests of conservatism it was well to count this item as unstable. The other factor which was unstable between the two periods was usual occupation, and besides it was somewhat unreliable because of its subjective nature.

When Dr. Hill divided his sample into occupational and residential strata—rural-farm, rural-nonfarm and urban-nonfarm—he found seven factors stable between the three strata. These were age at conviction, number of siblings in family, home conditions, previous criminal record, crime for which convicted, number of associates in crime, and changes of residence during probation. Those which did not differ significantly were marital status, number of dependent children, property possessed by probationer, length of maximum sentence, and number of contacts per month by probation officer. The purpose of this comparison was to indicate to the probation authorities "danger spots" in rural probation work. They do not affect the value of the significant categories which remained stable over a three year period.

When Dr. Hill compared the categories he found valid in differentiating success from failure on probation with Mr. Wood's parolees over the same period of time, 1933-34, he found that 5 of 10 factors considered differentiated between success or failure equally well when applied to probationers and parolees. These five were age at conviction, number of siblings in the family, usual occupation, previous criminal record, and length of maximum sentence. But there were five others which differed in their effect on probationers and parolees. They were home conditions, marital status, crime for which convicted, size of community at time of crime, and number of associates at time of crime. But, remember, the only one of these five categories which was stable throughout the three periods tested by Wood in his study of his parolees is previous criminal history.

This study like that of parole leads to the conclusions either that (1) the data given in the records do not reveal the real factors in conduct, or (2) that of the data in the records some factors were more important during one period of time and others at another period in affecting conduct. Probably both are true. It may be that if we had data on the more subtle factors in motivation of behavior, we might find common factors in all these cases. This can be ascertained

⁴The same statistical measures used in the other studies were employed in this one to determine the degree of difference of association of a characteristic or factor with successes and failures on probation. That is if the test of X^2 showed that the difference could have occurred by chance less than 5 times in 100 (P), then that factor did discriminate between success and failure.

only
sub
real
could
we
mon
each
Ther
each
my
priso
cated
chara
prop
what
the
f
priso
in th
ment
they
we si
which
deal

If
study
to be
to pro
consi
except
be sa
only
not a
states
the su
For V
what
provid
those

The
ground
tables
not a
result
sugges
and fu
predic

WHO
WILL

Ri
the st
this co
and se

only by careful interviews which reveal those subtle emotional factors which possibly are the real motivations. It may also be that, if we could unearth these really important factors, we should find that there are no elements common to all, but that they would fall into groups each having more homogeneous characteristics. Then probably we could predict behavior for each group. The intensive case studies made in my investigation of the backgrounds of 486 prisoners in the Wisconsin State Prison, indicated that there were differences between the characteristics of murderers, sex offenders and property offenders. But that grouping was somewhat artificial, and the study did not determine the fundamental factors which differentiate the prisoners into clear-cut classes. Until the data in the records give information on these fundamental characteristics of individuals or until they can be obtained by careful case studies, we shall not be able to set up prediction tables which give much help to the authorities who deal with parolees and probationers.

If one were to reach any conclusion from this study it would be that on the basis of the data to be found now in the records it is impossible to predict future behavior of the convict in Wisconsin, except for one or two categories, and except for a very short period of time. It should be said, however, that our findings are based only on data in the Wisconsin records, and do not apply to data found in the records of other states. It may be that the latter reveal more of the subtle factors in the behavior of prisoners. For Wisconsin we shall have to dig deeper into what motivates conduct, before we can hope to provide a prediction table for the guidance of those who grant probation.

These studies, however, have cleared the ground. They have shown that the prediction tables for probation worked out elsewhere do not apply to Wisconsin parolees. They close doors which we thought might lead to promising results, but which we now know do not. They suggest that other data will have to be supplied and further studies made before we can say that prediction cannot be made.

WHO TEACHES SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY?

WILLIAM BRUCE CAMERON, *Butler University*

PHILIP LASLEY, *Butler University*

RICHARD DEWEY, *University of Illinois*

Recent years have seen a growing interest in the study and teaching of social psychology in this country, both on the part of psychologists and sociologists. However, due to academic iso-

lation of many of those interested there is as yet incomplete agreement on the basic interpretation and content of this field. As Steuart Henderson Britt has pointed out, for sociologists it is frequently *social psychology*, whereas for psychologists it is *social psychology*.¹ A similar uncertainty exists in the minds of those who determine curricular allocations. Some universities treat the material in sociology departments, while others consider it to be psychology. Still others handle social psychology in both departments, separately or collectively.

The attempt was made to determine where social psychology is taught, by examining the catalog descriptions of courses offered, and comparing these to a model definition of social psychology. Attention was paid primarily to departments of psychology and sociology, since these are the two departments principally concerned. The small minority of courses of a sociopsychological nature which may be found in other departments was not recorded. Departments of psychology and sociology were included in the tabulation only if they offered a course in social psychology as defined in the study; thus the catalogs of many schools were examined from which the one or the other department does not appear.

The criteria on which the classification of courses was made were developed in an M.A. thesis,² based upon the available texts in the field, the theoretical comments in symposia and monographs, and correspondence with a number of recognized leading social psychologists. This is not reproduced here, but the resulting definition seems to be well in line with the views of social psychologists with whom it has been discussed. In brief, while the definitive criteria established may not completely satisfy all social psychologists, the attempt was made to develop a picture which contained all of the points on which there was something approximating consensus, and in addition to include the points which some of the social psychologists held as minority opinions, where the addition of these seemed logically defensible in relation to the general position.

The results of the original study appear in Table I while those of the recent study appear

¹ Steuart Henderson Britt, "Social Psychologists or Psychological Sociologists—Which?" *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XXXII (1937), 314 ff.

² Wm. Bruce Cameron, "What Is Social Psychology?" unpublished M.A. Thesis, Butler University, 1943.

in Table II. No elaborate statistical manipulations have been performed, since it was felt that apparent precision in results so obtained would belie the nature of the original data.³

The main observation to be made concerning these data is that social psychology, whether recognizable in the course titles or not, is taught in almost equal degree, if not kind, in psychology

ful. In view of the unavoidable looseness of the method, the authors do not consider these especially meaningful, whether they may be statistically significant or not.

However, the statistical stability of curricula is unfortunately matched in many instances by theoretical stability. Sociology-hired social psychologists and psychology-hired social psycholo-

TABLE I. DISTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY COURSES IN PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY DEPARTMENTS, 1942-1943

Department	Number of Departments	Number of Courses, Each Title		Total
		Soc. Psych.	Other	
Psychology	193	112 Mn. .6	665 Mn. 3.4	777 Mn. 4.0
Sociology	205	55 Mn. .3	444 Mn. 2.2	499 Mn. 2.4
Total	398	167 Mn. .4	1109 Mn. 2.8	1276 Mn. 3.2

TABLE II. DISTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY COURSES IN PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY DEPARTMENTS, 1949-1950

Department	Number of Departments	Number of Courses, Each Title		Total
		Soc. Psych.	Other	
Psychology	165	208 Mn. 1.3	384 Mn. 2.3	592 Mn. 3.6
Sociology	189	71 Mn. .4	424 Mn. 2.2	495 Mn. 2.6
Total	354	279 Mn. .8	808 Mn. 2.3	1087 Mn. 3.1

and sociology departments. Social psychology is coming more and more to be recognized in course titles. There have been no remarkable shifts in this distribution generally in the last seven years, unless we choose to regard the slight apparent increase in courses in sociology departments and the similarly slight apparent decrease in psychology departments as meaning-

gists still do not recognize in practice what many of them accept in theory, the necessity of joining forces in academic work and in research. Old curricular property rights are defended in some schools, and whether through physical isolation or other reasons, many of us simply do not know what is going on "over in the other department." By far the most serious consequence of this separation is the lack of communication of ideas. Both sociologists and psychologists have investigated many of the same phenomena. Both have devised theories with which to account for some of these phenomena, and in so doing both have developed concepts. But while

³The arguments against elaborate analysis of such data are concisely stated in Thomas C. McCormick, "Simple Percentage Analysis of Attitude Questionnaires," *American Journal of Sociology*, L (March 1945), 394-395.

the social psychologist trained in both fields may be able roughly to translate some of these concepts, such as the Super-ego and the Generalized Other, much valuable work is beclouded by esoteric terminology to the extent that the beginning student often flounders from one department to the other, vaguely wondering if anybody knows anything. Furthermore, from a scientific standpoint, such duplication of effort, unless it is deliberately performed as a check on previous investigation, is wasteful and useless.

A quick solution is not likely, nor is any solution inexpensive or easy, but conscientious effort by persons in the field along three lines would seem to promise greater success than has been ours in the past. These three suggestions are not original, but since they have not been

needed generally as yet, they demand repetition:

1. Social psychologists of whatever persuasion should seek to become better acquainted with the current literature in "the other field," in textbooks, monographs, and in the journals.

2. Social psychologists should become members of the professional societies in their own department and in the other department, particularly such organizations as SPSSI.

3. Interdepartmental research should be pursued whenever this is possible.

As a means to the above ends, social psychologists should attempt to apprise their faculty committees, administrative officials, and governing boards of the desirability of financial and moral assistance in developing a more unified field of study and instruction.

COMMUNICATIONS AND OPINION



COMMENT ON "SOME SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF ATOMIC POWER"

To the Editor:

In the February issue of the *Review* (pp. 43-50) Feliks Gross has pointed to the need for an analysis of the sociological consequences of the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses. At the same time, he has suggested some possible far-reaching implications for the class structure and distribution of political power in Europe. Such changes as Mr. Gross envisages may well occur, but there is no evidence to suggest that they will derive from atomic development.

Mr. Gross' argument, as I gather it, rests on the unproved assumption that nuclear energy will provide a universally cheap source of power. As such, it will lead to "... a much wider use and distribution of energy ..." in consequence of which "energy will become still cheaper and still more generally used" (p. 49). This will lead to a shorter working day, which, it is argued, will mean "... further consumption of energy and elimination of physical effort" (p. 49). Thus, the new leisure will increase the demand for intellectual workers. The ultimate possibility, in Europe at least, is that atomic development, in conjunction with such other factors as increasing mechanization and nationalistic bureaucracy, "... may create an entirely new system of class division" and "... may affect distribution of political power" (p. 49).

This is a tenuous series of derivations which is to some extent reminiscent of Darwin's long-familiar illustration of the web-of-life in which he "demonstrates" with charming wryness that an increase in old maids in a population will lead to an increase in the yield of clover. Because of space limitations, I shall confine my comments to the underlying assumption that nuclear energy in the form of power will be inexpensive and that it will therefore, by implication, have revolutionary consequences for industry and workers.

Aside from radioisotopes, which seem likely to have increasingly important applications in medical and industrial technology, the only

known peaceful application of nuclear energy is in the form of atomic power. No method is known of using such energy directly as a power source. The heat liberated in the fission process must be transformed into electricity in a nuclear station which, except for the substitution of the pile for the furnace, will not be unlike conventional steam stations in its arrangements for making use of heat. What the cost of nuclear-based power at any location will be, no one knows. There are no reactors in this country producing atomic power today though experimental piles will probably be operating in a few years. The briefest span envisaged by experts for any conceivable development of atomic power for general commercial uses is 20-25 years. Meanwhile, all estimates of atomic power costs are guesswork and should be recognized as such. (See Walter Isard and Vincent Whitney, "Atomic Power and the Location of Industry," *Harvard Business Review*, 27 (March 1950), 45-54.)

Even if it is not possible to speak of the costs of atomic power, it may be pointed out that, in spite of obvious regional variations, costs for power based on conventional sources are generally low to moderate; and that they have declined gradually over time and are likely to continue to do so in spite of the depletion of certain superior natural resources. This means that to be economically competitive, atomic power costs must fall to levels which are low indeed in view of the apparently high capital investment which will be entailed by the necessity for converting the heat produced in the reactor to mechanical energy by conventional means involving the use of turbines and generators; by the extensive additional chemical and metallurgical facilities required in connection with handling the fissionable material; by the heavy shielding and other precautions necessary to protect personnel from lethal radiation—all of which suggest to engineers that the capital cost of an atomic power plant will considerably exceed that for a comparable conventional steam station. What is more, excellent and accessible hydro sources, which produce truly cheap power, remain undeveloped in various

parts of the world because of a variety of cultural resistances. (See Isard and Whitney, "Atomic Power and Economic Development," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 5 (March 1949), 73-79.)

Even if it is presumed, solely for purposes of argument, that atomic power costs drop to zero for a given area, it does not follow that this will result in revolutionary changes in the use of machine power relative to man power and in consequent sizeable increases in leisure. I agree with Mr. Gross that declining power costs encourage the use of more power-consuming operations in the fabrication of specific products. But it must be remembered that power costs are only one of the costs of production and that even in important power-consuming industries such as the electro-process industries, a decline of a few mills per kilowatt hour in power cost will produce only minor changes in total costs. For the majority of industries such declines are not likely to be significant. However, analysis would have to be given to the whole complex of factors involved in industrial cost structure before a reasonably satisfactory estimate of the impact of a reduction in the single variable of power costs could be constructed. My own guess is that, if atomic power proves commercially practicable, it will for some time tend to serve chiefly to supplement existing power sources and to replace chiefly poorer alternative sources.

Except that I would change *may* to *must*, I concur fully with Mr. Gross when he writes that a sociological consideration of energy resources ". . . may well involve a good knowledge of technology in addition to social science since it may be hard otherwise to analyze the social consequence of technological change" (p. 43). It would appear that it is exactly a lack of such knowledge which leads Mr. Gross into the error of hypothesizing "inexpensive energies" (p. 45), and drawing elaborate conclusions based on the assumption that this hypothesis is correct. In short, the changes in the social structure of Europe which Mr. Gross foresees may occur. I only suggest that if so, it will likely be primarily because of other factors than cheap atomic power.

VINCENT H. WHITNEY

Brown University

MAX WEBER VERSUS OLIVER C. COX

To the Editor:

Permit me to correct a somewhat subtle point in Mr. Cox' depreciation of Weber's work in the

April issue of *The Sociological Review*, p. 227. Without evidence and with possibly misleading inuendo Mr. Cox attributes to Max Weber "the popular notion that 'ethnic' relations are the congealing force in the formation of caste" and that "the Jews in Western society are defined as constituting a caste." The following may suffice to indicate Weber's position:

"The attempt has been made more or less radically to simply equate caste stratification with racial differences. The oldest term for 'status' (varna) means 'color.' Tradition often distinguishes the castes by typical skin color; Brahmins, white; Kshatriyas, red; Vaishyas, yellow; Shudras, black. Anthropometric researches, especially those of Risley, have yielded typical degrees of anthropometric differences by caste. Hence correlation has been established. However, one should not assume that the caste order could be explained as a product of 'race psychology'—by mysterious tendencies inherent in the 'blood' or the 'Indian soul.' Nor can one assume that caste is the expression of antagonism of different racial types or produced by a 'racial repulsion' inherent 'in the blood' or of differential 'gifts' and fitness for the various caste occupations inherent 'in the blood.'"

"Such notions also creep into the discussion of the North American Negro problems. With reference to the alleged 'natural' antipathy of races it has been rightly pointed out that several million mixed bloods represent a sufficient dementia of this alleged 'natural' strangeness. Indian blood is at least as strange if not more so. Every Yankee, however, seeks to trace Indian blood in his pedigree, and if the chieftain's daughter Pocahontas were responsible for the existence of all those Americans who wish to stem from her, she must have had as many children as August the Strong."

Weber's term "pariah people" for Jewry "means that they were a guest people who were ritually, *formally* or *de facto* separated from their social surroundings." (Weber uses the terms "guest people," "guest tribes," "guest artisans," etc., to characterize their marginality in Robert Park's sense.)

Of course, Weber is far from considering Jewry, ancient or modern, a caste and sees "the differences between Jewish and Indian pariah tribes . . . in the following three significant circumstances.

1. Jewry was, or rather became, a pariah people in a surrounding free of castes.
2. The religious promises to which the ritual

¹ Max Weber, *The Hindu Social System*, Tr. by Hans Gerth and Don Martindale with Introduction by Don Martindale, University of Minnesota Sociology Club, Bulletin No. 1, 1950, p. 121.

segregation of Jewry was moored differed essentially from those of Indian castes. . . .

3. . . . There existed in addition (to ritual correctitude and voluntary segregation) a highly rational religious ethic of social conduct, i.e., it was free of magic and all forms of irrational quest for salvation and was inwardly worlds apart from all paths of salvation of Asiatic religions. To a large extent this ethic still lies at the foundation of contemporary Near Eastern and European ethic."²

HANS GERTH

University of Wisconsin

IN DEFENSE OF THE *ENCYCLOPÆDIA*
OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

To the Editor:

I have been disturbed with the recent rash of materials vilifying a monumental contribution to American scholarship, the *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences*.

The American Bar Association *Journal* of March 1950 carries an article by one William G. McLaren devoting one and one-third pages to hysterical outcries against what he characterizes as a "trojan horse." "Nowhere in the entire fifteen volumes do you find the views of any proponent of American capitalism, individualism, or free enterprise."

A book entitled *The Return of Adam Smith* by one George S. Montgomery, Jr., accuses the *Encyclopædia* of being "the most perfect illus-

² Max Weber on Ancient Judaism, Tr. by H. H. Gerth and Ned Polsky, *The Wisconsin Athenaean*, Literary Magazine for the University of Wisconsin, (Autumn, 1949), p. 12.

tration available of the extreme to which a determined group of collectivists are resorting to subvert and corrupt the minds of American youth."

In case the hog-wash cited above portends a kind of hysteria which may be in the process of manufacture to tar and feather scholarship in the social sciences, it would be well for us sociologists to be on the alert. A refutation has been sent to the American Bar Association *Journal* which I hope to see published. But it would be well for all of us to have the obvious facts regarding the *Encyclopædia* well in mind. Disagree as we may with one or many contributions, the integrity of the *Encyclopædia*'s auspices and intellectual efforts is above reproach. Even an examination of the *Encyclopædia*'s board of directors, editors and contributors should satisfy anyone no matter what his political outlook.

Best that we abandon our ivory towers long enough that we may at least justify our defense mechanism of burying ourselves in scholarly volumes.

ROBERT C. SORENSEN

University of Nebraska

A CORRECTION

In the article on "Cultural Contradictions and Sex Roles: A Repeat Study" by Paul Wallin, which appeared in the April issue of the *American Sociological Review*, a portion of a sentence was omitted at the bottom of page 292. The sentence should have read: "The women investigated in the latter research are almost unanimously oriented to marriage, a home and children, and unlike college women oriented to a career one would not expect them to be militantly attached to the modern role."

OFFICIAL REPORTS and PROCEEDINGS



REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON NOMINATIONS

To the President of the American Sociological Society:

As Chairman of the Committee on Nominations, I submit herewith the report of the Committee, giving the results of the election of officers of the American Sociological Society for 1951 and the President-Elect for 1952.

The official ballot for the election was prepared by the Committee on Nominations and mailed by the Executive Officer of the Society to all voting members on May 15, 1950. The nominees for the elective offices were as follows:

For President

Robert C. Angell, Samuel A. Stouffer

For President-Elect

Dorothy Swaine Thomas, Florian Znaniecki
For First Vice-President

Margaret Jarman Hagood, Richard T. LaPiere

For Second Vice-President

Kingsley Davis, Thomas C. McCormick

For Members of the Executive Committee

Leonard Broom, Raymond V. Bowers, Robert
E. L. Faris, Robin Williams

For Assistant Editors of the Review

Howard W. Beers, Clyde W. Hart, Reuben
Hill, Robert F. Winch

Of a total of 1,394 ballots mailed out, 894, or 64 per cent., were returned to the Chairman. Since 11 were ineligible because of improper identification, a total of 883 valid ballots were counted. George A. Douglas and Sanford Winston, as tellers, officiated with the Chairman of the Committee in counting the ballots. On the whole, the votes were well distributed among the nominees and in most cases results were quite close. The following persons, however, were elected by clear majorities:

President

Robert C. Angell

President-Elect

Dorothy Swaine Thomas

First Vice-President

Margaret Jarman Hagood

Second Vice-President

Kingsley Davis

Members of the Executive Committee

Robert E. L. Faris, Robin Williams

Assistant Editors of the Review

Clyde W. Hart, Reuben Hill

This year's Committee on Nominations found its task somewhat complicated by three factors: (1) This and preceding Committees have been somewhat pushed for lack of time. Appointed by the President at the annual meeting of the Society, held usually late in December, the Committee on Nominations, composed of 15 members regionally distributed, has not been able to get under way before the middle of January or later, if appointees are slow in accepting membership on the Committee. This allows not more than three months at the most for the Committee to prepare a slate. This year, with the annual meeting being held in September, and in succeeding years, through the provision of a President-Elect, the Committee on Nominations can be appointed and begin functioning earlier. (2) To bring elections in line with the recently revised by-laws which provide for a President-Elect of the Society, it was necessary for the Committee on Nominations this year not only to nominate candidates for President for 1951, but also to submit nominees for a President-Elect for 1952. Succeeding Committees will have the responsibility of nominating only candidates for President-Elect. (3) A situation likely to continue for at least several years is the number of sociologists who are out of the country on special assignments and who, therefore, are unavailable to serve the Society, if elected. As a consequence of this third complicating factor, the Committee on Nominations cast six successive ballots before arriving at a complete slate of candidates acceptable to a majority of the Committee. Forty-seven ballots carried write-in votes with no write-in candidate receiving more than three votes for a particular office.

Members of the Committee on Nominations were:

Raymond V. Bowers
 Ernest W. Burgess
 Marshall B. Clinard
 Robert E. L. Faris
 Clifford Kirkpatrick
 Harvey J. Locke
 Harry Estill Moore
 Theodore Newcomb
 Talcott Parsons
 Stuart A. Queen
 Edgar A. Schuler
 Raymond F. Sletto
 Conrad Taeuber
 Logan Wilson

Respectfully submitted,

KATHARINE JOCHER
Chairman, Committee on Nominations

REPORT OF THE REORGANIZATION COMMITTEE

In accordance with its mandate from the Society, your Reorganization Committee has the honor of presenting this report. It is the Committee's understanding that the report will be discussed by the membership and the Executive Committee at the Denver meeting. The issues requiring amendments to the Constitution will then be drawn up and circulated to the membership at least fifty days prior to a mail referendum. If this procedure is followed, the Society could begin to function under a revised Constitution early in 1951.

This report is organized around the several topics which have emerged from the Committee's activities. Beginning during the annual meetings held in New York, December 1949, the Committee constituted itself into various subcommittees which have held their own meetings preparatory to the May meeting of the full Committee.

The terms of reference

Your Committee has taken as its mandate the work of the 1949 Reorganization Committee, together with that Committee's policy of looking toward a strengthened and more active Society. It has attempted to follow the basic line established by the action of the Society at its 1949 meeting, with its approval of the grant from the Carnegie Corporation, the establishment of an executive office, and the expanded activities of the Society to date.

This indicates that the intention of the So-

cietry is to bring about a steady rise in professional standards and scientific achievement, with a concomitant increase in the number of qualified members enrolled. Thus, the Committee has viewed all of the specific proposals with respect to this twofold focus: the raising of professional standards and, at the same time, the extension of the benefits of membership in the Society to an increasing proportion of those whose interests, activities, and achievements qualify them for membership.

The structure of the Society

The following proposals affecting structure have been viewed by the Committee as bearing both on the professionalization and the democratization of the Society:

I. Government of the Society

1. The Members

- a) The ultimate governing power of the Society shall rest with the Active members, in whom the voting power is vested.
- b) This power may be exercised in two ways:
 - (1) through mail ballot to the whole Active membership
 - (2) through those Active members present at a membership meeting
- c) It is further recommended that the present provision for constitutional amendment at a business meeting be eliminated and that no amendment shall be acted upon without mail referendum. Amendments will be initiated by the Council, or any Active member of the Society may submit an amendment to the Council. But if the Council rejects the amendment it may then be initiated by a petition of at least 50 Active members, or by a two-thirds majority of the Active members present at a business meeting.
- d) The Committee further recommends that at each annual meeting there shall be at least one general meeting of the membership at which time the officers, the Council, committees, and representatives will make their annual reports, and any business of the Society will be transacted. Only Active members shall be permitted to vote in such meetings.

2. The Council

- a) Subject to the Constitution and the mandates of the membership, the formulation of policy and the general direction of the affairs of the Society shall be vested in a governing body to be known as the Council.

- b) The Council should initially consist of 29 members as follows: the six officers—president, president-elect, two vice-presidents, secretary, and editor; the three last former presidents;¹ eight special representatives from the regional societies and the rural society (such representatives to be Active members of the American Sociological Society); 12 members at large, elected by the Active members of the Society by mail ballot as at present, but four each year for three year terms. (The Council is to be regarded as the successor to the present Executive Committee, with the addition of 6 members to be elected at large by the Active membership of the Society).
- c) The definition of the powers of the Council shall be similar to those of the present Executive Committee subject to such changes as recommended in other parts of this report.
- d) The Council shall implement any actions taken by the membership at the annual meeting automatically, unless the Council believes that the majority which passed the legislation was not sufficiently representative of the Society, in which case it may hold up its implementation pending submission by mail ballot to the membership-at-large not more than four months after the original vote. This provision does not give the Council veto power over the action of the membership but serves only to insure that important legislation will have been considered by an adequate representation of the voting membership.
- e) The Council will normally meet at the time of the annual meeting.

3. The Executive Committee

- a) The Council in turn shall constitute from its ranks an Executive Committee which shall have continuing responsibility for the implementation of the policies and programs established by the Council.
- b) The Executive Committee shall consist of the president, president-elect, the retired president for the first year after his term of office, the secretary, editor, and four members at large to be elected from the Council by the Council, two elected each year for a two-year term.
- c) Whereas the Council would normally meet only at the time of the annual meeting, the Executive Committee would normally meet at the time of the annual meeting, twice a year between the annual meetings, with additional meetings

if and when necessary at the call of the president.

4. Officers of the Society

It is recommended that the officers be as at present with the following changes:

- a) Not only the editor, but also the assistant editors shall be elected by the Council and not by the membership. The assistant editors should be elected with staggered terms with the advice of the editor. There should be a specific statement of policy that both the editorship and assistant editorships are to be considered technical jobs and that the primary criteria for selection should be technical competence and, with respect to the assistant editors, an adequate distribution of specific fields of competence.
- b) Among the officers of the Society there shall be an executive officer elected by the Council to serve at the pleasure of the Council. The executive officer should be responsible to the president, subject to action by the Executive Committee in case of disagreement. The functions of the executive officer should include: the management of the Society's central office; the management of the financial affairs of the Society (subject to the provisions specified in the section on Financial Structure below), and of the business affairs of its publications; and facilitation of the general work of the Society and its committees. It is therefore recommended that the offices of treasurer and of managing editor of the *Review* be discontinued, their functions being absorbed in those of the executive officer. The executive officer shall be a non-voting member of the Executive Committee and Council, with responsibility under the president for the preparation of agenda for the meetings.¹
- c) It is recommended that the editor, assistant editors, and secretary be elected for three-year terms, subject to re-election if the Council so desires.

II. Membership Classification

The Committee believes that the present classification of members into Active, Associate, and Student categories is serving a useful purpose in encouraging professionalization and that it should therefore be maintained. It recommends that the criteria for classification of individual members be re-defined, however, as follows:

- 1. The present criteria for Active membership, as defined in the By-Laws, be so revised (without retroactive effect) as to make Ac-

tive membership contingent upon:
 —a Ph.D. or its equivalent in sociology
 —or substantial professional achievement in sociology
 —a Ph.D. or its equivalent, or substantial professional achievement, in a closely related field, provided that the applicant's interest and activities have sociological emphasis or implication.

This, it was felt, would allow flexibility in line with the current trend toward breadth of training and cross-fertilization within the social sciences as a whole.

2. The interpretation of this requirement be left flexible in the By-Laws, so as to permit a general rise in the standards of membership over time, as the standards of sociological training improve and the number of well-trained sociologists increases.

To implement this procedure, the Classification Committee should recommend criteria from time to time, based upon the current membership situation, for review by the Council. A subcommittee of the Reorganization Committee has been appointed to make more specific recommendations on implementation during the immediate future, as well as in the long run. With such revisions as implied by the above, it was felt that the present categories of Associate and Student members, within this proposed framework, were satisfactory.

III. Recognition for Distinguished Achievement

The Committee discussed at considerable length the wisdom of establishing at this time an honorific category of members, to be known as Fellows. Although it was felt that such a device might have some value in recognizing top professional achievement and in stimulating higher standards for the profession as a whole, the Committee came to the conclusion that such action would be premature. Nevertheless, it urges that the Society reconsider this matter for possible action at a future time.

Though not recommending the establishment of a category of Fellows at present, the Committee did feel that the Society should take a positive stand on the need for recognition in other ways by the Society of distinguished achievement among its members. It would like to see machinery made available for recognizing outstanding professional accomplishments. Thus, it recommends that a special committee be set up to consider and report on such questions as:

- a) Awards for especially distinguished research, publication, public service, and teaching.
- b) Recognition of particularly distinguished sociologists at the time of their retirement or death.

IV. Standing Committees

The following changes in the standing committees of the Society are recommended:

1. A Committee on Training and Professional Standards should be established. This Committee shall be an active committee in the sense that it will continuously investigate and consider the question of standards for the profession as a whole. The Committee should begin by studying current standards of professional training and research, with a view to the later development of recommended minimal standards.
2. With respect to the present *ad hoc* Committee on Relations of the Society with Sociologists in Other Countries, the Committee feels that it should be continued as an *ad hoc* committee, pending developments in the International Sociological Association. Not only should the work of the current Committee be continued, but additional functions should be undertaken. For example, through the executive office, the Committee might attempt to keep an up-to-date record of sociologists visiting this country from abroad. Information about the sociologists themselves, their availability for lectures, and their itinerary as it develops, would be helpful in assuring that such visits will be as mutually beneficial as possible both to the foreign sociologists and to American sociology in general.
3. There shall be a Standing Committee on Publications to replace the present Editorial Board and to be responsible for policy on all publications of the Society. This Committee shall consist of the president, the editor of the *Review*, the executive officer, and two other members elected by the Active membership.
4. The Budget Committee shall be continued as at present, except that the chairman shall be selected from the membership of the Executive Committee (excepting the president, the editor, and the executive officer).

V. Financial Structure

The Committee recommends that the life-membership fee should be increased to \$200 with provision for joint life memberships by a husband and wife on payment of a fee of \$230.

Formal provision should be made for a reserve fund, in part made up of present assets not immediately needed for operating purposes and in part by such annual additions as may be practicable.

The bonding of officers of the Society authorized to sign checks should be increased to at least \$10,000 from the present limit of \$5,000.

The Committee recommends that future

budgets of the Society make adequate provision for essential committee activities as needed to assure their efficient functioning.

The following practices should be observed by the Budget Committee in its periodic review of the finances of the Society for recommendation to the Executive Committee:

Quarterly financial reports should be submitted by the executive office to the Budget Committee and to the Executive Committee.

The Budget Committee should review income and expenditures to date at the end of May of each year so that necessary adjustments for the current year can be recommended in the light of experience up to that time.

The Budget Committee should receive estimates of income and expenditures for the coming year from the executive office not less than two months prior to the annual meeting.

The functions of the Society

The Committee does not believe that a specific outline of functions could or should be laid down. It feels that the Society is in a period of rapid development and that the situation should be kept open so that the Council, Executive Committee, and the executive office may take advantage of opportunities for developing functions as they arise. Your Committee, however, does propose that the following specific recommendations be implemented as quickly as the financial resources of the Society make them possible:

I. Publications

It goes without saying that the *Review* should remain the official journal of the Society, but the Committee feels that all materials not in the nature of scientific contributions might well be taken out of it. This would allow the *Review* to develop further—and emphasize its concentration on scientific papers, book reviews, and comments and discussions on scientific issues. To achieve this end the Committee recommends two additional publications:

1. A new periodical to deal with the practice of sociology as a profession, to be known by some such title as *The Professional Sociologist* or *The Sociologist* or *The Bulletin of the American Sociological Society* (referred to below as "Publication X," the official title to be chosen by vote of the membership) and that this publication be distributed to all members of the Society as one of the privileges of membership.⁸ It is recommended that an editorial committee be set up to work with the executive office on this publication and that the frequency of its issue be dic-

tated by the amount of material and the financial problems involved. The following types of items would, in the opinion of the Committee, be suitable for publication in this channel: news and notes; business proceedings; reports of committees of the Society and of related organizations; articles having to do with the teaching of sociology, the training of sociologists and other such professional concerns; the employment bulletin; reports on research in progress; routine obituaries; fellowship opportunities available at the proper season; information about graduate faculties offering curricula in sociology; and the like.

The Committee considers this recommendation highly important. This publication would provide a vehicle for which the services developed by the expansion of the work of the executive office could be made available to the membership on a basis which would not be confused with the functions of the *Review* as essentially a scientific journal. It should prove particularly important in connection with a general program of working toward the improvement of standards of training and professional competence in the field.

In this connection a word may be said about the problem of the functions of the Society with respect to research. It is recommended that the prosecution of research as such should not be considered a function of the Society. However, the Society should operate as a clearing house of information about research opportunities, research planned and in progress, and the general facilitation of research. It is suggested that the systematic collection of information on research in progress should be a function of the executive office with the advice and guidance of the Committee on Research. This office should attempt a much more systematic coverage, using various channels of information such as universities, foundations, and government agencies. Instead of publishing a single annual census of research, the Society, under the guidance of the Committee on Research, should attempt to publish in "Publication X" a systematic series of competently edited surveys of different types and fields of research. Special care should be taken not to overlook research being done by people outside the main centers.

2. It is also recommended that the Society should publish, perhaps triennially, a directory of its membership, working gradually up to a publication which would contain relatively full information about present position held, training, fields of competence, professional experience, major publications and the like. It is believed that this can be

much more useful than the old membership list.

3. In addition to "Publication X" and the directory, it is recommended that the Society consider sponsoring a series of volumes of collected reprints, each from journal articles in an important field of sociology. The scattering of important contributions in many different journals makes their availability both for the information of the profession and for teaching purposes a very difficult problem which could be met by such a series. Each volume should be edited by a committee set up for the purpose.

II. Personnel Utilization and Placement

The Society should focus substantial attention and effort on the more adequate utilization and placement of properly qualified personnel. To this end the Committee recommends the following:

1. That the executive office continue its experiments with the Employment Bulletin and that continued provision be made at the annual meetings for a placement desk with appropriate card files, interviewing accommodations and the like.
2. That more effective liaison be established with non-academic sources of employment, especially the federal government and industry. In this connection, the Committee is of the opinion that such a function, if carried out on any scale, would require both staff and funds now outside the reach of the Society. It recommends, however, that an *ad hoc* committee be established to make intensive explorations of the possibilities for the greater utilization of sociologists in the federal government. It recommends also that the Society actively promote joint effort with other societies and social science organizations along these lines.
3. That an analysis be made when time and funds are available of the various materials now on deposit in the executive office showing the occupational fields in which members of the Society are now engaged and fields of professional competence currently reported. The Committee feels that such an analysis might serve a useful purpose in advising students and in providing information for employing agencies.
4. Finally, as a long range effort, the Committee feels that investigations should be carried out to explore the various non-academic fields of endeavor in which sociological skills might

be further utilized. It is recognized that such a study would require several years, would have to be done with imagination and thoroughness, and would probably require a foundation grant. The present Committee, therefore, recommends this undertaking to the Society for further consideration.

Respectfully submitted,

Gordon Blackwell
Raymond Bowers
Maurice R. Davie
E. Franklin Frazier
Philip M. Hauser
Harvey J. Locke
Harry E. Moore
Talcott Parsons
John W. Riley, Jr.
Frederick F. Stephan
Conrad Taeuber
Carl C. Taylor
Dorothy S. Thomas
Louis Wirth
Donald R. Young
Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., Chairman

DISSENTING OPINIONS AND AMENDMENTS:

¹ Change to "one last former president"—Maurice R. Davie, Harvey J. Locke.

² "I am still not in agreement concerning the functions of the executive officer and the role of this office in relation to the officers elected from among the membership to the Society. I am also still not certain that we can continue the functions of such an office on the present basis; therefore, it seems to me that the creation of this office should not become part of our constitution or by-laws, but rather that we should provide for permissive power under which the governing body (such as the proposed council) would have the power to make necessary arrangements for the conduct of the Society's business." —Conrad Taeuber

³ "Eliminate the provision for establishing a new publication, known as *The Professional Sociologist* or 'Publication X.' It is my opinion that this publication is not needed and moreover the finances of the Society will not support the continuance of such a publication. Consequently, it should not be started. The executive office, through mimeographed material, can keep the membership informed without the establishment of a new publication." —Harvey J. Locke

NEWS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS



Anti-Defamation League. Teachers who have been working in the area of Equality of Educational Opportunity may be interested in various materials which can be used effectively in this field. The materials may be procured from the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, 212 Fifth Avenue, New York 10, New York, and can be well correlated with two publications of the National Council for the Social Studies, *America's Stake in Human Rights and Improving Human Relations Through Classroom, School, and Community Activities*.

The Committee for the Social Scientific Study of Religion has recently been formed by a group of social scientists. The purpose of the organization is to stimulate the study of religion by social scientific methods and to facilitate contacts between social scientists and religious scholars. The officers are as follows: Chairman, Walter Houston Clark, Middlebury College; Vice Chairman, Paul E. Johnson, Boston University; Secretary-Treasurer, J. Paul Williams, Mount Holyoke College. The next meeting has been scheduled for October 12 at Cambridge, Massachusetts. The membership is open to interested social scientists, and inquiries may be directed to any of the officers.

International Journal of Sexology. Announcement is made of this new quarterly which was originally published for several years prior to the war under the title of *Marriage Hygiene*. Devoted to the scientific study of sex, the Journal is published in India under the editorship of Dr. A. P. Pillay, with regional editors in many parts of the world. The American editor is Dr. Le Mon Clark, and the American editorial office is located at 400 N.W. Thirteenth Street, Oklahoma City, Okla. The subscription price is \$4 a year. On the American board for the Journal are the following members of the American Sociological Society: Kingsley Davis, Albert Ellis, Joseph K. Folsom, Reuben Hill, Maurice J. Karpf, and Herbert D. Lamson.

The Menninger Foundation. Through a financial grant from the Grant Foundation of New York, The Menninger Foundation is beginning a three-year training program in the field of marriage counseling starting in September 1950. The training program, in connection with the School of Psychiatry, will require one year of residence. Applicants must have the Ph.D. or M.D. degree and a minimum of

three years' experience in the field of counseling as background.

Two \$2,500 Grant Foundation fellowships are available to married persons interested in this opportunity. For further information write to Dr. Robert G. Foster, The Menninger Foundation, Topeka, Kansas.

Social Science Research Council. The Council's publication *Items* for June 1950 contains an article on "Financial Aid for the Individual Scholar: Preliminary Report of a Study of the Status of Self-Directed Research," by Elbridge Sibley, which should be of interest to many sociologists.

United Nations. The United Nations Library began publication in February 1950 of a monthly index to documents under the title *United Nations Documents Index; Documents and Publications of the United Nations and Special Agencies*.

The *United Nations Documents Index* is intended to list and index by subject all such documents and publications except restricted (confidential) materials and internal papers. It will be for the use of Delegations, the Secretariat, research institutions, libraries, and all others who make use of the United Nations and Specialized Agencies documents.

Each issue will contain: Introductory material concerning distribution, sales and other pertinent items; a list of documents and publications of the United Nations arranged by symbol, followed by lists for each of the Specialized Agencies; a subject index in one alphabet referring to all of these documents. The subject index will be cumulated annually.

The publication, reproduced by photo off-set with a printed cover, is 8½" x 11" in size. It is estimated that each issue will run somewhere between 75 and 100 pages.

The annual subscription to the *United Nations Documents Index* is \$7.50. Subscriptions may be placed through regular sales agents for United Nations publications, or may be sent to Sales and Circulation Section, United Nations, Lake Success, New York.

Central Pennsylvania Sociological Society. A group of teachers of sociology met at Dickinson College on March 18 at Carlisle at the call of Dr. Charles D. Kepner, chairman of the department of sociology at Dickinson, to organize the Central

Pennsylvania Sociological Society. The program was devoted to a discussion, led by Dr. Seth Russell, chairman of the department of sociology at Pennsylvania State College, of the content and functions of the introductory course. Officers for 1950 are: President, Jerry Neprash of Franklin and Marshall College, and Secretary, Robert Eshleman of Elizabethtown College. Brother Augustine of La Salle College, Dr. Seth Russell, and Dr. Kepner together with the officers constitute the executive committee.

Midwest Sociological Society held its annual meeting in Omaha, April 20-22. Featured speakers at the annual dinner were: Professor Florian Znaniecki on the subject, "Sociology after Two World Wars: European and American," and Professor George B. Vold, in the presidential address, "Criminology at the Cross-roads." Another highlight was a luncheon meeting in commemoration of the work of the late John M. Gillette, at which Professor James M. Reinhardt read a paper on the subject, "The Sociology of John M. Gillette: A Personal View." A resolution of appreciation of Dr. Gillette's work was adopted at the annual business meeting. Two very popular sectional meetings were presented by students in programs sponsored by the Department of Sociology of the University of Nebraska and the Beta of Nebraska Chapter of Alpha Kappa Delta.

Officers for the next year include the following:

President: Thomas D. Eliot, Northwestern University.

First Vice President: J. Howell Atwood, Knox College.

Second Vice President: William H. Sewell, University of Wisconsin.

Secretary-Treasurer: Herbert F. Lionberger, University of Missouri.

Editor, *Midwest Sociologist*: John H. Burma, Grinnell College.

Representative to American Sociological Society: James M. Reinhardt, University of Nebraska.

Past President: George B. Vold, University of Minnesota.

Additional members of the Executive Committee to represent the various states are: William J. Tudor, Southern Illinois University; Joseph B. Gittler, Iowa State College; Marston McCluggage, University of Kansas; Arnold M. Rose, University of Minnesota; Chester Alexander, Westminster College; John P. Johansen, University of Nebraska, College of Agriculture; J. Walter Cobb, University of North Dakota; Albert Blumenthal, University of South Dakota; William H. Sewell, University of Wisconsin.

A reorganized research committee provided for in a recent constitutional amendment includes: William H. Sewell, University of Wisconsin, chairman; Stuart A. Queen, Washington University; and Allen Bates, University of Nebraska.

Ohio Valley Sociological Society held its twelfth annual meeting on the Ohio State University campus on Friday and Saturday, April 28 and 29. More than two hundred sociologists, from colleges of Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, Kentucky, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania, were in attendance. There were Section Meetings on Social Psychology, Racial and Ethnic Groups, Culture and Personality, The Family, and Social Organization; a Round Table Discussion on the Undergraduate Curriculum Related to Preparation for the Field of Social Work; and a Symposium: How Can Wars Be Avoided? W. F. Cottrell of Miami University presided at the Annual Dinner of the Society, and H. Warren Dunham of Wayne University gave the Presidential Address: "Psychoanalysis—Ideology or Science: Some Sociological Considerations." It was voted to hold the 1951 meeting at Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.

Officers for the coming year are:

President: J. Milton Yinger, Oberlin College

Vice President: J. R. Leevy, Purdue University

Secretary-Treasurer: William Form, Michigan State College

Editor of *The Ohio Valley Sociologist*: Brewton Berry, O.S.U.

Southwestern Sociological Society. The annual meeting of the Southwestern Sociological Society was held in Houston, Texas on April 7 and 8. The program, arranged by W. L. Kolb, included the following sections: Rural Sociology, Social Disorganization, Contributions of Sociologists to Marriage and Family Life Education, Social Theory, and Social Psychology. At the closing luncheon, Dr. Ellsworth Faris spoke on "The Ivory Tower."

Officers elected for 1950-1951 are:

President: W. L. Kolb, Newcomb College, Tulane University.

Vice President: Stephen Stephan, University of Arkansas.

Secretary: Ethelyn Davis, Texas State College for Women.

Executive Committee: Wyatt Marrs, University of Oklahoma; and Dean S. Yarbrough, Prairie View A. & M. College.

Associate Editor, *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*: Walter T. Watson, Southern Methodist University.

Representative, American Sociological Society: Harry E. Moore, University of Texas.

Brooklyn College of the City of New York. Prof. Willoughby C. Waterman, for seven years chairman of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, has voluntarily relinquished the chairmanship in order to devote himself entirely to his teaching and other interests.

Prof. Alfred McClung Lee, who has been a member of the department faculty since September 1949, was unanimously elected Chairman May 1 at

its
ver-
and
col-
Vest
nace.
ogy,
lity,
ound
lum
ocial
Be
pre-
H.
the
y or
was
ver-
ge
rsity
igan
ton
nual
society
The
the
Dis-
Mar-
theory,
Dr.
Tu-
y of
lege
rsity
View
ience
odist
society:
ork.
years
An-
hair-
o his
en a
mber
t at

the triennial election by his colleagues to succeed Professor Waterman. His term begins July 1, 1950. He was Chairman of the Wayne University department from 1942 to 1947 and a research professor there in 1947-49.

Dr. Samuel Koenig has received an SSRC grant to aid him to spend a sabbatical year studying the cultural adjustments of new immigrant groups in Israel. He will leave for Israel in September. On the return trip, he will seek additional background materials in Italy, Switzerland, and France. Dr. Koenig has an article on "Cultural Marginality" in the June 1950 number of the international Yiddish journal, *Bleter far Yiddisher Dartsinug*.

Seymour Michael Miller spoke at the annual meeting of the American Labor Education Service on "Workers' Education and Union Structure."

The visiting faculty in the department of sociology and anthropology during the summer of 1950 include the following: Stanley Diamond, Columbia University; Torrey Fuller, Columbia University; Christen T. Jonassen, Ohio State University; Frank Riessman, Jr., Vassar College; Jackson Toby, Harvard University.

Feliks Gross is serving as Director, Sixth Institute of International Affairs, University of Wyoming, from July 24 to August 25, 1950.

LeRoy Bowman is project chairman of the Brooklyn College Community Experience Program in which 322 juniors participated during the spring 1950 semester. Eight other instructors from other departments aid Bowman in placing and counseling the students in supervised volunteer work for more than 75 agencies.

Dartmouth College. Dr. McQuilkin DeGrange, who has been professor of Sociology at Dartmouth since 1924, retired in June.

Duke University. Professor Donald Roy, now teaching at Roosevelt College and the University of Chicago, will join the staff in September. Professor Roy will develop courses in the field of Industrial Sociology in which he has had a rich experience.

Dr. Hornell Hart will teach courses in "Change in American Culture" and "Social Implications of the Atomic Age" at the University of Minnesota this coming summer. *Toward Consensus for World Law and Order* by Dr. Hart has been published by the Duke University Press.

Dr. Edgar T. Thompson will visit Jamaica, Puerto Rico, Barbados and Trinidad this summer in connection with current investigations in race relations.

Emory University. Thesis research in Sociology now in progress includes A Study of the Teckwood and Clark Howell Homes, Public Housing Projects (Atlanta) by David Courtney, and Predicting the Successful Probation of Juvenile Delinquents, based

on cases brought before the Fulton County juvenile court, by Robert Lawler.

Louisiana State University. Chester W. Young, assistant professor of sociology, died in January, 1950. He was an Active Member of the American Sociological Society. He had received the M.A. degree from Louisiana State University in 1940 and also from Harvard in 1948. In 1941-42 he made a study of rural life in Haiti and from 1942 to 1947 was engaged in demographic research in Caribbean countries. Since 1948 he had been teaching sociology, first at Northwestern State College, Natchitoches, Louisiana and then at Louisiana State University.

Mount Holyoke College. Margaret S. Wilson has been appointed as instructor in sociology for 1950-51. Miss Wilson received her B.A. and M.A. degrees from Cornell University and is a candidate for the Ph.D. degree at the University of Pennsylvania in 1951.

Princeton University. Dr. Gerald W. Breese has been appointed director of the Bureau of Urban Research at Princeton University. Prof. Breese will survey the possibilities of industrial development along the Delaware River south of Trenton this summer as a prelude to the program the Bureau will introduce next year. An important part of this program will involve a study of the flow of populations from home to work in industrial communities.

The Bureau has sponsored several publications, the most recent being *Highways in Our National Life*, edited by Jean Labatut and Wheaton J. Lane. The Bureau also distributes *The Urban Reference*, an annotated bibliography of current literature on the general subject of urban problems.

Saint Louis University. Dr. Alvin W. Rose, chairman of the graduate department of sociology at North Carolina College, will be visiting professor during the summer session. He will teach an undergraduate course in race relations which will be open to city officials and others interested in the problem of race relations, as well as regular students in the University.

Stanford University. Mr. Gregory Bateson, English anthropologist, offered a seminar in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology on "Communication and Cultural Transmission" during the spring quarter. Mr. Bateson is currently doing research at the Veterans' Administration Hospital, Palo Alto, and serving in a consultative capacity at the Langley Porter Psychiatric Clinic, San Francisco. During the summer quarter Professor Joseph Kappeler, of the University of Washington, will give courses in the department on social psychology and urban sociology.

Dr. Felix M. Keesing, Executive Head of the department, spent the spring quarter in the South

Pacific. He is United States Senior Commissioner on the South Pacific Commission and attended the South Pacific Conference held under the Commission's auspices at Suva, Fiji, at which delegates of island populations met with representatives of governments holding non-selfgoverning territories in the Pacific to discuss their common problems. Following the Conference Dr. Keesing went on to Noumea, New Caledonia, to attend the Fifth Session of the South Pacific Commission.

University of Illinois. Professor Florian W. Znaniecki has retired after ten years on the University faculty. He joined the faculty after war broke out in Europe. He had been in the United States as a visiting professor at Columbia University and on his return trip to Poland was caught in England as Hitler began his march. Later he returned to the United States to accept an appointment at the University of Illinois.

In honor of Prof. and Mrs. Znaniecki a dinner was given at the University Men's Club on June 2 by the Department of Sociology and Anthropology. Professor Howard Becker of the University of Wisconsin, a friend of Znaniecki for many years, was guest speaker. Professor J. W. Albig, department chairman, spoke of Dr. Znaniecki's work at the University. Robert E. Corley spoke for the students, and Professor James E. Hulett spoke as a colleague and office-sharer. Professor Robert Bierstedt served as committee chairman. For the department, Mrs. Albig presented the Znanieckis with a sterling silver set suitably engraved. Professor Znaniecki remained through the summer session, teaching graduate work. During the coming college year he will be visiting professor of sociology at Wayne University.

Author's Request

Dr. Belle Boone Beard, Professor of Sociology at Sweet Briar College, is making a sociological analysis of the Activities and Attitudes of Centenarians and would be most grateful if members of the American Sociological Society would send her names, addresses and other available data regarding men or women who are 100 years of age or older.

OBITUARY

TRIGANT BURROW, 1875-1950

Dr. Burrow, psychiatrist and exponent of phylobiology, died at his home in Greens Farms, Conn., on May 24, 1950. He was a member of the American Sociological Society as well as of numerous other professional associations. Born in Norfolk, Virginia, Dr. Burrow received an A.B. degree from Fordham University in 1895, an M.D. from the University of Virginia in 1899, and a Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins University in 1909. He also did graduate work at the Universities of Munich, Vienna, and Zurich.

Dr. Burrow was an early student of the Viennese psychoanalysts, Dr. Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung, and was one of the first to introduce psychoanalysis to the United States. He was a founder and former president of the American Psychoanalytic Association. From 1911 to 1923 his interest was devoted to practice and research in psychiatry and psychoanalysis; from 1923 to 1928, to social psychiatry and to the group method of analysis; from 1928 to his death, to research in phylopathology, or in the modifications of behavior induced through adjusting the organism's internal tensional patterns; also to instrumental recording of these physiological changes. Since 1927 he was scientific director of the Lifwynn Foundation for Laboratory Research in Analytic and Social Psychiatry. He was the author of numerous articles and of the following books: *The Social Basis of Consciousness*, 1927; *The Structure of Insanity*, 1932; *The Biology of Human Conflict*, 1937; and *The Neurosis of Man*, 1949.

Surviving are his widow, Mrs. Emily Sherwood Bryan Burrow; a daughter, Mrs. Hans Syz of Greer Farms; and three grandchildren.

(2)

BOOK REVIEWS



Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire: Volume I, West Africa; Volume II, South Africa High Commission Territories, East Africa, Mauritius and Seychelles. By R. R. KUCZYNSKI. London and New York: Oxford University Press (Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs). Vol. I (1948) xiii, 821 pp.; Vol. II (1949) x, 983 pp. \$13.00 each volume.

The British Colonial Empire is a sprawling inchoate assemblage of lands and peoples united only by the fact that under various legal authorizations and with differing governmental forms they have become dependents of Britain. No project for social or demographic research divorced from political considerations would yield this combination of areas for the world; it would be highly unlikely to do so for a continent. Ethnologically, economically, and socially the similarities and interrelationships between areas are likely to be those of contiguity, or product of historical factors, of which on the whole common allegiance to an alien power is a minor one. But demographic analysis rests on statistics, primarily on census enumerations and vital statistics registration systems, and for dependent areas these are the product of the traditions and the needs of the administering authorities. Hence statistical comparability and the correlated possibilities for regional analysis are often a function of common political allegiance rather than unity or gradations in common culture. It is this basic accentuation of the political factor in the collection of data that focuses the quantitative analysis of non-literate cultures on British, French, Belgian, Portuguese, Japanese, or other territories and thus limits the contributions that can be made to the demography or the sociology of regional or otherwise localized cultures.

Criticism of the analysis of sources, official statistics, or other data for politically delineated rather than culturally related areas is relatively simple for the American demographer whose interest in the far-away places is largely scientific, albeit increasingly intermingled with humanitarian sentiments, political goals and military orientations. For the colonial powers the

situation is somewhat different, for the analysis of existing statistics, the improvement of statistics, and the formulation of policy are the national responsibilities of a governing power for the areas over which it exercises suzerainty of one type or another. It is thus particularly interesting to note that Kuczynski's *Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire* is the final contribution of a great German expatriate to the country which became his adopted home.

Robert R. Kuczynski brought to his final and most laborious study a knowledge and a kindly wisdom based on decades of systematic research in international statistics. He studied at the universities of Freiburg, Munich, Strassburg, and Berlin. In 1900-1901 he worked with Professor Walter F. Willcox on the population and manufacturing statistics of the United States. Then he labored in Germany for almost a quarter of a century before joining the staff of the Brookings Institute. Here, from 1926 to 1932, he produced his two volumes on *The Balance of Births and Deaths* and his *Fertility and Reproduction*. In these volumes he presented the historical series of vital statistics for European countries that remain the standard citation in comparative demographic studies, and he developed Böckh's fertility tables, gave to their final products the names of gross and net reproduction rates, and with indefatigable labor presented the basic data on births by age of mother and the corresponding rates for a wide range of countries over long time periods.

In 1934 Dr. Kuczynski joined the staff of London University. Here he published *The Measurement of Population Growth* and began the series of contributions on colonial demography that included *Colonial Population* and *The Cameroons and Togoland*. In 1938, at the request of the Population Investigation Committee, he commenced a survey of the demographic statistics of the entire colonial empire as a basis for possible improvements in the censuses then scheduled for 1941. Plans for the censuses were abandoned in 1940, and in 1941 Dr. Kuczynski "retired" from academic work. But with the pressure thus removed this most

prolific of the students of comparative demography saw the opportunity to prepare a series of monographs on the colonial areas that should include demographic history and present status, that should be reference source books rather than compendia. Also in this "retirement" Dr. Kuczynski became Demographic Adviser to the Colonial Office and worked intensively for the improvement of the statistics whose inadequacies he had revealed systematically in colony after colony and decade after decade.

Dr. Kuczynski died in December of 1947, the major portion of his four volume survey of the British Colonial Empire completed. Volume I, *West Africa*, was in press. Volume II, *South Africa High Commission Territories, East Africa*, and *Mauritius and Seychelles*, was in final proof. Volume III, on America, the Atlantic, and Oceania, and Volume IV, on Europe and Asia, were approaching final draft. The proof-reading of Volume II and the completion of Volumes III and IV were undertaken by Dr. Kuczynski's daughter, Dr. Brigitta Long.

To review the massive volumes of the *Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire* in detail would require a competence possessed only by their author. Even summation or annotation of content is difficult, for conditions, peoples, and statistical resources in the colonies that comprise the Empire are so diverse as to preclude comparable presentation of the data or quantitative generalization of the status and dynamics of the population of the various areas. The most adequate statistical sources existed for some of the most minute areas, whereas there was a virtual hiatus for great areas such as East Africa. But where demographic statistics were sparse and inaccurate the literature on population trends, births, and deaths tended to be profuse. Colonial officers had to make annual reports, and tradition required that they report whether population was increasing or decreasing, the level of infant mortality, and the incidence of specific diseases. If they reported population decrease, they were likely to be queried concerning the factor or factors responsible.

All colonies had laws or regulations concerning "censuses" or counts, poll-tax estimates, and vital registration; and in most colonies figures of one type or another were published. Administrators published whatever figures were available or refused to publish them because of their gross inaccuracies. In the latter case the responsible officials noted the reasons for the

"suppression" and often added opinions as to the status and trends of the various population groups in their areas. But the opinions of the uninitiated élite concerning the intrinsic reproductive power of the native people often approach the ludicrous; and even the guesses of the sophisticated are, after all, only guesses. It is this welter of laws, regulations, official statistics and official opinions that Dr. Kuczynski assembled, reduced to logical order, and partially evaluated. His achievement is a stupendous bibliographic and descriptive document, best illustrated by noting the treatment of a specific colony. Let us consider Sierra Leone, whose 1931 "census" population was less than one hundred thousand persons. There is a twenty-page survey of the censuses, the plans for censuses and the pseudo-censuses between 1811 and 1931, including citations to legislative acts, published reports, and administrative comments. Furthermore, the types of data included are noted in detail and summary figures presented. This is followed by a one hundred page history of the early colonization, with emphasis on the vital rates of the liberated Africans. There are then separate chapters on the population of the Colony and Protectorate; the composition of the African population; the composition of the non-African population; birth and death registration; African fertility, mortality, and population growth; and non-African mortality. Ten pages are necessary to list the "sources quoted." Altogether almost three hundred pages of text and closely spaced footnotes are given to the Colony and Protectorate of Sierra Leone alone.

The general reaction of the person familiar with library research and bibliographic procedure to such massive documentation is that this pace could not be maintained throughout the whole expanse of the British Colonial Empire. Yet it has been, and the product is on the whole noteworthy both for the completeness of its coverage and the accuracy of its citations and its analysis. The reviewer could make a detailed, critical examination of only one area, the Trust Territory of Tanganyika. Here Dr. Kuczynski's discovery of and familiarity with the official publications within the field delimited was virtually complete. Moreover, he laboriously and quite systematically destroyed the credibility of the so-called counts, unmasked the estimates presumably based on poll-tax records, and demolished both reported vital statistics and the conclusions based on them. But then, having discredited the presumed high rate of natural

increase that was secured by differencing the "count" of 1921 and the "census" of 1931, he yields to the compulsion to utilize the unutilizable and thus to commit the sin which he deplores in others. He cites the estimate of an eight per cent increase between 1931 and 1944 as possible but a larger increase as highly unlikely. The reasons were that "economic conditions were on the whole less favorable than in 1925-31, medical care had been restricted considerably during the crisis, and famines or at least serious food shortages were frequent." (Vol. II, p. 399) Previously Dr. Kuczynski had stated that there was no increase between 1921-25, and that the increase between 1925-31 was probably smaller than eight per cent. In this particular case an actual count of the population was made for the first time in 1948. The census population was 7080 thousand as contrasted to an official estimate of 5650 thousand in mid-1947, 5063 thousand in the "census" of 1931, and 4124 in the "count" of 1921! This was truly an awkward instance to choose for departure from the role of destructive critic. His scientific lapses are minimal, however, as contrasted to those perpetrated by demographers less sophisticated concerning colonial statistics, by sociologists prone to utilize data as illustrative of pre-formulated theories, or by the compilers of international yearbooks.

The *Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire* is at once a source book and bibliographical tool. Sociologists working on any problem related to people in any British colony will expedite their task greatly if they first use Dr. Kuczynski's systematic analysis of sources and statistics. This is limited demography, however, defined as population size, age composition, sex ratios, ethnic composition, migration, fertility, and mortality. The social, economic, and psychological factors related to population dynamics are omitted, as are the physical facts of climate, resources, and inherent health hazards. Moreover, the literature covered is almost entirely the official output of government, whether of Royal Commissions, the Colonial Office, or the individual colonies and their administrative subdivisions. Such critical sources as the field studies of anthropologists are largely ignored, as are the tangential materials that permit assessment of the physical and cultural matrix that underlies the biological facts of human reproduction and human wastage. Even as formal demography, the *Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire* became history rather than

current inventory before it appeared from the press. This is perhaps the greatest tribute to Robert Réne Kuczynski, for the driving goal in the last years of his life was not the description and evaluation of the past but the preparation for improved censuses and vital statistics registration in Britain and throughout the British Colonial Empire. Censuses now being taken by more adequately staffed statistical offices utilizing modern procedures are themselves in no small part memorials of the man. His many decades of continuing labor ended with no nostalgia for the past but rather with a philosophical regret that he could not participate in the exciting developments in demographic research that he believed would eventuate from what he regarded as the plebian labors of his own generation.

IRENE B. TAEUBER

Princeton University

The Authoritarian Personality. By T. W. ADORNO, ELSE FRENKEL-BRUNSWIK, DANIEL J. LEVINSON, and R. NEVITT SANFORD. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950. xxiii, 990 pp. \$7.50;

Dynamics of Prejudice: A Psychological and Sociological Study of Veterans. By BRUNO BETTELHEIM and MORRIS JANOWITZ. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950. xix, 227 pp. \$3.50;

Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder. By NATHAN W. ACKERMAN and MARIE JAHODA. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950. xiv, 135 pp. \$2.50.

Here are three volumes in the thoughtful Studies in Prejudice Series, sponsored by the American Jewish Committee and edited by Max Horkheimer and Samuel Flowerman. *The Authoritarian Personality* appears to be the key volume of the series, treating the problem of prejudice in general and anti-Semitism in particular; the two others deal with specific aspects of its many ramifications. All of these studies—five books thus far have been published, and more are to follow—are the outcome of an important long term research undertaking initiated by Dr. John Slawson. These books together constitute a serious attempt at cross-fertilization and careful teamwork in the social sciences. Their guiding light is Freud, whose basic assumptions are occasionally extended and modified, but whose spiritual leadership can be noted throughout.

The major concern of all projects is the

actual and, even more, the potential fascist, the authoritarian personality of our time combatting the forces of reason, decency, and democracy. These studies of individuals and some small groups are to be followed by studies in group- and mass-psychology. Although approximately 2000 subjects have been studied, the research undertaken thus far is intensive rather than extensive.

The major hypothesis states that "the political, economic and social convictions of an individual form a broad and coherent pattern . . . [which] is an expression of deep-lying trends in his personality." To recognize the structure and organization of the authoritarian personality, the authors have devised an ingenious web of scales on which to test the real ego—and its strength—of the subject. They also have assembled an impressive array of clinical material, and a carefully analyzed T.A.T. *Dynamics of Prejudice* was based upon a so-called open-ended interview of 150 veterans; and *Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder* summarizes 40 psychoanalytic case studies. Projective techniques were employed in addition to questionnaire methods and the study of the dynamics of ideology. Hardly any method of social psychology remained unused.

Specifically the scales constructed refer to (a) the susceptibility of the interviewed person to anti-Semitism (AS-scale); (b) his ethnocentrism, based on a pervasive and rigid in-group out-group distinction involving stereotyped negative imagery and hostile attitudes regarding out-groups, stereotyped positive imagery and submissive attitudes regarding in-groups and a hierarchical authoritarian view of group interaction in which in-groups are rightly dominant, out-groups subordinate (E-scale); (c) the phenomenon of political and economic conservatism and pseudo-conservatism (PEC-scale); and (d) the attempted measurement of an individual's predisposition for fascism and anti-democratic ideologies (F-scale). All scales were pre-tested, repeatedly revised, and correlated with each other and with the findings of interviews and clinical material. They are guardedly described and evaluated, and their statistical significance not overestimated.

Of these scales, the F-scale seems especially noteworthy. It was constructed so as not to approach too closely the surface of overt prejudice; removed from the actual interest of the study group, it had to strike a proper balance between irrationality and objective truth. It had,

of course, to contribute to the structural unity and validity of a scale *per se*.

Within a necessarily brief review one cannot dwell upon all technical aspects of a major piece of research nor can one enumerate all its findings. The authors have proceeded with full awareness of all possible procedures and have enunciated with commendable clarity their hypotheses, biases, and techniques. Results thus far obtained furnish few surprises. High scoring subjects on each scale are strongly predisposed to fascism, ethnocentrically inclined and overly conservative. They are psychologically ill in the highest scoring brackets, but not maladjusted in a prejudiced society. Low scores may actually be suffering from "conscious guilt feelings" and appear less well adjusted, but they "receive more gratification of their basic needs." Somewhat unexpectedly, it seems that church membership emerges as an high-scoring factor, and church attendance ever more so. The authors warn, however, against hasty conclusions. Two complete case studies exemplify all procedures used in *The Authoritarian Personality*. Highest and lowest scorers each comprise about 10 per cent of the total, thus leaving a large middle class for therapy and re-education.

The most interesting part of *The Authoritarian Personality* for the sociologist will probably be Adorno's chapter on "Types and Syndromes." After a spirited defense of typologies in general and a warning against clear-cut dichotomies, Adorno indicates the syndromes and their contents which have emerged from the study. The most important syndrome, and the one which comes closest to an over-all picture of the high scorer he calls the authoritarian type, which "is governed by the superego and has continuously to contend with strong and highly ambivalent id tendencies. He is driven by the fear of being weak." The second most frequent type is the conventional pattern where "the superego was never firmly established and the individual is largely under the sway of its external representatives. The most obvious underlying motive is the fear of being different." Other types are self-explanatory, e.g. surface resentment, tough guy, crank, and manipulative. Complete rejection of any urge to love is the most outstanding defense of the latter.

Among the low-scoring individuals the most frequent types are the "Protesting" and the "Easy-going." The former has much in common, as one might expect, with the "Authoritarian"

high scorer, the main difference being that the further-going sublimation of the father idea . . . leads to conscientious rejection of heteronomous authority, instead of its acceptance. The decisive feature is opposition to whatever appears to be tyranny. "Easy-going" subjects sometimes come close to neurotic indecision. They do not wish to hurt anyone. Other low scoring types are: "the Genuine Liberal," "the Rigid," and "the Impulsive." This typology, even without Freudian terms and interpretation, appears fruitful and suggestive; and is probably deserving of more sociological attention and continued research.

The high correlation between psychological illness and potential political instability has been well established. It now becomes important to ask what therapies the doctors propose. Here we shall have "to be content," because the answers to our questions are neither positive nor very instructive nor specific. It is quite true that Professor Horkheimer, the study's *spiritus rector*, declares in his programmatic statement that "its (the present work's) ultimate goal is to open new avenues in a research area" and that "it seeks to develop and promote understanding of social psychological factors which have made it possible for the authoritarian man to threaten to replace the individualistic and democratic types." Furthermore, "progressive analysis will enhance the chances of a genuinely educational counterattack." Perhaps we should not ask for more than was promised to us. But Professor Horkheimer unfortunately uses the same dichotomous approach here against which his students and collaborators warn, an approach which will lead invariably to vast and gratuitous over-simplifications. Moreover, the concept of democracy should either be defined or not used at all because of its strong connotative character. We seem entitled, after such a persistent and brilliant display of research talents, to learn of some directions in which he and his team want to go.

Some indications are given *passim*. The authors of the first volume recognize that "the modification of the potentially fascist structure cannot be achieved by psychological means alone"; all authors agree that neither exhortation nor factual corrections are fruitful; and the authors of *Dynamics of Prejudice* propose actually a two-way program. They call for (a) lessening of economic insecurity through establishment of an annual adjusted wage, stabilization of employment, and extension of social se-

curity; and (b) sociological education toward love, free from competitiveness and frustrated aggression. They see, however, that this is more easily said than done. "It is always possible," said Freud, "to bind a greater number of persons in love to each other if only enough people remain for our expression of aggression." And he added wisely, "as long as virtue finds its reward not on earth, ethics will preach in vain." The authors' assertion that tolerant low-scorers reap psychological rewards on earth, and that "eros belongs mainly to democracy," sounds hopeful but not very convincing.

A therapeutic re-education of mankind—or at least the "civilized" part of it—presupposes planning of the highest order. It speaks well for the competence and modesty of these several authors that they do not suggest too many concrete steps; but there could have been some mention of planning and its possibilities for a mass-society.

The authors also have omitted an approach which would lend itself to fruitful and significant application: the arts, the individual, and society. Perhaps they have a volume on the role of the arts in preparation; if not, we believe such a research should be seriously considered. Art as an *objective criterion for diagnosis* and as a *subjective possibility of therapy* offers, we believe, an invaluable heuristic possibility for further action research. To remain in the lofty realm of pure research, waiting for others to act upon its findings, might become treason to the very ideal of social science. *Nostra res agitur.*

JOSEPH H. BUNZEL

Pittsburgh, Pa.

Public Opinion in Soviet Russia: A Study in Mass Persuasion. By ALEX INKELES. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950. xix, 379 pp. \$5.00.

The purpose of this book is to describe and analyze sociologically the apparatus created in the Soviet Union to achieve uniformity in political and related attitudes among citizens of the USSR. The content of the opinions imposed on the citizenry receives only incidental discussion; major emphasis is given to procedures. Based on a thorough study of Soviet sources, the work is a valuable contribution to the understanding of the major social force now opposing the United States.

The author begins by outlining Lenin's and Stalin's ideas on propaganda, and continues by describing the structure of the department of

propaganda and agitation from which the manipulation of public opinion emanates, as well as the system of training opinion-leaders or opinion-makers. He establishes the difference between *propaganda*, the indoctrination of a few with many ideas, and *agitation*, the presentation of one or a few ideas to the masses; and he insists on the connection between agitation and organization of the masses toward the achievement of concrete goals. He is somewhat astonished by the fact that Soviet literature on mass persuasion stresses content infinitely more than the devices used for inculcating "the one truth."

There follows a study of "mass oral agitation," a subject neglected in American sociology. In the Soviet Union this is perhaps the most important device of indoctrination. While in principle every Communist should be an agitator, only a minority is selected to perform this task, and these party agitators are supplemented by some "non-party bolsheviks." It is interesting to note that the technique of discussion circles is not utilized: if there is discussion, there may be more than "one truth," but this is incompatible with the very structure of the Soviet system. Of great interest is the study of the social role of the agitator who finds himself compressed between party directions and the aspirations of the people whom he has to address. Time and again this results in mass defections from the ranks of agitators.

The rest of the book is devoted to a detailed study of the press, the radio, and the film as means of influencing public opinion in Russia. The author is aware of the discrepancy between the constitutional proclamation of freedom of the press and the practice. In his opinion, the puzzle is solved if one realizes that it is the party which determines when one is free to exercise one's rights and when not. This "explanation" shows a lack of consideration for legal matters: exercise of a right which depends on the good will of another party is no right at all.

The peculiar form of "the freedom of the press" determines the scope and form of that which is called "self-criticism." Its social functions are these: it gives an outlet to aggression resulting from frustrations of daily life; and it reorients the ire of the people away from the government to such symbols as "the bureaucrat." The author should also have mentioned the "bourgeois" of the twenties, the "Trotskyite wrecker" of the thirties, and the "homeless cos-

mopolitan" of our day. Finally, it is a substitute for free elections.

In the study of the radio these traits are of interest: the radio audience commonly depends not on individual sets but on public exchanges, which leaves them only two choices—listening to a particular program, or not listening at all. No systematic test of individual reactions to radio programs seems ever to have been made. As to films, now only those produced in the USSR are being shown. They are not many, numbering less than one hundred a year; and among them are no more films aiming primarily at entertainment.

The book is a valuable contribution to the sociology of the means of mass communication, for knowledge of a system entirely at variance with the American one allows the student to test the wider validity of propositions derived from American experience. But it is questionable whether the book is also a contribution to the sociology of public opinion since the very existence of the latter in the USSR is subject to doubt. Public opinion is the resultant of the composition of forces corresponding to the political and related attitudes of citizens. In the Soviet Union, however, the citizens are systematically and successfully atomized; they may have deviant attitudes, but no composition of these forces can occur.

The sociological frame of reference chosen by the author is not fully adequate. The basic concept ought to have been "perfect monopoly," a counterpart to the economists' perfect competition. This study is primarily one in an ideological monopoly, a fact which is recognized on many pages but one which never receives the top position it deserves. Had it been given, the author would have seen a simple explanation of the fact that the devices of mass persuasion are not elaborated by Soviet authors; in monopoly conditions, even crude methods may suffice.

The author is correct in stating that the Soviet government proceeds both by persuasion and coercion (not studied in the book); he ought however to have added public education—another monopoly—to the number of pillars of the Soviet system. The scope of mass persuasion is not entirely covered—literature, the theater, art, and even music are additional devices of mass persuasion. Their study, however, would have required another volume.

The author's understanding of Russian texts is in general excellent, but a few slight mistakes remain. The city named after Gorki is Gorki, not

Gorkov; the city in Central Asia is Alma-Ata, not Alma-Atinsk. The Russian word *control* connotes the same concept as the French, but not the English; therefore the translation of Russian control by the same English word is misleading. The author is right when saying that the Communist-led agitation continues their pre-revolutionary practice; but he seems not to know that, in Imperial Russia, all parties of the left excelled in agitation. This is therefore nothing peculiar to Communist society.

N. S. TIMASHEFF

Fordham University

The Western World and Japan: A Study in the Interaction of European and Asiatic Cultures. By G. B. SANSOM. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950. xxvii, 504 pp. \$6.00.

This historical treatment of culture contact falls into two main parts, the first dealing with contacts between Europe and Asia as a whole up to the eighteenth century, the second with Japan and her relations with the West from 1600 to 1894. Much of the first third of the book—virtually a monograph in itself—deals with Asia and Europe as two great cultures in contact. One of the intriguing problems Sansom raises here is why Asia was so uninterested in Europe during the early period of contact whereas Europe was so eager to learn about Asia. During this period the dominant direction of cultural influences was from Asia to Europe, a trend that was not reversed until the nineteenth century.

The significant and intertwined parts played by Christianity, commerce, and exploration-for-its-own-sake are fully discussed; and due attention is given to the fact that while the Church strongly influenced European states and their overseas trading posts and factories, it had precious little *religious* influence on Asiatics. Yet missionaries, as *Europeans*, often played significant roles in contacts between their mother countries and the Asiatic nations in which they were stationed.

A sociologist might take issue with some of Sansom's sweeping generalizations about the nature of Asiatic and Western European societies—some of these resting on differences of recent origin. For example, the statement: "The typical Asiatic culture, as contrasted with the typical culture of European origin, is based upon an agrarian economy. It is of its nature a conservative culture . . ." Yet before the rise of industry in Europe the contrast between Asia

and Europe could scarcely be explained on agrarian grounds alone. The anthropologist, on the other hand, might query the statement that the growth of city-states in the Aegean Sea was due to reasons that "mostly have to do with geography and climate." Despite these professional reservations, the general treatment, not unlike that in Kroeber's *Configurations of Culture Growth*, is a valuable contribution to our understanding of the whole problem of Asiatic-Western cultural relations before the era of modern transportation and communication.

The analysis of Japan's relations with the West is thus placed within this broad historical context—but it also forms a distinct study in itself. Except for a brief section on law, most of the treatment is cultural-historical rather than sociological. One of Sansom's chief points is that the cultural evolution of Japan has been primarily determined by external contacts, that it was bound to develop as it did in Meiji times regardless of whether its presumed models were French, German, or American. Another significant finding is the wide range of individual variation of character found among the leaders of the Meiji period: the conservative but dynamic Saigo, the iconoclastic but serious-minded Fukuzawa, the "solid" governmental leaders such as Ito, and the frivolous literati. Sansom devotes considerable attention to these men and others less well-known, and to their attitudes and activities at the close of the Tokugawa period. This is one good way to lay bare some processes of culture change when dealing with a historic culture.

The analysis of Japanese contacts with the West constitutes a real contribution to the field of acculturation studies, especially as between one national state and others of contrasting cultural background. Full attention is given to the part played by Christian missions and missionaries in the effects of contacts of the West with Japan. In the first flush of enthusiasm for things Western, there was a short-lived period when some Japanese advocated national adoption of Christianity. But as cooler heads prevailed it can be seen that the chief cultural influence of the missionaries has been in secular aspects of Japanese culture such as education and public health.

With its richly documented emphasis on the persistence of cultural forms in the face of culture contact, this book should provide a valuable lesson for those occupation officials who expect to make over Japanese culture after an American model. Sansom is careful, however, to

eschew prophecy. "The processes studied . . . throw but little light on the possibility of success where cultural influence is supported by powerful political pressure and a highly organized propaganda." The real conclusion of the study "raises doubts whether any of the chief civilizations of Asia will, even if they voluntarily follow a Western economic pattern, submit to Western precept or example in political, social, or religious life." If this may be said of Japan, the most "western" of the nations of the Far East, it should apply equally to India and China.

JOHN F. EMBREE

Yale University

The English Middle Classes. By ROY LEWIS and ANGUS MAUDE. New York: A. A. Knopf, Inc., 1950. xiii, 360 pp. \$3.75.

To understand England it is necessary to understand the English class system with all its subtleties, snobberies, and irrationalities. It is a system where officers promoted from the ranks in the First World War were called "temporary gentlemen"; where public schools are eminently private; where every Englishman on the day of birth is branded on his tongue with a mark of social class; where children of the upper classes were taught an air of effortless superiority so necessary in ruling lesser breeds without the law; and where the most damning dismissal of a person was to dub him as NOCD. (Not our class dear.)

Clearly, the crisis of the middle classes in England and the increasing pressures to which they are subjected by the rising tide of socialism have impelled the authors to write this book which is partly a lament, partly an apologia. In broad historical perspective the authors survey the rise and development of the bourgeoisie, its culmination in the golden age of Victorianism and Imperialism, and its decline and atrophy under Labor and the welfare state. The decline has manifested itself in the smaller incomes of the middle classes, in the dwindling of their families, in their valiant efforts to give their children the kind of education they themselves had, and in their pathetic attempt to maintain a retinue of servants so that they may continue to live in the manner to which they are accustomed and which they assume is their due. For does not this class, as the authors point out and believe, have a monopoly of "the brains, the leaders, the wisdom and learning of the nation," and "does it not conserve and transmit the stored experiences of the whole nation in the arts of community

and statecraft"?

Not only is the middle class made synonymous with the nation as a whole but the middle class and middle classes are used interchangeably. Although the authors admit that a number of criteria such as speech, clothes, leisure, education etc., should be used in determining class affiliation, they accept as the distinguishing mark of the middle classes "money, wealth, possessions and particularly the accumulation and retention and the use of them." If this is the case, it is difficult to see how the authors place nearly 40 per cent of the population in this class. A more serious error on their part, serious from the point of view of political diagnosis and prognosis, is to lump all the segments of the middle classes together and then speak of them as almost homogeneous. Working people who have obtained what they regard as a middle class standard of living are also regarded as middle class. The upper class as distinguished from the upper middle class is also indefeasibly middle class. It is true, as the authors point out, that the upper class consists of only a few thousand families; but its role in shaping the attitudes of the middle class as a whole is undeniably important. There is no attempt to analyze and define the old and the new middle classes in terms of their different outlook, economic functions, and political roles. We are told that "the English middle classes had and have no frontiers; they were and are the recruiting ground of talent, the natural social ladder of all who have a capacity for leadership." But the actual facts on the extent of social mobility are not given nor is the relationship shown between lack of opportunity and educational achievement.

Nowhere do the authors realize that in a world whose outstanding features are invention and technology, any other way of life than the one they associate with the middle classes is possible. They are unaware that modern homes can do much to reduce the numerous "slaves" who minister to many middle class families, or that "public" schools can be really made public as they are in this country. Discussing the pusillanimity of England's middle class political leaders in the face of Hitler's and Mussolini's threats, the authors fall back for an explanation on the "spirit of the time which defeated good intentions and atrophied their power. A mischievous, disillusioned spirit full of mockery and malice and haunted by guilt and shame."

JAY RUMNEY

Rutgers University

Stat
S
L
bi
pr
Sc
Stat
the
Nati
is th
be a
teria
usef
inter
we l
come
and
prod
expo
and
curre
struct
electr
gover
illumin
sets,
factu
letter
teleph
availa
of Nu
For m
period
trends
war b
One
defend
many
ing or
show
to kee
Never
studie
as imp
sponde
—HAR
Intern
Prep
Aff
cess,
vers
Fift

BOOK NOTES

Statistical Yearbook: 1948. Prepared by the STATISTICAL OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Lake Success, N.Y.: United Nations (Columbia University Press, distributor) 1949. 482 pp. \$6.00.

Scholars will rejoice over the fact that the Statistical Office of the UN plans to continue the kind of work performed by the League of Nations in its statistical yearbook. This volume is the first of a new series which, one hopes, will be a long one. Here we have all kinds of material for the scholar—in fact, a good deal of it useful to any person likely to be concerned with international questions of general interest. Here we have statistics on population, national income, general economic activities, employment and unemployment, industrial and agricultural production, livestock population, imports and exports, balance of payments, wages and prices and the cost of living, exchange rates of foreign currencies in terms of U.S. money, building construction, merchant shipping, social security, electrical energy, civil aviation, and the yield on government bonds. Other human activities are illuminated by tables on the number of wireless sets, broadcasting stations, automobiles manufactured and licensed, international travel, letters and telegrams sent, and the number of telephones in the world. Criminal statistics are available under the cautious heading: "Indexes of Numbers of Offences Known to the Police." For most subjects statistics are provided over a period of years to enable the reader to consult trends. The economic consequences of the late war become apparent in many different ways.

One will find nothing on the armed forces and defence budgets of the nations of the world. In many tables materials on Soviet Russia are wanting or incomplete, for Russia does not wish to show her colors here any more than she likes to keep her seat in the commissions of the UN. Nevertheless this volume is basic history to the student of contemporary affairs, and it is quite as important as any volume of diplomatic correspondence or memoirs that one can think of.

—HARRY R. RUDIN

International Advisory Social Welfare Services. Prepared by the DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED NATIONS. Lake Success, N.Y.: United Nations (Columbia University Press, distributor) 1949. v, 75 pp. Fifty cents.

This monograph was prepared in and for the Secretariat's Department of Social Affairs and its Division of Social Activities at the request of the Economic and Social Council and its Social Commission. In the compilation of the report, the authors, who remain anonymous, used information derived from the practical experience not only of the United Nations but also of many other agencies and institutions.

The main objectives of this project are strictly practical. Its long-range purpose is to help Member Governments promote higher standards of living and conditions of social progress in accordance with the charter of the United Nations. The immediate goal is to provide background information to help determine the best method of serving governments by furnishing them at their request with technical assistance in the field of social welfare activities.

To the sociologist, this and the many other official papers being issued by the United Nations and its subdivisions constitute an admirable set of documents recording the genesis and early developments of a new social institution.—CHARLES G. CHAKERIAN

The Effects of Mass Media: A Report to the Director of the Public Library Inquiry. By JOSEPH T. KLAPPER, with a Foreword by PAUL F. LAZARSFELD. New York: Bureau of Applied Social Research (Columbia University), 1949. (Mimeographed, discontinuous paging) \$2.50.

This report consists of four separate memoranda, each responding to a general question posed by the Director of the Public Library Inquiry: The Impact of Mass Media upon Public Taste; The Comparative Effects of Various Mass Media; The Functions and Effects of Escapist (sic) Communication; and Mass Media and Persuasion—this last with particular reference to "important civic attitudes."

Within the limits suggested by the Director, the author has performed a valuable service. He has combed the literature, and summarized and evaluated the evidence on the points mentioned above. Further, his reservations, doubts, speculations, and suggestions are generally convincing; particularly suggestive are his comments on "active" and "verbal" sanctions and their relation to persuasion.

The major conclusion, however, is that we do not know very much about any of the real

or alleged effects of mass communication upon our beliefs and actions. The reasons for this are made clear by the author and by Lazarsfeld, who has contributed the foreword. First, the mass media are not easily comparable: their availability differs, as do their products and the degree of exposure they permit. Second, research is impeded by the omnipresent process of "self-selection": in normal communications behavior the variables are multiple and simultaneous, while in experiments the situation is often too artificial to be convincing. Finally, the effects of any given medium, or combination of media, may be so cumulative over time that their observation and measurement are impossible with present methods.

Thus more research is necessary, with improved methods and analytical tools. The need for the latter is evident when one question of the present work concerns "public taste," an extremely vague concept. Before much progress can be expected, concepts capable of being dealt with in empirical terms must be introduced.—E. H. VOLKART

The Cost and Financing of Social Security. By LEWIS MERIAM, KARL SCHLÖTTERBECK, and MILDRED MARONEY. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1950. ix, 193 pp. \$3.00.

This timely and provocative study seriously questions the financial soundness of the American social security system and the proposals of the administration for its further expansion. The authors present abundant evidence to support their central thesis that mushrooming benefit costs, expanding annually for the next fifty years, are likely to result in a burden of taxation beyond the capacity of the economy to support without a substantial increase in the price level. And it is ironical that such an increase in prices will at least impair if not destroy the real utility of the elaborate and administratively costly system.

Readers are also warned that if either the burden of taxation or the availability of social security benefits is such as to lessen individual incentives the prospects for an expanding productive system will be correspondingly impaired.

Therefore, the authors feel compelled to make a number of radical recommendations for the transformation of the present system of social security. The basic changes suggested aim to provide for all persons now in need, according to a reasonable standard based on current capacity to pay, and to finance the costs through

current taxation, trusting future generations to make comparable provisions for their dependents.—CHARLES G. CHAKERIAN

The Field of Social Work. (Revised Edition).

By ARTHUR E. FINK. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1949. xiv, 577 pp. \$3.75.

In keeping with the persistent growth of the welfare functions of governments, the revised edition of Fink's *The Field of Social Work* places greater emphasis upon the public social services and the important developments in the field of social security. At the same time, the book retains, in revised form, the excellent treatment accorded the several voluntary services and programs in the earlier edition.

An entirely new and more pertinent group of illustrative case materials replaces the one included in the original work. Unfortunately the case stories are once again appended to the end of several chapters in complete isolation from the main discussions.

In spite of this rather serious shortcoming, this second edition of Fink's work is indubitably one of the best currently available texts on the field of social work.—CHARLES G. CHAKERIAN

Blindness: Modern Approaches to the Unseen Environment. Edited by PAUL A. ZAHL. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950. xvi, 567 pp. \$7.50.

The present work was undertaken by the Committee on Sensory Devices of the National Research Council as part of its report to the Department of Medicine and Surgery of the U.S. Veterans Administration and the Surgeon-General of the Army. Containing thirty-four chapters by numerous writers, and dealing with many aspects of blindness, it helps to illuminate the great problems of those who are denied the light of day. As a rule the authors of the individual contributions are well qualified in their particular fields.

Especially informative is the description of current laboratory endeavors to provide mechanical substitutes for the sense of vision—devices over and above such things as canes, guide dogs, braille writers, and "talking books." The material on mechanical and sensory devices to aid the blind is the best available. Other interesting accounts deal with education of the blind and practical services for the adult blind within the Western nations. Problems of the psychology and personal adjustment of the

blind are not neglected. Only partially treated, however, are the industrial potentialities of the blind, a matter whose importance is secondary only to the prevention of blindness itself. Little is said as to pensions or compensation measures for loss of sight. Furthermore, prevention—really the sole "solution"—receives far less consideration than it deserves.—HARRY BEST

Community Health Organization. By IRA V. HISCOCK. New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1950. ix, 278 pp. \$2.75.

Ten years have elapsed since the publication of the third edition of *Community Health Organization*. The many far-reaching changes during that time, as well as the ever-increasing interest in community health principles and practices, have made necessary the thorough revision and amplification of this important book.

Dr. Hiscock has re-written most of the chapters and has added much new material covering not only the areas of general planning, organization, and administration but also various specialized services, such as those for venereal disease and tuberculosis control, newer health problems, material and child health programs, etc.

Health officers, public health nurses, teachers of public health, and students of social welfare and community organization in general, will find the latest edition of this standard work extremely useful and worthwhile.—CHARLES G. CHAKERIAN

Town and Country Planning. By M. P. FOGARTY. London: Hutchinson's University Library (Longmans, Green and Co., Inc., distribution) 1950. viii, 221 pp. \$1.60.

So compact and competent is this brief history of English town and country planning that, paradoxically enough, one wishes its publication had been delayed several years to permit adequate analysis of postwar planning experience. Fogarty, an economist swept by the war for a time into the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, wrote most of his pages in 1946, and was able to include no more than the merest account of the contents of the New Towns Act of 1946 and the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947. His analysis has had to be limited to the first phases of wartime planning, and to conjecture of possible difficulties thereafter.

Fogarty's chief concern is with the administrative organization of planning, and his comments

on the structure of both English planners and of the government agencies of planning are shrewd and informed. As an economist he has a short but succinct analysis of such problems as land acquisition, confiscation of increments which derive from land improvement through planning, migration of industries, social control over their location, and problems of government-private enterprise relationships. He is constantly alert to the sociological aspects of planning, however, and especially to the need for a widened democratic basis to national planning.—JOHN SIRJAMAKI

Character Assassination. By JEROME DAVIS, with an Introduction by ROBERT M. HUTCHINS. New York: Philosophical Library, 1950. 259 pp. \$3.00.

This book purports to lay bare the tendency "to smear the character of others," a tendency which the author regards as a kind of "group psychosis" afflicting America. Thus he cites numerous instances of labor-baiting, red-baiting, the smearing of Presidents, anti-Semitism, attacks on educators, government loyalty investigations, and so on. One chapter recites in detail the author's own experience in having his character assailed in a national weekly.

Professor Davis is frankly alarmed at such things, and so might we all be. In this book, however, he is content to describe charges and refutations in particular cases rather than to analyze any basic problems. For example, nowhere does he define "character assassination" with any precision. How is it to be differentiated from libel, campaign broadsides, or any other form of personal criticism? Such vagueness permits the inclusion of irrelevant data on discrimination and segregation of Negroes, and enables the analysis to consist of platitudes about freedom and justice.

The book also suffers on the score of objectivity. The author's biases are clearly evident, and he seems to assume that his readers will share them. Perhaps so, but have no business men or industrialists ever been smeared?

In an allegedly democratic society, the wide dissemination of irresponsible accusations does pose problems. These should be studied, but in a sober, penetrating fashion. There is still room for such work.—E. H. VOLKART

Management Behavior and Foreman Attitude: A Case Study. By DAVID N. ULRICH, DONALD R. BOOZ, and PAUL R. LAWRENCE. Cambridge:

Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration, 1950. vii, 56 pp. Seventy-five cents.

This monograph is another study of the problems of middle management, particularly of the foreman, which have been of increasing interest to industrial sociologists in recent years. During eight months of field work in a single plant, the authors tried to discover the effect of management behavior on the attitude and performance of foremen. They found a self-perpetuating gap in communication between top management and subordinate levels of the organization, both middle management and production workers, and concluded that a first step in bridging this gap would be for top management to see more clearly what its own part in maintaining the gap had been.

While more time was spent in field work for this than for some similar studies, the conclusions reached are somewhat meagre. The authors rely too heavily on better communications as the primary solution to difficulties in human relations. Also, the specific research methods used are not described.—RAVE HUDSON

Popol Vuh: The Sacred Book of the Ancient Quiché Maya. Translated and Edited by DELIA GOETZ and SYLVANUS G. MORLEY. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1950. xix, 267 pp. \$3.75.

The Quiché nation was the most powerful of the Maya Indians inhabiting what is now Guatemala. Although there is reason to believe that the Maya had numerous books written in hieroglyphs, few pieces of their literature survived the Spanish conquest. This, their sacred book, is the most important. During the middle of the sixteenth century a literate Quiché Indian transcribed his folk legends into Latin script in his own language. Late in the seventeenth century Father Francisco Ximénez, parish priest of Santo Tomás Chichicastenango, copied and translated the now lost manuscript. This is the first complete English translation, taken from the Spanish version of the Guatemalan diplomat, linguist, and ethnologist, Adrián Recinos. The

late Sylvanus G. Morley, author of *The Ancient Maya*, and Delia Goetz, author and translator, undertook the task of translation into English. Their work reveals the *Popol Vuh* as a folk epic, expressed in exalted language, which reflects the culture and values of the ancient Quiché Maya. Its account of their cosmogony, mythology, traditions, and history will prove intensely interesting to students of anthropology, folklore, theology, and history.—JOHN BIESANZ

Backwoods Utopias: the Sectarian and Owenite Phases of Communitarian Socialism in America: 1663-1829. By ARTHUR EUGENE BESTOR, JR. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1950. xi, 288 pp. \$3.50.

This is the first of a projected two-volume analysis of "communitarian socialism" in the United States. By this unfamiliar term Bestor means the small, voluntary, experimental communities, commonly called utopias in looser language, which were being continuously founded on American soil well into the 19th century. Deriving from radical Protestantism and for more than a century and a half intimately associated with religion, these sectarian societies had considerable acceptance in their time as a means of social reform, in contrast to such other methods as individualism, gradualism, and revolution. In communitarianism it was assumed that local cooperative groups might become the basis of the total reorganization of society, particularly adapted to the circumstances of American life, and with none of the segregation or backwardness such schemes have since come to connote. In this well-written, carefully documented, scholarly account, Bestor traces the absorbing history of these sectarian groups in the United States up to 1829, with most space devoted to Robert Owen and his New Harmony colony. A checklist of the numerous communitarian experiments and an excellent bibliographical essay are included in the appendix. The story will be carried through the Fourierist and other movements of the 1840's and 1850's in a subsequent volume.—JOHN SIRJAMAKI

[AM
tio
Un
Ra
BELO
Rat
Pub
logi
BENN
Val
(Ya
Nur
BETTE
Tree
Glen
\$4.5
BILAIN
Libr
BROW
Univ
pp. 3
BUCHI
Aid
Phys
1059
BUTLE
tion
York
459 p
CARMAL
sid's
ington
Cook,
A So
vision
(Seco
Book
DEES, J
Emerg
Arbor
pp. \$6
DUBEST
States
ton: 1
320 p
DUBEST
Official
An A
Govern
Twenty
EDWARDS
chologi
Compa
ELDRIDGE
BARD, M
MALCOL

Ancient
anslator,
English.
s a folk
hich re-
ancient
mogony,
ll prove
ology,
BIESANZ

Owenie
ism in
EUGENE
of Penn-
50.

—volume
in the
Bestor
al com-
a looser
inuously
the 19th
stantism
half inti-
sectarian
in their
contrast
gradua-
nism it
s might
circum-
e of the
es have
written,
Bestor
sectarian
9, with
and his
numer-
excellent
the ap-
ough the
1840's
—JOHN

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

(Listing of a publication below does not preclude its subsequent review)

[AMERICAN COUNCIL ON RACE RELATIONS]. *Instruction in Race Relations in American Colleges and Universities, 1950*. Chicago: American Council on Race Relations, 1950. 25 pp. Free.

BELO, JANE (Edited by MARIAN W. SMITH). *Bali: Rangda and Barong*. New York: J. J. Augustin, Publisher (Monographs of the American Ethnological Society, XVI), 1949. x, 59 pp. \$2.50.

BENNETT, WENDELL C. *The Gallinazo Group: Viru Valley, Peru*. New Haven: Yale University Press (Yale University Publications in Anthropology, Number 43), 1950. 124 pp. \$2.00.

BETTELHEIM, BRUNO. *Love Is Not Enough: The Treatment of Emotionally Disturbed Children*. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1950. ix, 386 pp. \$4.50.

BILAINKIN, GEORGE. *Tito*. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1950. 287 pp. No price indicated.

BROWN, GEORGE W. (Editor). *Canada*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950. xviii, 621 pp. \$6.50.

BUCHLER, WALTER. *Parkinson's Disease: Advice and Aid for Sufferers of Parkinson's Disease and Other Physical Disabilities*. London: Walter Buchler, 1950. 79 pp. \$1.00 (Cloth, \$2.00).

BUTLER, GEORGE D. *Playgrounds: Their Administration and Operation* (Revised Edition). New York: A. S. Barnes and Company, 1950. viii, 459 pp. \$4.00.

CARMAN, ERNEST DAY. *Soviet Imperialism: Russia's Drive Toward World Domination*. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1950. 175 pp. \$3.25.

COOK, LLOYD ALLEN and ELAINE FORSYTH COOK. *A Sociological Approach to Education: A Revision of Community Backgrounds of Education* (Second Edition). New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950. xii, 514 pp. \$4.50.

DEES, JESSE WALTER, JR. *Urban Sociology and the Emerging Atomic Megalopolis*. Two Parts. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Ann Arbor Publishers, 1950. 538 pp. \$6.00.

DUBESTER, HENRY J. (Editor). *Catalog of United States Census Publications, 1790-1945*. Washington: U. S. Department of Commerce, 1950. x, 320 pp. \$1.50.

DUBESTER, HENRY J. *Population Censuses and Other Official Demographic Statistics of British Africa: An Annotated Bibliography*. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950. v, 78 pp. Twenty cents.

EDWARDS, ALLEN L. *Experimental Design in Psychological Research*. New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1950. xiv, 446 pp. \$5.00.

ELDRIDGE, SEBA, BREWTON BERRY, HAROLD A. GIBBARD, NOEL P. GIST, CARL M. ROSENQUIST, and MALCOLM M. WILLEY. *Fundamentals of Sociology: A Situational Analysis*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1950. xvi, 720 pp. \$4.75.

ELLSON, HAL (With an Introduction by DR. FREDERIC WERTHAM). *Tomboy*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950. viii, 215 pp. \$2.75.

EVERETT, JOHN R. *Religion in Human Experience: An Introduction*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1950. xvii, 556 pp. \$3.75.

FARRIS, EDMOND J. *Human Fertility and Problems of the Male*. White Plains, New York: The Author's Press, Inc., 1950. xvi, 211 pp. No price indicated.

FILLER, LOUIS. *Crusaders for American Liberalism* (New Edition). Yellow Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press, 1950. xvi, 422 pp. \$4.00.

[FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS]. *Constitution and Rules and Regulations*. Washington: FAO (Columbia University Press, distributor), 1950. 94 pp. Twenty-five cents.

[FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS]. *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics, I. Production: 1949*. Washington: FAO (Columbia University Press, distributor), 1950. v, 313 pp. \$3.50.

[FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS]. *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics, II. Trade-Commerce: 1948*. Washington: FAO (Columbia University Press, distributor), 1949. xviii, 261 pp. \$3.50.

FORSTER, ARNOLD. *A Measure of Freedom: An Anti-Defamation League Report*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1950. 256 pp. \$2.50.

FOSTER, ROBERT GEIB. *Marriage and Family Relationships* (Revised Edition). New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950. xiv, 316 pp. \$2.75.

FRIS, HENNING (Editor). *Scandinavia: Between East and West*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press (Publication of the New School for Social Research), 1950. x, 388 pp. \$4.50.

GALLAGHER, J. ROSWELL. *You and Your Health*. Chicago: Science Research Associates, Inc., 1950. 48 pp. Sixty cents.

GEE, WILSON. *Social Science Research Methods*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1950. vii, 380 pp. \$4.00.

HAMILTON, KENNETH W. *Counseling the Handicapped in the Rehabilitation Process*. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1950. vi, 296 pp. \$3.50.

HAMRIN, SHIRLEY A. and BLANCHE B. PAULSON. *Counseling Adolescents*. Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1950. x, 380 pp. \$3.50.

HILLIARD, A. L. *The Forms of Value: The Extension of a Hedonistic Axiology*. New York: Co-

lumbia University Press, 1950. xvi, 343 pp. \$4.00.

INKELES, ALEX. *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia: A Study in Mass Persuasion*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950. xviii, 379 pp. \$5.00.

JACQUEMYNS, G. *La Société Belge Sous L'Occupation Allemande, 1940-1944: Alimentation et état de santé*. Bruxelles, Belgium: Nicholson and Watson, 1950. 538 pp. No price indicated.

JACQUEMYNS, G. *La Société Belge Sous L'Occupation Allemande, 1940-1944: Mode de vie: Comportement moral et social*. Bruxelles, Belgium: Nicholson and Watson, 1950. 502 pp. No price indicated.

JACQUEMYNS, G. *La Société Belge Sous L'Occupation Allemande, 1940-1944: Les travailleurs déportés et leur famille*. Bruxelles, Belgium: Nicholson and Watson, 1950. 143 pp. No price indicated.

JENNINGS, HELEN HALL. *Leadership and Isolation: A Study of Personality in Inter-personal Relations* (Second Edition). New York: Longmans, Green and Company, Inc., 1950. xviii, 349 pp. \$4.00.

KIMMEL, LEWIS H. *Taxes and Economic Incentives*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1950. x, 217 pp. \$2.50.

KLEIN, ERNEST L. *How to Stay Rich: The Story of Democratic American Capitalism*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Company, 1950. xxiii, 196 pp. \$2.75.

KLEIN, HENRIETTE R., HOWARD W. POTTER and RUTH B. DYK. *Anxiety in Pregnancy and Childbirth: A Psychosomatic Medicine Monograph*. New York: Paul B. Hoeber, Inc., 1950. ix, 111 pp. \$2.75.

KLINEBERG, OTTO. *Tensions Affecting International Understanding: A Survey of Research*. New York: Social Science Research Council (Social Science Research Council Bulletin 62), 1950. xi, 227 pp. \$1.75 (Cloth bound—\$2.25).

KUCZYNSKI, R. R. *Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire: Volume I. West Africa*. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1948. xiii, 821 pp. No price indicated.

LAIDLOR, HARRY W. *British Labor as Government and as Opposition*. New York: League for Industrial Democracy, 1950. 37 pp. Twenty-five cents.

LAMONT, CORLISS. *The Illusion of Immortality* (Second Edition). New York: Philosophical Library, 1950. xvii, 316 pp. \$3.05.

LANDIS, CARNEY and MARJORIE BOLLES. *Textbook of Abnormal Psychology* (Revised Edition). New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950. x, 634 pp. \$5.00.

LASKER, BRUNO (Editor). *New Forces in Asia* (The Reference Shelf, Vol. 21, No. 6). New York: H. W. Wilson Company (Published in association with The American Institute of Pacific Relations), 1950. 237 pp. \$1.75.

LOWRY, HOWARD. *The Mind's Adventure: Religion and Higher Education*. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1950. 154 pp. \$2.50.

MCCORMICK, THOMAS CARSON. *Sociology: An Introduction to the Study of Social Relations*. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1950. xii, 570 pp. \$4.50.

NEWCOMB, THEODORE M. *Social Psychology*. New York: The Dryden Press, 1950. xi, 690 pp. \$4.50.

NILIACUS, HORAPOLLO (Translated by GEORGE BOAS). *The Hieroglyphics of Horapollo*. New York: Pantheon Books, Inc. (Bollingen Series XXIII), 1950. 134 pp. \$3.50.

NORDSKOG, JOHN ERIC, EDWARD C. McDONAGH, and MELVIN J. VINCENT. *Analyzing Social Problems*. New York: The Dryden Press, 1950. xi, 818 pp. (including *Teacher's Manual*, prepared by Esther Penchel, 80 pp.) \$4.25.

O'KANE, WALTER COLLINS. *Sun in the Sky*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1950. xvii, 261 pp. \$4.00.

ORTEGA Y GASSET, JOSÉ. *The Revolt of the Masses*. New York: The New American Library (A Mentor Book), 1950. 141 pp. Thirty-five cents.

[PAN AMERICAN UNION]. *Proceedings of the Meetings of the Administrative Committee of the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences Held in Turrialba, Costa Rica, March 31-April 3, 1947*. Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1947. 117 pp. No price indicated.

PIDDINGTON, RALPH. *An Introduction to Social Anthropology: Volume I*. Edinburgh, Scotland: Oliver and Boyd, 1950. xvii, 442 pp. 25s net.

RADER, MELVIN. *Ethics and Society: An Appraisal of Social Ideals*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1950. xii, 401 pp. \$3.25.

[RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION]. *Effective Use of Social Science Research in the Federal Services*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1950. 47 pp. Fifty cents.

SANTAYANA, GEORGE. *Atoms of Thought: An Anthology of Thoughts from George Santayana*. (Selected and Edited by IRA D. CARDIFF). New York: Philosophical Library, 1950. xv, 284 pp. \$5.00.

SARGEANT, S. STANSFIELD. *Social Psychology: An Integrative Interpretation*. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1950. x, 519 pp. \$4.50.

SAUNDERSON, MONT H. *Western Land and Water Use*. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1950. xi, 217 pp. \$3.75.

SCHAER, HANS (Translated by R. F. C. HULL). *Religion and the Cure of Souls in Jung's Psychology*. New York: Pantheon Books (Bollingen Series XXI), 1950. 221 pp. \$3.50.

SPINKA, MATTHEW. *Nicolas Berdyaev: Captive of Freedom*. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1950. 220 pp. \$3.50.

STEIN, LEON. *The Racial Thinking of Richard Wagner*. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1950. xiv, 252 pp. \$4.75.

STEINCRÖHN, PETER J. *How To Stop Killing Yourself*. New York: Wilfred Funk, Inc., 1950. 272 pp. \$2.95.

Sternberger, Dolf. *The Social Sciences in Western Germany: A Postwar Survey*. Washington: Library of Congress, European Affairs Division, 1950. 63 pp. No price indicated.

STEWART, MAXWELL S. *This Land of Ours*. New York: Public Affairs Committee, Inc. (Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 162), 1950. 32 pp. Thirty cents.

[UNITED NATIONS]. *United Nations Documents Index: United Nations and Specialized Agencies Documents and Publications*. January 1950. Vol. 1, No. 1. Lake Success, N.Y.: United Nations (Columbia University Press, distributor), 1950. 83 pp. No price indicated.

[UNITED NATIONS, INTERIM CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY ARRANGEMENTS]. *Review of International Commodity Problems, 1949*. Lake Success, N.Y.: United Nations (Columbia University Press, distributor), 1950. vii, 76 pp. Sixty cents.

[UNESCO]. *Study Abroad: International Handbook: Fellowships, Scholarships, Educational Exchange: Supplement to Volume II, 1949*. Paris, United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (Columbia University Press, distributor), 1950. xii, 195 pp. Fifty cents.

[UNESCO]. *Reference Pamphlet Number 2*. Lake Success, N.Y.: United Nations (Columbia University Press, distributor), 1949. iv, 100 pp. Fifteen cents.

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS, INSTITUTE OF LATIN-AMERICAN STUDIES. *Basic Industries in Texas and Northern Mexico: Conference Sponsored by the Institute of Latin-American Studies of the University of Texas, June 9-11, 1949*. Austin: University of Texas Press (Latin-American Studies, IX), 1950. 193 pp. No price indicated.

WALKER, CHARLES R. *Steeltown: An Industrial Case History of the Conflict Between Progress and Security*. New York: Harper and Brothers (Yale Labor and Management Center Series), 1950. xv, 284 pp. \$4.50.

WELD, RALPH FOSTER. *Brooklyn Is America*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1950. 266 pp. \$3.50.

YNSFRAN, PABLO MAX (Editor). *The Epic of the Chaco: Marshal Estigarribia's Memoirs of the Chaco War, 1932-1935*. Austin: The University of Texas Press (Latin-American Studies, VIII), 1950. xiv, 221 pp. No price indicated.

"A penetrating analysis of the changing situation of the Chinese family."

—AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST

THE
Family
Revolution
 IN
Modern China

By Marion J. Levy, Jr., Assistant Professor of
 Sociology, Princeton University

"LEVY's study is an important, substantial, and necessary contribution to knowledge in three fields: anthropology, sociology, and Sinology."—*The American Journal of Sociology*. \$6.00

At all bookstores, or
 HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
 Cambridge 38, Massachusetts



For Your Fall Classes —

A REVISION OF
INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL SCIENCE
VOLUMES I & II

BY ATTEBERRY-AUBLE-HUNT-MASIKO

Intended for college survey courses introducing their students to the entire field of social science, these two volumes cover the basic facts and concepts of sociology, economics, and political science.
Volume I \$5.00 Volume II to be published in September.

CRIMINOLOGY

Revised Edition

BY DONALD TAFT

Criminology, penology, and delinquency prevention are thoroughly dealt with in this book from a multifactor approach. The new edition, fully revised and brought up to date, features a more definite cultural theory of crime. \$5.50

HUMAN SOCIETY

BY KINGSLEY DAVIS

"This is a fine piece of work—well conceived and lucidly written," says Professor Wellman J. Warner, New York University. Placing primary emphasis on basic principles, this book gets at the very root of sociological problems by teaching the student first of all how to approach and understand his material. \$4.25

Coming in the Fall —

THE "WHY" OF MAN'S EXPERIENCE

BY HADLEY CANTRIL

Sociologists will be especially interested in this new work integrating evidence from biology, cultural anthropology, and experimental, social, and clinical psychology. Stressing the complete interdependence of the individual and his social environment, the author presents, in brief, non-technical fashion, a new interpretation concerning the *why* and *how* of human experience and behavior. *Publication expected in September*

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

60 Fifth Avenue, New York 11, New York

When writing advertisers please mention the AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

VO

GO

CR

BE

JOH

MA

THE
REV
Ahna
consi
ary,
tober
right
Socio

★ Me
ciety,
are \$
tion a
\$1.00
publis
and C
\$1.00

Enter
mailin
P.L.